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BRIDGING THE BARRIERS: PUBLIC HEALTH STRATEGIES FOR
EXPANDING DRUG TREATMENT IN COMMUNITIES
Introduction
Alcoholism and drug dependence exact a tremendous cost on individuals, families, and
communities across the United States.1 As the public searches for common sense approaches to
reducing the toll, public health strategies that promote prevention and treatment are being relied upon
increasingly as a necessary tool, both separate from and in conjunction with law enforcement efforts.2
The value and indispensability of this strategy is supported by the growing body of medical and

1 The societal cost of drug abuse, alone, in 1998 was estimated at $143.4 billion. Sixty-nine percent

(69%) of the cost related to lost productivity resulting from incarceration, crime careers, drug abuse
related illness, and premature death; 22% related to criminal justice and social welfare costs; and 9%
related to health care costs for drug treatment and medical conditions related to addiction. OFFICE OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES:
1992-1998 2-9 (Sept. 2001). The societal cost of alcohol abuse in 1998 was estimated at $184.6 billion.
Seventy-two percent (72%) of the cost resulted from lost earnings; 14% related to heath care costs for
alcohol treatment or medical conditions related to abuse; and 13% related to criminal justice and other
damage costs. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, UPDATING ESTIMATES OF THE ECONOMIC
COSTS OF ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Dec. 2000).
2 Many states, including Alabama, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Washington, have implemented programs that either mandate or permit diversion of drug
offenders from prisons and jails to treatment, and others, including Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi,
North Dakota, and Wyoming, have implemented or expanded drug court programs that emphasize
treatment for alcohol and drug dependence. A. COLKER, HEALTH POLICY TRACKING SERVICE,
CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 36 AND OTHER STATE DIVERSION PROGRAMS: MOVING DRUG OFFENDERS
OUT OF PRISONS AND INTO TREATMENT 8-23 (July 1, 2003). Implementing these policies requires the
expansion of comprehensive alcohol and drug treatment services. Indeed, the implementation of
California’s Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, which permits
individuals convicted of drug possession or use crimes to be diverted to treatment, has resulted in a 42%
increase in the number of licensed or certified treatment programs since the Act’s passage. Licensed
residential programs increased by 17% and certified outpatient programs increased by 81%. Id. at 6.
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scientific data that unravels this “brain disease”3 and bolsters the principles underlying civil rights laws
that, since the mid-1970’s, have recognized alcoholism and drug dependence as disabilities.
A significant impediment to the success of a public health strategy, however, has been
community opposition to the siting of treatment programs and the official and quasi-official support of
community resistance through government zoning policies. Zoning is one of the critical links in the
effort to increase alcohol and drug treatment capacity. Without the ability to identify appropriate sites
for new services4 and quickly obtain approval for occupancy, it is impossible to increase capacity in a
timely way. Zoning standards and the “message” those standards send to a community can either
promote or prevent the establishment of treatment services.
The magnitude of the “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) problem is not easily documented, but
evidence abounds that many local governments and communities have resisted the right of alcohol and
drug treatment services to locate in communities on the same terms as other medical services.5 Even the

3 See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 18-20.
4 This assumes that specialized programs will continue to be the primary vehicle for delivering alcohol

and drug treatment services. Efforts have been made to better integrate drug treatment into primary
medical care, and that process, as discussed in Part II, will advance the acceptance of these services in
the community. The recent approval of medical office-based buprenorphine treatment for opiate
dependence is a significant step in that direction. See Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, 21 U.S.C.
§ 823(g). The National Institute on Drug Abuse has also funded research on the use of immunotherapies
for some drugs of addictions, including cocaine, PCP and methamphetamines. If ultimately approved
for use, such immunotherapies could also be administered through a medical office-based setting with
linkages to other necessary counseling and supportive services. See NEW TREATMENTS FOR ADDICTION:
BEHAVIORAL, ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS (Henrick Harwood and Tracy Myers, ed.,
2004), available at www.nap.edu.
5 JOIN TOGETHER, ENDING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL POLICY PANEL 8 (2003), at www.jointogether.org/discrimination (last

visited Feb. 16, 2004). The Institute of Medicine noted in its 1995 study of methadone maintenance
2

best know spokesperson for alcohol and drug treatment and those in recovery, former First Lady Betty
Ford, experienced unyielding community opposition when the Betty Ford Center tried to provide
housing for patients receiving treatment. Testifying before a national policy panel convened by the
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Substance Abuse to address discrimination against
individuals seeking alcohol and drug treatment, Mrs. Ford described her experience:
One of our treatment programs works with state diversion groups who refer physicians, dentists,
pharmacists, nurses, and attorneys. Often these professional programs want their clients in
treatment for 60-90 days. We leased 14 single-family homes on a single street that was blocks
away from other residential developments. The week we moved our patients into these homes,
the nearby residents began to protest. Not only did they take their protests to the city and the
press, but they also picketed in front of these homes and had their young children marching with
them. They screamed and yelled at our patients to go home. They threatened to videotape our
patients going to and from the homes and make public their tapes. We met with the residents on
several occasions and were always shouted down. Both the city and the local newspaper came to
our support but there was no change in the residents’ behavior. So, the Betty Ford Center,
maybe the best-known treatment center in the world, had to find alternate housing for our
patients. NIMBY is alive and well in 2002.6
Civil rights laws, including the Americans With Disabilities Act7 and the Fair Housing Act,8

treatment that negative public attitudes about addiction have “strongly affected the number and location
of treatment clinics. The effort to open a methadone treatment clinic often arouses intense local
opposition from the prospective neighbors, both poor and middle class. Instances abound of local
community groups barring the opening of such clinics, and forcing clinics to close or move out of
neighborhoods.” INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE TREATMENT 29
(Richard A. Rettig & Adam Yarmolinsky eds., 1995). The National League of Cities spearheaded
several efforts in the late 1990’s to eliminate protections under the Fair Housing Act for group homes
that provide treatment and housing to individuals in recovery from alcohol and drug dependence. See
infra n. 9.
6 Testimony of Betty Ford, quoted in JOIN TOGETHER, ENDING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH
ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROBLEMS, supra n. 5, at 8.
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.
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protect individuals with disabilities – including those with histories of alcoholism and drug addiction -from discrimination in zoning and, thus, prohibit public entities from barring treatment programs and
group homes for individuals in recovery on the basis of their disability. These laws are valuable tools to
challenge discriminatory bars to siting and to establish the right to locate like other medical services. At
the same time, the existence and enforcement of civil rights protections has not necessarily changed the
negative attitudes, stigma and stereotypes that underlie resistance to the siting of alcohol and drug
treatment programs.9 Those attitudes have often resulted in the erection of zoning barriers that service

8 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq. The Fair Housing Amendments Act extended non-discrimination protections

to individuals with disabilities and has been interpreted to encompass zoning practices. A number of
cases that have shaped the FHAA’s zoning parameters have been brought on behalf of individuals in
recovery from alcohol and drug problems. Indeed, the only FHAA case to reach the Supreme Court,
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc, 514 U.S. 725 (1995), involved a group home for persons in
recovery from alcohol and drug dependence. See infra Part III.
9 Less than ten years after the enactment of the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), the National
League of Cities mounted a legislative effort to strip protections for individuals with disabilities. The
initial bill, the Fair Housing Reform and Freedom of Speech Act of 1997 (H.R. 589), sought to gain a
foothold by focusing on the most unpopular groups: “convicted felons, sex offenders, and recovering
drug addicts.” Individuals with alcohol and drug dependence were, in fact, the only population among
the targeted groups that is protected under the FHAA. The bill would have permitted localities to enact
zoning laws that restrict the maximum number of unrelated occupants in a group home for persons in
recovery and the proximity of such homes to one another. H.B. 589 did not get beyond the Committee
phase, but the following year, the National League of Cities backed a more expansive bill – the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1998 (H.R. 3206) – that would have, among other things, permitted local
jurisdictions to restrict the number of unrelated individuals who could reside in a group recovery home
in residential neighborhoods, impose dispersal requirements for residential treatment services for
persons with any disability, and impose restrictions on residential services for persons with disabilities
who had a felony conviction record. Well organized opposition by civil rights groups prevented the
passage of the legislation.
New Jersey Congressman Robert E. Andrews has also sought on several occasions to amend a
provision of the Public Health Services Act that creates a fund to establish group recovery homes to give
local jurisdictions control over the siting of homes that are established with that fund. The Substance
Abuse Group Homes Amendments of 2003 (H.R. 2159) would have required officials to notify those
residing, attending school or operating a businesses within a ten-mile radius of a proposed group home
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providers doggedly defeat only to find others erected in their place. This process deters providers from
establishing new programs or forces them to walk away from such efforts when faced with animus
against clients and the prospect of a lengthy legal battle just to open their doors.10
This author was involved in one attempt to overcome these official and quasi-official practices
through the use of a litigation-based strategy based on the Americans with Disabilities Act. The story of
that litigation in Baltimore County, Maryland and its aftermath provides important evidence that a more
complex strategy is called for. This article will explore what can be done to address discriminatory
barriers to siting alcohol and drug treatment services and, at the same time, build a base of support for
these life-saving services. Part I provides a brief overview of the etiology of alcohol and drug
dependence and the efficacy and availability of treatment services. Part II identifies how our national
policies regarding “drug control” and the delivery of alcoholism and drug dependence treatment have
contributed to the NIMBY response. Part III identifies the legal standards under the ADA and FHA that
protect individuals with alcohol and drug dependence and the programs that serve them from being
excluded from or segregated in communities on the basis of disability. Part IV describes how local
governments establish policies and practices that facilitate the exclusion of alcohol and drug treatment

and provide an opportunity to consult about the proposal and impose conditions on the group home’s
operation.
10 Individuals in need of treatment services are not the only losers when this happens. All parties – the

community, program provider and proposed clients -- suffer the cost of these siting conflicts. As Dear
has observed, “community fabric can be irreparably damaged by the anger, frustration and divisiveness
engendered by a proposed facility siting; service operators can be financially weakened by prolonged
legal battles and other forms of local opposition; and potential clients can be temporarily or permanently
denied access to much needed care and assistance.” MICHAEL DEAR ET AL., CAMPAIGN FOR NEW
COMMUNITY, HIERARCHIES OF ACCEPTANCE 1 (Resource Document Series 1996).
5

services from their communities and the community sentiment around such practices by examining the
zoning practices of two jurisdictions in Maryland – Baltimore County and Baltimore City – which are
emblematic of exclusionary practices around the country. Part IV concludes with an analysis of the
legality of the Baltimore City zoning scheme under the ADA and FHA. Part V captures the perspective
of Baltimore residents and city officials regarding the establishment and operation of community-based
treatment services in an effort to understand community concerns. Part VI applies a theoretical
framework to evaluate whether a litigation-based strategy will effectively address the exclusion of
treatment services, based on these two case studies, and then identifies the comprehensive strategies that
must be implemented to promote greater acceptance of treatment services and ensure availability in
communities where people reside.
The existence of clear statutory rights does not necessarily ensure that fair zoning standards or
treatment services will be established. Court-ordered remedies on behalf of an unpopular and poorly
organized group of individuals fall short of what is needed to address community needs and political
concerns. Thus, the strategies to expand access to alcohol and drug treatment must be as comprehensive
and complex as the disease itself 11 and recognize the uniquely political nature of drug dependence.12
Just as this disease involves biological and behavioral components that are influenced by one’s
environment, effective siting solutions must address the behavior of all parties involved in the zoning

11 Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is A Brain Disease, 17 ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 75, 75-77

(Spring 2001).
rd

12 DAVID MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL 294 (3 ed. 1999).

(“American concern with narcotics is more than a medical or legal problem – it is in the fullest sense a
political problem.”)
6

process – government officials, the treatment providers and communities – and change the legal, social
and political environment in which providers operate. Thus, traditional legal strategies that rely on
litigation to enforce civil rights statutes may be useful to articulate the existence of rights, compensate
for damages incurred by programs that have been shut out of a community or to nudge political leaders,
who want political cover, into negotiation about fair standards. But experience also teaches that
litigation, even when successful, may not be the most effective means to ensure the delivery of
desperately needed services. Multi-dimensional, collaborative approaches that harness for political
purposes the public sentiment favoring treatment, give communities a voice in what is needed to serve
residents, educate the public about addiction and the efficacy and value of treatment, provide incentives
to establish non-discriminatory zoning standards, and integrate alcohol and drug treatment into
mainstream medical care are necessary to create meaningful progress.

I.

Alcohol and Drug Dependence: The Public Health Perspective
A. The Disease and the Treatment
Alcohol and drug dependence affects an estimated 22 million Americans aged 12 years or older

(9.4% of the total population).13 Of this population, 14.9 million are dependent on alcohol; 3.9 million
are dependent on illicit drugs; and 3.2 million are dependent on both alcohol and illicit drugs. Of the 7.1

13 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 27 (2003), available at http://www.DrugAbuseStatistics.SAMHSA.gov.

(hereinafter NSDUH). The NSDUH, an annual survey conducted by the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, reports data on both drug and alcohol use by individuals over the age of
twelve as well as drug and alcohol dependence and abuse among the same population. A designation of
dependence or abuse is based on criteria specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 4th edition (DSM-IV). The above data reflects those classified with either dependence or
abuse. Id.
7

million who are dependent on illicit drugs, more than half -- 4.3 million Americans – are dependent on
marijuana, 1.5 million are dependent on cocaine, and 1.5 are dependent on non-medical use of pain
relievers.14 The rate of alcohol and drug dependence varies substantially among racial/ethnic groups,
but is essentially the same among African-Americans and whites.15
Drug dependence has been termed the “American Disease,”16 but debate still exists over whether
alcohol and drug dependence is a “disease” or a failure of will or strength of character. Twenty years of
scientific research, however, has convinced the majority of the biomedical community – if not the public
generally17 – that addiction is a brain disease: a condition caused by persistent changes in brain structure
and function. Scientific evidence suggests that long-lasting brain changes are responsible for the
distortions of cognitive and emotional functioning that characterize persons with addiction, including the
defining feature of addiction – the compulsion to use drugs even in the face of adverse medical, social,
employment, education and family consequences.18

14 Id. at 27. The figures do not add up to 7.1 million because some are dependent on more than one

drug.
15 The rate of alcohol and drug dependence among blacks is 9.5% and 9.3% among whites. The rate is

highest among American Indians/Alaska Natives (14.1%) and followed by persons reporting to be two
or more races (13%). The rate among Hispanics is 10.4% and 4.2% among Asians. NSDUH at 27.
16 David Musto coined this term in his seminal work on the history of drug abuse and narcotics control
in America, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra n. 12. The title comes
from a 1919 interview with the New York City Health Commissioner who called drug abuse
“emphatically an American disease.” Id. at viii.
17 In 1995, the Institute of Medicine observed that “the debate over the extent to which addiction is a

disease or a moral failure remains unsettled in the public mind.” FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE
TREATMENT, supra n. 5, at 29.
18 Leshner, supra n. 11. For a summary of the opposing viewpoint, see S. Satel, Is Drug Addiction a
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Like other illnesses, including other brain diseases, the development of and treatment for addiction
depends on biology, behavior and social context. While addiction may be distinguishable from other
brain diseases insofar as it begins with a clearly voluntary behavior – the initial decision to use drugs –
voluntary behavior patterns are involved in the etiology and progression of many other illnesses. The
onset of hypertension, arteriosclerosis and other cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and some forms of
cancer is heavily influenced by an individual’s diet, exercise, smoking and other behaviors. Moreover,
the susceptibility to becoming addicted is influenced by environmental and biological, particularly
genetic, factors. At the point at which an individual loses control over the initial voluntary behavior and
drug use becomes compulsive, the behavior is, for many, uncontrollable and requires treatment.19
Research has also demonstrated that, like other illnesses with environmental and biological components,
alcohol and drug dependence are best understood and treated as a chronic recurring illness, rather than a
curable, acute condition. Many individuals experience relapse, and repeated treatments become
necessary to increase the intervals between and diminish the severity of relapses until abstinence is
achieved.20
Alcohol and drug treatment consists of a range of approaches to treat addiction, including behavioral
therapy (such as counseling, cognitive therapy or psychotherapy); medications (methadone, naltrexone,

Brain Disease, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN (David Musto ed., 2002).
19 Thus, just as persons with schizophrenia cannot control their hallucinations and delusions,

Parkinson’s patients cannot control their trembling and clinically depressed patients cannot control their
moods without treatment, persons with addictions require treatment to control their compulsive use of
drugs. Few can simply stop their behavior on their own. Leshner, supra n 11.
20 Id. at 76.
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buprenorphine, antibuse) or a combination of both; case management; and, as needed, referral to other
medical, psychological, and social services. The best treatment programs, according to the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), provide a combination of therapies and other services to meet the
needs of the individual patient, which take into consideration issues such as age, race, culture, sexual
orientation, gender, pregnancy, family structure, housing and employment, as well as physical and
sexual abuse. Although scarce funds often limit the availability of ancillary services, a comprehensive
treatment program includes provision of or linkages to the following components: child care services,
vocational services, mental health services, medical services, educational services, AIDS/HIV services,
legal services, financial services, housing/transportation services, and family services.21 Treatment is
provided in an out-patient, residential or in-patient hospital setting.22 The same principles apply to
treatment for alcoholism.

21 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT: A RESEARCH

BASED GUIDE 13-14 (1999).
22 The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) tracks the types of
facilities that offer alcohol and drug treatment services and the services offered. The 2002 National
Survey of Substance Abuse Treatment Services (N-SSATS), the most current source of data on alcohol
and drug treatment facilities, found that 13,720 facilities offered treatment and served approximately 1.1
million patients on March 29, 2002. The overwhelming majority, 74%, offer outpatient treatment; 26%
offer residential rehabilitation; 7% offer inpatient detoxification; and 7% offer methadone treatment.
Treatment services vary but over 75% reported offering assessments, individual therapy, group therapy,
discharge planning, family counseling and aftercare counseling. Medical services were less frequently
provided, with approximately 25% offering testing for hepatitis and sexually transmitted diseases, 37%
and 33% offering screening for tuberculosis and HIV, respectively, and 19% offering pharmacotherapy
and prescription medications. NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (NSSATS): 2002 DATA ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT FACILITIES (2003), available at
http://www.DrugAbuseStatistics.samhsa.gov (hereafter N-SSATS).
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B.

Treatment Efficacy

Treatment has proven to be an effective and cost-effective response to alcohol and drug dependence;
more cost effective than any other intervention designed to stem the use of illicit drugs.23 Treatment
reduces drug use by 40% to 60%, saving lives and money.24 Studies have demonstrated that every $1
invested in addiction treatment programs yields a return of between $4 and $7 in reduced drug-related
crime, criminal justice costs and theft alone.25 Savings are boosted further if health care costs are

23 RAND analysts found that the United States could reduce cocaine consumption by 1% by investing
$34 million in treatment but would have to invest considerably more to achieve that same outcome
through domestic drug law enforcement ($246 million), interdiction ($366 million), or source country
controls ($738 million). P. RYDELL & S. EVERINGHAM, RAND CORPORATION, CONTROLLING COCAINE:
SUPPLY VERSUS DEMAND PROGRAMS xiii (1994). A second study estimated that spending $1 million to
expand mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenders would reduce national cocaine consumption
by 13 kilograms, while using that same money to expand drug treatment to heavy users would reduce
cocaine consumption by more than 100 kilograms. J.P. CAULKINS, RAND CORPORATION, MANDATORY
MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS’ MONEY? (1997).
Researchers have also observed that increasingly tough law enforcement during the period 1981 to 1995
did not result in raising the price of drugs or decreasing availability. ROBERT MACCOUN & PETER
REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, & PLACES 30-32 (2001).
24 PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT, supra n. 21, at 15-16.
25 Research has consistently demonstrated that treatment significantly reduces criminal activity during
and after treatment, regardless of the treatment modality. A 1995 report by the Institute of Medicine,
which summarized the results of over 300 published reports regarding methadone treatment, concluded
that patients in methadone maintenance treatment significantly reduced their level of illicit drug use and
criminal activity. One study concluded that crime rates declined from a pretreatment level of 237 crime
days per year per 100 addicted persons to 69 crime days per year per 100 patients during the first four
months of treatment; a reduction of over 70% from pretreatment levels. The number of crime days
declined further for individuals who remained in treatment more than one year and was reduced to
approximately 12 crime days per year per 100 patients after three years in treatment. THE FEDERAL
REGULATION OF METHADONE TREATMENT, supra n. 5, at 21-25.
The National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study (hereafter NTIES), a national evaluation
of the effectiveness of alcohol and drug treatment delivered by programs funded through federal
demonstration grants between fiscal years 1992 and 1995, revealed significant declines in criminal
activities, including selling drugs, shoplifting, using a weapon or force to steal, and attacking or
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factored in, with total savings exceeding costs by a ratio of 12 to 1.26 Health care savings are recognized
because treatment can prevent the costly health and social consequences related to untreated
dependence. Nationally, injection drug use has accounted for more than one-third of AIDS cases in the
United States since the epidemic began, and the trend has continued with almost one-quarter of new

threatening someone. Among 490 clients who entered treatment for both alcohol and crack cocaine use,
about one-third (⅓) reported at intake selling drugs and shoplifting, 17% reported attacking or
threatening someone, and 7% reported using a weapon or force to steal. During the year after treatment,
the proportion who reported attacking or threatening someone declined by almost three-fourths (¾) and
the proportion who reported selling drugs, shoplifting and using weapons or force to steal declined by
more than half. CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, TREATMENT OUTCOMES FOR
POLYSUBSTANCE USERS: ALCOHOL AND CRACK COCAINE (NEDS Fact Sheet 100, Nov. 2001). Similar
reductions in criminal activity were reported by approximately 370 individuals who entered drug
treatment for both heroin and cocaine powder use. At intake, approximately 45% of the clients reported
shoplifting and selling drugs, 15% reported attacking or threatening someone, and 9% using a weapon or
force to steal. During the year after treatment, the proportion who reported using a weapon or force to
steal declined by more than three-fourths (¾) and the proportion that reported attacking or threatening
someone, selling drugs, and shoplifting declined by more than one-half (½). CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE
ABUSE TREATMENT, TREATMENT OUTCOMES FOR POLYSUBSTANCE USERS: HEROIN AND COCAINE
POWDER (NEDS Fact Sheet 103, Dec. 2001).
These same reductions in drug use and criminal activity were reported in a recent study of nearly
1000 individuals who participated in publicly-funding out-patient treatment in Baltimore, Maryland
from 1998 to 1999. Heroin use declined over the first thirty (30) days of treatment by 72% and was
sustained at a 69% reduction one year later. Cocaine use also declined over the first thirty (30) days of
treatment by 64% and was sustained at 48% one year after treatment. The reduction in heroin and
cocaine use was greatest for those who were treated in methadone treatment programs. Crime rates
dropped precipitously, mirroring the decline in drug use. Participants engaged in illegal activities 64%
less at one year after entry into treatment, and reduced the amount of illegal income received by 69%.
BALTIMORE SUBSTANCE ABUSE SYSTEMS, STEPS TO SUCCESS: BALTIMORE DRUG AND ALCOHOL
TREATMENT OUTCOME STUDY 3-5 (Executive Summary, 2002).
26 PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT, supra n. 21, at 21. The California Drug and Alcohol

Treatment Assessment (CALDATA) showed that treatment reduced hospitalizations by 36% for
physical health problems, 58% for drug overdoses and 44% for mental health problems. D. R. GERSTEIN
ET AL., EVALUATING RECOVERY SERVICES: THE CALIFORNIA DRUG AND ALCOHOL TREATMENT
ASSESSMENT 41 (April 1994).
12

AIDS cases in 2002 being associated with injection drug use.27 and Hepatitis C and sexually transmitted
diseases are prevalent among injection drug users.28 Numerous studies have demonstrated that drug
treatment is primary prevention for HIV infection and reduces sexual and needle sharing behavior that
contributes to Hepatitis C and sexually transmitted diseases.29 Treatment also ameliorates the mental
health problems of those with co-occurring mental illness and drug dependence.30 In addition to the

27 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DRUG-ASSOCIATED HIV TRANSMISSION CONTINUES IN THE UNITED
STATES (May 2002) and Surveillance Report Vol. 14, Table 16, available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv.
28 In a study of patients in treatment programs in six cities in the United States, 79% of injection drug

users in treatment tested positive for Hepatitis C. An estimated 70% will ultimately develop chronic
liver disease, for which there is no cure except liver transplantation. CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE
RESEARCH, DRUGS IN MARYLAND: 2003 UPDATE 12 (2003).
29 The NTIES revealed a reduction of high-risk sexual behaviors (prostitution, sex exchange for drugs
or ten or more sexual partners in a year) among two groups of patients one year after treatment: persons
who sought treatment for alcohol and crack cocaine use and those who sought treatment for heroin and
cocaine powder use. Among the first group at intake, about one-fourth (¼) of the clients reported sex
exchange or prostitution and one-tenth (1/10) reported having ten or more sexual partners. After one
year in treatment, the proportion of clients who reported sex exchange or multiple sex partners declined
by half (½) and the proportion who reported engaging in prostitution declined by over two-thirds (⅔).
NEDS Fact Sheet 100, supra n. 25. Among the second group at intake, about one-fourth (¼) of clients
reported prostitution and sex exchange and 11% reported having multiple partners. After one year in
treatment, the proportion of clients who reported prostitution declined by over two-thirds (⅔) and the
proportion reporting multiple sex partners and sex exchange declined by about one-half (½). NEDS
Fact Sheet 103, supra n. 25.
30 The NSDUH found a high co-occurrence of serious mental illness (SMI) with alcohol and drug

dependence and abuse. Among adults with SMI in 2002, 23.2% (4 million people) were dependent on
or abused alcohol or illicit drugs, while the dependence rate among adults without SMI was only 8.2%.
Among adults with alcohol or drug dependence, 20.4% had SMI, while the rate of SMI was 7% among
adults who did not have alcohol or drug dependence. NSDUH, supra n. 13, at 32.
NTIES examined the effect of treatment on individuals who reported depression, attempted
suicide and receipt of outpatient mental health treatment. At intake among those receiving treatment for
alcohol and crack cocaine use, 62% reported depression, 29% reported having attempted suicide and
15% reported having received outpatient mental health services. In the year after treatment, 39%
reported depression, 4% reported attempted suicide and 11% reported receiving mental health services.
13

savings generated from reduced criminal activity and improved health, treatment increases employment
and earnings for many who receive treatment.31
When measured against treatment outcomes for other chronic medical conditions, alcohol and drug
treatment proves to be just as effective as treatment for other chronic medical conditions. Persons in
treatment for alcohol and drug dependence adhere to medical regimens and relapse to problematic
behaviors at rates comparable to persons who receive treatment for three other chronic illnesses: type 1
diabetes mellitus, hypertension and asthma. 32

NEDS Fact Sheet 100, supra n. 25. Similar declines were reported for patients receiving treatment for
heroin and powder cocaine. At intake, 53% reported depression, 22% reported attempted suicide and
20% reported receiving outpatient mental health services. In the year after treatment, 37% reported
depression, 4% reported attempted suicide and 10% reported receiving mental health services. NEDS
Fact Sheet 103 supra n. 25.
31 The NTIES found that the proportion of men employed after one year of treatment increased by half

and the proportion of women increased by almost two-thirds. CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT BENEFITS: EMPLOYABILITY OF MALE AND FEMALE
CLIENTS (NEDS Fact Sheet 137, Sept. 2002). Employment improved across all racial groups. The
proportion of clients employed after one year in treatment increased by over two-thirds for white clients,
over half for African-American clients and almost half for Hispanic clients. CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE
ABUSE TREATMENT, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT BENEFITS: EMPLOYABILITY ACROSS
RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUPS (NEDS Fact Sheet 114, March 2002). Participants in the CALDATA study who
completed more than four months of residential treatment increased their employment by more than
30%, notwithstanding a recession in the state during the study period. THE CALIFORNIA DRUG AND
ALCOHOL TREATMENT ASSESSMENT, supra n. 26, at 55. The study also concluded that women who
received welfare before entering treatment reduced their participation in welfare programs by 22% after
treatment. D.R. GERSTEIN ET AL., ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG TREATMENT FOR PARENTS AND WELFARE
RECIPIENTS: OUTCOMES, COSTS AND BENEFITS 29 (Jan. 1997).
32 One-year post-discharge follow-up studies of individuals who participated in alcohol or drug

treatment have typically shown that about 40% to 60% of discharged patients are continuously abstinent,
and an additional 15% to 30% have not resumed dependent use during this period. Favorable outcomes
typically continue beyond the one-year period for patients who comply with the recommended regimen
of education, counseling and medication, i.e., remaining in methadone maintenance or maintaining
abstinence through participation in self-help groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics
14

C.

Treatment Accessibility

All things being equal, treatment for alcohol and drug dependence should be an accepted and
readily available medical service in most communities. It hasn’t worked that way.33 While local
governments and the public voice support for alcohol and drug treatment,34 public and private funding

Anonymous (NA). Similarly, outcome studies indicate that 30% to 50% of adult patients with type 1
diabetes and approximately 50% to 70% of adult patients with hypertension or asthma experience
recurrence of symptoms each year to a degree that requires medical care to reestablish symptom
remission. Adherence to medication regimens and behavioral and diet changes, which are critical to
prevent recurrence of these disorders, are also comparable to those with addictions: less than 30% of
patients adhere to prescribed diet and/or behavioral changes. In addition, research has demonstrated that
compliance with a medical regimen and outcome across all four of these medical conditions is poorest
among persons with low socioeconomic status, lack of family and social supports or significant
psychiatric co-morbidity. Thomas A. McLellan et al., Drug Dependence, A Chronic Medical Illness:
Implications for Treatment, Insurance, and Outcome Evaluation, 284 J. OF THE AMER. MED. ASSN.1689,
1693 (Oct. 4, 2000).
33 Thus, while the societal costs of alcohol and drug problems in the United States soared above $184
billion and $143 billion, respectively, in 1998, alcohol and drug treatment comprised only $7.5 billion
(4%) and $4.9 billion (3.4%) of those costs, respectively. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
supra n. 1, at 1; OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra n. 1, at 5.
A study that examined state expenditures for substance abuse (defined as alcohol, drug or
nicotine) found that of every dollar states spent on substance abuse in 1998, 95.8 cents went to pay for
the burden of this problem on public programs, while only 3.7 cents went to fund prevention, treatment
and research programs aimed at reducing the incidence and consequences of substance abuse.
NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, SHOVELING UP:
THE IMPACT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE ON STATE BUDGETS 2 (Jan. 2001), available at
http://www.casacolumbia.org. The trend persists today. In Maryland, for example, the estimated cost of
alcohol and drug abuse in 2002 is $5.6 billion, with treatment comprising 3% of that cost. An untreated
drug abuser is estimated to cost the state $43,300 annually. Incarcerating that individual costs an
estimated $39,600, while providing treatment costs between $1,050 and $7,421, depending upon the
treatment modality. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, OUTLOOK AND
OUTCOMES IN MARYLAND SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 9 (FY 2002).
34 In a nationwide telephone survey of 1,056 adults conducted from September 6-17, 2001, Americans,

by two to one, described drug abuse as a medical problem that should be handled mainly through
counseling and treatment (63%) rather than as a serious crime that should be handled mainly by the
courts and prison system (31%). This view was shared across the political spectrum, with majorities of
15

for treatment services is a fraction of that needed to meet the demand.35 In 2002, an estimated 7.7
million people (ages 12 and older) needed treatment for an illicit drug problem, and 18.6 million needed
treatment for an alcohol problem.36 Only 1.4 million received drug treatment and 1.5 million received

fundamentalist Protestants (54%) and Republicans (51%) sharing this sentiment. PETER D. HART
RESEARCH ASSOC., INC., CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 5 (Feb. 2002). Nationwide, 76% favored a proposal requiring supervised
mandatory drug treatment and community service rather than prison time for people convicted of drug
possession. Seventy-one percent (71%) of those polled also favored this approach for those found guilty
of selling small amounts of drugs. Id. at 10.
A Fall 2003 poll of 704 Maryland registered voters from across the state revealed similar views.
An overwhelming majority of those polled – 73% compared to 11% -- believed drug treatment is more
effective than prison in stopping illegal drug use. Even self-described “very conservative” voters
supported treatment over prison by 65%. POTOMAC INCORPORATED, MARYLAND VOTER SURVEY 2-11
(Dec. 2003). Moreover, 86% of those polled thought judges should have the option to order supervised
treatment and counseling rather than prison for some drug users. Id. at 2-12. Voters favored prison over
treatment, however, for those who sell drugs by a margin of 66% to 30%. Id. at 2-13.
35 Spending for substance abuse treatment in 1997 was $11.9 billion, with public funding (state and
federal funding including Medicare, Medicaid and federal block grant and other funding) totaling $7.3
billion and private funding (including out-of-pocket and private insurance) totaling $4.5 billion. From
1987 to 1997, reliance on public payers increased from 50.3% of total substance abuse spending to
61.8%. Private insurance spending for substance abuse treatment grew particularly slowly during this
period: only 1.9% annually. Tami L. Mark, et al., Spending On Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Treatment, 1987-1997, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 108, 112, 115 (2000). See Sonja B. Starr, Simple Fairness:
Ending Discrimination in Health Insurance Coverage of Addiction Treatment, 111 YALE L.J. 2321
(2002) (describing exclusion and caps on coverage for alcohol and drug treatment in private insurance
and efforts to obtain treatment parity).
The NSDUH found that the source of payment for specialty drug or alcohol treatment was
reported to be from the individual’s “own savings or earnings” or family members (50% to 60%);
private health insurance (30%); public assistance, including Medicaid (43% to 49%) and Medicare
(20%). NSDUH, supra n. 13, at 28.
36 NSDUH, supra n. 13, at 30. The NSDUH defines as individual as needing treatment if he or she is

dependent on or abused alcohol or drugs or received specialty treatment for alcohol or drug dependence
in the prior twelve months. Id. at 28. Specialty treatment is treatment that is received at inpatient or
outpatient alcohol or drug rehabilitation facilities, in-patient hospital, or mental health facilities. It
excludes treatment at an emergency room, doctor’s office, self-help group, prison or jail or out-patient
hospital care. Id.
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alcohol treatment at a specialty substance abuse facility. 37
Even when treatment funds are available, some local governments and communities resist
establishing programs, citing fear of crime, lower property values and loss of tax revenue.38 Objective
data casts significant doubt on these fears. Studies conducted from the late 1970’s through the late

37 Id. at 30. Of the 6.3 million who did not receive drug treatment in a specialty facility, an estimated

362,000 reported that they felt they needed treatment and an estimated 88,000 of those reported that they
had made an effort but were unable to get treatment. Of the 17.1 million who did not receive alcohol
treatment in a specialty facility, an estimated 761,000 reported that they felt they needed treatment for
their alcohol problem and an estimated 266,000 reported that they had made an effort but were unable to
get treatment.
38 Research suggests that there are wide variations in the degree to which facility siting triggers

community opposition and the level of that opposition. Michael Dear, who has studied community
opposition to social services extensively, suggests that variations in opposition can be analyzed by
looking at three factors: the host community, facility design and client population. Among the client
populations that are most often rejected by communities are individuals with alcohol and drug problems.
Various scales have been used to measure the “hierarchy of acceptance” of individuals with disabilities.
Studies over time have found that “alcoholism” ranks among the least accepted disability, slightly more
acceptable over time than “mental illness,” “mental retardation,” and “AIDS.” One study that looked at
“drug addiction” found that it was ranked as the least acceptable disability, and a second study found
that “people in recovery from drug and alcohol dependency” ranked next to the last in desirability,
second only to people with psychiatric problems. Michael Dear, supra n. 10, at 6-7 and 16-17.
Similarly, hierarchies of facility acceptance rank facilities for persons with drug and alcohol problems in
the most undesirable category; a ranking that has also persisted over time. Id. at 8-9. In some studies,
these facilities rank with or just above facilities such as landfills and waste treatment plants. Id. at 12.
Researchers who have tried to explain the variations in acceptability have identified several
different, but not mutually exclusive, factors: (1) level of functionality; (2) aesthetic and social
interaction effect; (3) level of individual responsibility for the condition; (4) reversibility of condition;
and (5) personal vulnerability to a particular condition. The second and third factors adversely influence
the acceptability of individuals with alcohol and drug problems and the facilities that serve them because
these individuals are often viewed as engaging in unpredictable and dangerous behavior and being
responsible for their own disabling condition. Id. at 13-14. The persistence of drug and alcohol
problems as well as the relapsing nature of the disease also make this population less acceptable. The
fact that all individuals are vulnerable to alcohol and drug problems and most know someone who has
had such problems has not necessarily enhanced the acceptability of those who have this condition.
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1980’s concluded that the siting of human service facilities has little impact on the community’s
property values, crime, business, or traffic.39 More recent studies in cities throughout the country have
also found a limited impact in the area of property values and crime rates.40 Nonetheless, resistance runs

39 Michael Dear et al., Campaign for New Community, FACTORS INFLUENCING COMMUNITY

ACCEPTANCE: SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 6-7 (Resource Document Series, 1996), and studies cited
therein; G. Galster et al., The Impact of Supportive Housing on Neighborhood Crime Rates, 24 J. OF
URB. AFFAIRS, 289, 292 (2002) (noting that studies conducted in the 1980’s reached this conclusion, but
that some more recent analysis have concluded that with certain circumstances and kinds of
developments, supportive housing for persons with chronic mental illness can create harmful effects on
proximate property values). Herbert A. Eastman, War on Drugs or on Drug Users? Drug Treatment
and the NIMBY Syndrome, 5 B. U. PUB. INT. L. J. 15, 21 (1995); Laurie C. Malkin, Trouble at the
Doorstep: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and Group Homes for Recovering Substance
Abusers, 144 U. PA. L. R. 757, 792-98 (1995).
40 A 2002 study in San Diego County examining the effect of licensed residential alcohol and drug

treatment facilities on property values and crime rates near those centers revealed that the facilities
promoted community safety and enhanced property values. To evaluate property values of homes in the
vicinity of the facilities, a licensed realtor measured the sale value of seventy-one (71) homes,
comparing those located within five blocks of eight treatment facilities with those located farther from
but in the same general areas. The facilities were located in different types of neighborhoods; urban,
suburban, residential, commercial, high and low crime. In five locations, property values near treatment
facilities were slightly higher than in the comparison areas; in one location property values were
approximately the same, and in one, property values were slightly lower. An analysis of crime rates
compared crime incident data reported in September and October 2002 in the area immediately adjacent
to facilities in nine diverse neighborhoods with incidents reported in the larger surrounding
neighborhood. Crime levels were consistently lower next to licensed treatment facilities than elsewhere
in the same areas. Higher crime rates tended to center around alcohol sales outlets and other areas with
higher risks of drug availability. INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC STRATEGIES, COMMUNITY STABILITY AND
SAFETY: THE IMPACT OF LICENSED RESIDENTIAL ALCOHOL AND DRUG TREATMENT CENTERS 1-2 (May
2003), available at http://www.publicstrategies.org.
In the District of Columbia, an analysis of the impact of halfway houses and community-based
services for former criminal offenders on neighborhood property values and crime rates showed similar
results. The resale value of homes in neighborhoods within a six to eight block radius of seven different
facilities in diverse neighborhoods was examined over the five year period, December 1997 to March
2002. The data revealed that community-based facilities did not contribute to a decrease in housing
values. Homes that sold within a one-block radius of the facilities increased in value, and all the
neighborhoods with these facilities experienced an increase in housing value both on the street and
within the zip code of where the facility was located. CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
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deep and persists over time.41

Part II: National Policies that Promote NIMBY
The American public and government have struggled for over 140 years to find an effective

POLICY BRIEF: DO HALFWAY HOUSES AND COMMUNITY CORRECTION FACILITIES CAUSE PROPERTY
VALUES TO DECREASE? 1-9, available at http://www.dcprisonerhelp.org.
Another study analyzed crime rates by comparing all reported Part 1 crimes (homicide, sex
abuse, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, theft, theft from an automobile, stolen
automobile and arson) within 1,000 feet of the seven facilities with the crime rate within 1,000 of other
randomly selected sites, including businesses, grocery stores, libraries and schools, for the period 1997
to 2001. The data revealed that crime trends in neighborhoods with facilities serving former criminal
offenders were similar to those in neighborhoods with services (library, grocery store, private school)
not normally associated with crime. CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POLICY BRIEF: DO
COMMUNITY REHABILITATION FACILITIES INCREASE CRIME IN THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD? 10-16, available
at http://www.dcprisonerhelp.org.
Finally, a study in Denver, Colorado, examined the effect of fourteen supportive housing
facilities established between 1992 and 1995 on crime rates, defined as reported crimes involving
property, violence, criminal mischief, disorderly conduct and total (all crimes). The study examined
crime rates at various distances from the facilities – 500 feet, 501 to 1000 feet and 1001 to 2000 feet. It
also examined whether crime rates differed based on clientele, specifically clients who were perceived
as more threatening (defined as persons with criminal records and those with mental health and drug and
alcohol histories), or facility scale (facilities with a maximum of eight residents versus those facilities
that served 50 to 100 individuals). The study concluded that there were no statistically significant
increases in the rates of any category of reported crime rates within any distance of a supportive housing
facility, including those that served more threatening clients. A modest but statistically significant
upsurge in reported violent and total crimes occurred within 500 feet of the large facilities. The study
concluded that the residents of the larger facilities were not the perpetrators of the crime, but that the
larger facilities attracted more crime. These facilities either provided a mass of victims (many of the
larger facilities served persons who were physically compromised and often elderly) and/or eroded the
collective efficacy of the neighborhood, i.e. the social cohesion among neighbors and their capacity to
enforce norms of civil, lawful behavior through informal social controls. G. Galster, supra n. 39, at 3078.
41 For example, New York City’s zoning battles to establish treatment programs in 1919 were

essentially repeated fifty years later when it sought to establish a network of methadone treatment
programs. R. NEWMAN, Relationship with the Community, in METHADONE TREATMENT IN NARCOTIC
ADDICTION: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, FINDINGS, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE (1977). As of 1993,
only three new methadone programs had been able to open throughout New York State in the previous
twenty (20) years. FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE TREATMENT, supra n. 5, at 29.
19

response to alcohol and drug use and dependence among its citizens. The American response, according
to Musto, swings predictably from periods of drug tolerance to drug intolerance with virtually no happy
medium or equilibrium.42 Our most recent wave of drug problems, which began in the mid-1960’s, was
met first with tolerance in the 1970’s followed quickly by severe intolerance beginning in the early
1980’s. The pervasive intolerant national response to drug and alcohol problems certainly contributes to
the NIMBY syndrome.
First, and perhaps most important, our nation’s punitive, “lock ‘em up” approach to drug
dependence over the past twenty years has made it acceptable to dismiss individuals with these problems
as a group to be feared and undeserving of treatment all together, much less fair and equal treatment.43
Since 1975, every state has passed a mandatory minimum sentencing law requiring incarceration for
weapons offenses, habitual offenders and other categories. According to Mauer, these laws have been
applied most frequently to drug offenses, resulting in an increase in the proportion of arrested drug
offenders who are sentenced to prison and an increase in the length of time offenders serve. Congress
also enacted harsh “anti-drug” mandatory sentencing laws in 1986 and 1988.44 This punitive response

42 David Musto, supra n. 12, at x.
43 As the Institute of Medicine observed in evaluating the public’s support for methadone treatment,
“the stereotype of addicts are of individuals engaged in criminal activity, predatory toward others, and
unable or unwilling to respect the norms of acceptable social behavior or participate in the work force.
The public’s fear of opiate addicts creates a reluctance to spend “treatment” dollars on them; it also
creates sympathy for a criminal justice response.” FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE TREATMENT,
supra n. 5, at 29.

According to Mauer and others, both state and federal sentencing policies have captured an
overwhelming majority of low-level dealers or accomplices who are considered low-risk based on their
limited criminal histories. A study of the more than 150,000 drug offenders incarcerated in state prisons

44
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has spilled over into federal civil rights, health, education, housing and welfare policies. Millions of
individuals have lost important civil rights protections, educational opportunities and basic housing and
subsistence because of an alcohol or drug problem or drug-related criminal activities.45

in 1991, revealed that 84% of these offenders, almost 127,000 people, had no history of a prior
incarceration for a violent crime and that 50% had no prior incarcerations at all. MARC MAUER, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 151-157 (1999).
A recent study that examined incarceration trends in Maryland found that, for prisoners held on
June 30, 2001, the largest single category of conviction offense, according to the Department of
Corrections, was “drug abuse,” accounting for 23.6% of those incarcerated in the state system. Cases
involving drug offenses comprised more than half (53%) of the sentences imposed by judges in 2000
and 2001, and, in 63% of these cases, the offender was sentenced to a prison term. Prison terms were
imposed in 54% of the cases involving simple possession of drugs, a misdemeanor offense, and in over
8000 cases involving convictions for drug distribution, 64% of the offenders were sentenced to prison,
even though a mandatory minimum sentence was not required. The authors of the study concluded that
State could safely mandate treatment rather than incarceration for persons convicted of drug possession,
distribution, all but the most serious burglary offense, and all theft cases where the offender is a drug
abuser. JUDITH GREENE & TIMOTHY ROCHE, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, CUTTING CORRECTLY IN
MARYLAND 14-17, 20 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org.
45 In 1989 and 1990, when Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans

with Disabilities Act, providing broad civil rights protections for individuals with disabilities, it
eliminated statutory protections for individuals with current drug problems, which had been in place
since 1978 under Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act. The Congress and the Bush
Administration excluded these individuals from civil rights protections because they did not want to
enact a law that was seen as being “soft” on drugs.
In 1996, Congress and the Clinton Administration made sweeping changes in eligibility
requirements for federally funded subsistence programs that excluded individuals with alcohol and drug
dependence. Congress first amended the standards governing the federal Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) and Supplemental Security Disability Income (SSDI) programs, excluding individuals whose
disability diagnosis was based on their alcoholism or drug dependence. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2).
Exclusion from the SSI and SSDI programs also stripped these individuals of Medicaid coverage. That
same year, Congress amended public housing laws to facilitate the exclusion of individuals involved in
drug-related activities from public, federally assisted and/or Section 8 housing. Under the so-called
“one-strike” standards, public housing providers are required to include a lease provision that requires
the termination of tenancy of a leaseholder if he, his family member, or a guest or other person under the
leaseholder’s control engages in drug-related activity on or off the premises. 42 US.C. § 1437d(l)(6).
Individuals who have been evicted from public, federally assisted or Section 8 housing because of drugrelated criminal activity are ineligible for such housing for three years from the date of the eviction. 42
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Closely associated with the dramatic increase in incarceration of persons convicted of drug crimes,
is the public perception – albeit inaccurate – that drug addiction is a problem that primarily affects
people of color.46 The perception of the “drug problem” as existing in and involving primarily poor,
African-American communities results from at least two factors: the disparate rate of arrest, prosecution
and incarceration of African-American men and women for drug-related crimes47 and the high visibility

U.S.C. § 13661(a). Those who have engaged in any drug-related activity may be denied tenancy if the
activity occurred within a reasonable time prior to their seeking admission to housing. 42 U.S.C. §
13661(c). Finally, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, enacted on
August 22, 1996, permanently bars any individual with a drug-related felony conviction from receiving
cash assistance (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or “TANF”) and foods stamps during the
individual’s lifetime, unless the state opts out of or modifies the drug felon bar. 21 U.S.C. § 862a. The
welfare law also prohibits states from providing TANF, Supplemental Security Income, public and
federally-assisted housing, and food stamps to individuals who are violating a condition of probation or
parole. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(9)(A)(ii). States were also authorized to test welfare recipients for drug use
and sanction those who test positive. 21 U.S.C. §862b.
Most recently, in 1998, Congress amended the Higher Education Act, suspending the eligibility
for any grant, loan or work assistance for students convicted of drug-related offenses. Persons who have
been convicted of possession of a controlled substance lose eligibility for one year for the first offense,
two years for the second and indefinitely for a third or subsequent offense. The penalty for a sales
conviction is stiffer: a two-year ineligibility for the first offense and indefinite suspension for any
subsequent convictions. 20 U.S.C. § 1901(r).
46 Mauer, supra n. 44, at 148-51.
47 The racial and ethnic breakdown of drug offenders in state prisons in 1997 revealed that four out of

every five drug prisoners are members of racial and ethnic minorities – 56 % African-American and
23% Hispanic. Between 1985 and 1995 the number of white drug offenders (those convicted only of a
drug offense) increased by 306% while the number of African-American drug offenders increased by
707%. During this period, drug offenders constituted 42% of the rise in African-American state prison
population, while constituting 26% of the increase in white prison population. Mauer, supra n. 44, at
152-53.
During this period, the racial characteristics of those incarcerated for drug crimes sharply
contrasted with the demographic profile of drug users nationally. Indeed, much like the 2002 National
Survey on Drug Use and Health statistics (see supra. n. 15), in 1997, African-Americans constituted
13% of monthly drug users and Hispanics, 9%. Whites constituted 74% of monthly drug users, but only
20% of the drug offenders in state prisons. RYAN KING & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
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of drug-related criminal activity in inner-city, minority communities. The causes of the racially
disparate incarceration rates are complex, but the phenomenon is not explained by the rate of drug use or
dependence among racial minorities.48 As noted above, the rate of drug dependence among blacks and
whites is virtually identical, with rates slightly higher among Hispanics. The rate of drug use among
racial and ethnic minorities reveals a similar pattern: in 2002, 8.5% of whites, 9.7% of AfricanAmericans and 7.2% of Hispanics reported using illicit drugs in the preceding month. Among youth
age 12 to 17, 10% of African-Americans, 10.7% of Hispanics and 12.6% of whites reported using illicit
drugs in the preceding month.49
Notwithstanding the relatively comparable rates of drug use among African-Americans and
whites, the drug trade is more visible in African-American communities and has had a harsher impact on
those communities. Drug dealing in inner-city, impoverished neighborhoods, a large share of whose

DISTORTED PRIORITIES: DRUG OFFENDERS IN STATE PRISONS 11 (Sept. 2002).
In Maryland, the racial disparity among those convicted of drug crimes is even starker.
Maryland ranks third in the nation for total annual prison admissions for drug offenses. Nationally, 27%
of prison admissions are for drug offenses, while 42% of Maryland’s prison admissions are for drug
offenses. In 2003, 68% of those arrested for drug crimes and 90% of those imprisoned for drug
offenses were African-American. The disparity is marked since the enactment of federal mandatory
minimum sentences. In 1986, African-Americans and whites entered Maryland prisons for drug
offenses in roughly equal proportions – 15% and 17%, respectively. By 1999, nearly half of all AfricanAmerican admissions to prison (47%) were for drug offenses compared with 21% for whites. Between
1986 and 1999, the increase in African-American admissions to prison on a drug offense was 18 times
greater that the increase in white drug offender admissions. VINCENT SCHIRALDI & JASON ZIEDENBERG,
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, RACE AND INCARCERATION IN MARYLAND 10-13 (2003).
48 An exploration of the reasons underlying this trend is beyond the scope of and not essential to this
article.
49 NSDUH, supra n. 13, at 12-13. Drug dependence also was also more prevalent in rural communities

than urban communities for this age group. Id. at Tables 5.9 A and B.
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residents are African-American, is more likely to take place on the street, in open-air drug markets. In
contrast, drug dealing in suburban neighborhoods takes place behind closed doors through word-ofmouth contact.50 The impact of this drug trade is readily observed in increased violence, loss of social
capital and communities wrecked by high rates of incarceration.51 To the extent treatment programs are

50 Mauer, supra n. 44, at 148-50; and MacCoun, supra n. 23, at 114. The high visibility of the drug
trade does not necessarily translate into a higher level of drug use and dependence. One study
examined the visibility of drug sales and drug use in more than 2100 neighborhoods across 41 sites. It
concluded that, while the drug trade was more visible in minority communities than white
neighborhoods, those same neighborhoods had lower scores on drug use and drug dependency. It found
that the neighborhoods that had the most visible drug problems were those that were the most
disadvantaged (measured by unemployed adult population, high school dropouts, female-headed
households, individuals receiving public assistance and individuals living in households below the
poverty level), had higher proportions of minority residents and high levels of population density.
Visible drug sales were 6.3 times more likely to be reported in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods
than the least disadvantaged, while illicit drug use was only 1.3 times more likely. L. Saxe et al., The
Visibility of Illicit Drugs: Implications for Community-Based Drug Control Strategies, 91 AM. J. OF
PUB. HEALTH 1987, 1989 (Dec. 2001).
51 According to MacCoun, the high prevalence of drug selling in the inner city has generated drug

dependence, encouraged violence for self-protection at the individual and community levels, decreased
the prevalence of positive role models, and, for the large numbers of incarcerated individuals, minimized
the ability and time to develop as members of the community, family and workforce. MacCoun, supra
n. 23 at 114-15. Similarly, Saxe observed that drug markets, which get established in disadvantaged
neighborhoods, in part, because of the low social capital in those neighborhoods, further erodes the
social capital. Saxe, supra n. 50, at 1992-93.
Sociologist Jeanette Covington has observed that “resource deprivation” causes minority
communities to suffer more intensely from drug problems than more affluent communities. Limited
access to good schools and primary labor market jobs make it more difficult for individuals in
impoverished communities to support a drug habit through employment or family support and loans -avenues more readily available to more affluent individuals with drug problems. Minorities also face a
greater disadvantage when seeking treatment for their drug problem, as they must frequently rely on the
publicly funded treatment system, which, because of insufficient funding, has limited slots and often less
comprehensive services. Sustaining recovery is also more difficult for individuals who do not have
access to employment, housing and a family support system. Jeanette Covington, The Social
Construction of the Minority Drug Problem, 24 SOCIAL JUSTICE 117 (1997)
While individuals who are employed and have homes and private health insurance may also face
limited access to treatment, the response to a drug problem is entirely different. As Mauer observed, a
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associated with addressing the “visible” problem, white and more affluent communities do not perceive
a need for those services and fear exposing their neighborhoods to people who do not fit the racial and
socio-economic profile and who engage in destructive behavior. Thus, racial bias and stereotypes
simmer beneath the surface of many battles over the siting of a drug treatment program.52
Second, while treatment for alcoholism and drug dependence has expanded and been supported by
federal and state entities, it is not well integrated into mainstream medical practice and is not financed
on par with other medical care. Since the inception of a national alcohol and drug treatment system,
services have been provided primarily by specialty providers.53 Indeed, methadone maintenance

middle class family in suburbia who realizes its seventeen year old son is selling and using cocaine does
not call the police, demand that he be arrested, and expose him to a mandatory five-year sentence for
possession and sales. The son of family in a low- income, minority community who engages in the
same behavior, however, is much more likely to be picked up on the street, charged with drug
possession and intent to sell, and face a stiff penalty rather than receive treatment. Mauer, supra n. 44,
at 142-43. For a discussion of how resource deprivation in some minority communities plays out in the
battles over siting treatment services see infra text accompanying notes 270 and 271.
52 Racial and ethnic discrimination has been at the core of the national response to drug control since the

turn of twentieth century. Musto describes how the South in the early 1900’s feared cocaine because
Southern whites feared that black cocaine users would become “oblivious of their prescribed bounds and
attack white society.” Musto, supra n. 12, at 6. This perception prevailed even though cocaine use was
popular among both whites and blacks in both the North and South for medicinal and non-medicinal
purposes at the turn of the century (cocaine was added to commercial products such as soda pop, wine,
ointments and sprays), and there was no evidence that cocaine caused a crime wave among blacks.
According to Musto, white fear of violence, not the reality of cocaine’s effects, provided one more
reason for the repression of blacks. Id. at 8-10, 295.
53 The alcohol and drug treatment system traces its roots to the narcotics prison-hospitals in Lexington,
Kentucky and Fort Worth, Texas, established in 1932 and 1938, respectively. These facilities were
established to address over-crowded prison conditions that resulted from the unprecedented level of
incarceration of opiate dependent persons in the 1920’s. These federal prison-hospitals provided the
only narcotics addiction treatment in the United States at the time, and, thus, served individuals who
voluntarily committed themselves in addition to criminal offenders. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TREATING
DRUG PROBLEMS 48-50 (Dean Gerstein & Henrick Harwood, eds., 1990); H. Kleber, Methadone: The
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treatment, one of the most controversial treatment modalities for opiate addiction, is essentially available
only at hospitals or highly regulated treatment centers.54 Most medical schools and residency programs
cast a blind eye to alcoholism and drug addiction in their curricula.55 Private health insurance often

Drug, the Treatment, the Controversy, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN 150 (David Musto ed.,
2002).
Alcohol and drug treatment continues to be delivered primarily through specialty providers that
are not integrated with the larger general medical care system. The 2002 N-SSATS reported that 60% of
the 13,720 facilities offering alcohol and drug treatment designate themselves as substance abuse
treatment settings. Twenty-five percent (25%) are combined substance abuse and mental health
organizations, 8% are mental health organizations and 3% are health care settings. Sixty-one percent
(61%) operate as not-for-profit and 25% operate as private for-profits, with the remaining 14% a
combination of state and local government, federal agencies and tribal government. N-SSATS, supra n.
22, at Highlights and Figure 2.
54 Since 1972, methadone has been subject to special regulatory standards that prescribe how and under
what circumstances it may be used to treat narcotic addiction. No other medication is so highly
regulated. These standards were implemented initially to respond to real abuses and perceived threats of
diversion of methadone into illicit channels while creating standards that would permit communitybased services to be available. By the mid-1990’s, however, when Congress asked the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) to examine whether these additional regulatory restrictions remained necessary, the
IOM concluded that no compelling medical reason existed for regulating methadone differently from
other FDA approved medications, including schedule II controlled substances. The IOM found that the
regulations had deprived society of reaping the full benefit of methadone as an effective treatment for
addiction and preventative measure for violence and other public health problems. The regulations had
prevented some individuals from obtaining treatment tailored to their needs, prevented doctors from
exercising professional judgment in treating patients, resulted in the isolation of treatment programs
from mainstream medical care, and imposed significant economic costs to ensure compliance. The IOM
recommended, among other things, readjustment of the regulatory controls to reduce government
oversight and increase reliance on clinical practice guidelines, provision of maintenance treatment
outside a licensed treatment program, and greater latitude to obtain take-home doses after the first three
months of treatment. FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE TREATMENT, supra n. 5, at 30-31, and
200-204. While the federal government revised the regulations in 2001 to address some of these
concerns, it retained the most problematic structural features – the need for daily attendance by most
patients at a centralized location to obtain medication – that continue to undermine the expansion of
services. Opioid Drugs in Maintenance and Detoxification Treatment of Opiate Addiction, 21 C.F.R. §
291 and 42 C.F.R. § 8 (2003).
55 McLellan, supra n. 32, at 1689. This limited education has implications for subsequent diagnosis and
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excludes coverage for addiction treatment and rarely provides coverage that is comparable to that for
other non-psychiatric medical conditions.
Taken together, these legal and social standards and practices have created, fueled and perpetuated
the stigma that is associated with alcoholism and drug dependence.56 On the local level, stigma is often
manifested in opposition to treatment services based on a lack of understanding about what happens
within the walls of a treatment program and a fear of the persons in treatment that our punitive policies

referral for treatment. Surveys indicate that most physicians fail to screen for alcohol or drug
dependence during routine examinations, and many health professionals view such screening efforts as a
waste of time. Moreover, a survey of general practice physicians and nurses indicated that most
believed no available medical or health care interventions would be appropriate or effective in treating
addiction. Id.
56 For a discussion of the role of law as both a source of stigma and a basis for challenging stigma in the

public health context, see S. Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J. OF LAW, MED. &
ETHICS 179 (2002). Burris summarizes the literature on stigma and how it operates in society as a mode
of social control. Understanding this framework is useful for purposes of crafting effective responses to
NIMBY.
Stigma is conceptualized as the understanding that a particular trait “spoils” the identity of those
who posses that trait and that both the person possessing the trait – the stigmatized -- and those who do
not – the “normals” in the social group – share the view that the trait is discrediting. Stigma operates at
two levels of social organization, the individual and society. On the societal level, stigma exists,
according to some theorists, when four elements co-occur in a power situation: people distinguish and
label human differences; the dominant culture links labeled individuals to undesirable characteristics –
negative stereotypes; labeled individuals are placed in distinct categories and “separated” from those
who do not possess the label; and labeled persons experience loss and discrimination that result in
unequal outcomes.
On an individual level, theorists have observed that a person who possesses a stigmatized
condition that is concealable will respond in one of two ways: either accept the stigma and conceal the
condition to avoid the intolerant attitudes and potential discrimination or reject the stigma and adopt
resistance strategies to educate the public about the condition and develop social supports to address
mistreatment. Rejecting stigma may have two benefits. First, it can reduce an individual’s hidden
distress that results from the stress of concealment and self-imposed isolation to ensure concealment.
Second, it can challenge conventional views and gradually reduce the impact of stigma on both the
individual and society at large. Id. at 179-83.
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have constructed.57
PART III: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND ZONING DISCRIMINATION
Civil rights laws that protect individuals with disabilities against discrimination – the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,58 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Fair Housing Act

57 One court recently condemned as deplorable the “hyperbolic and intemperate language” used by one
locality to describe individuals who sought methadone treatment and the programs that serve them. The
court cited the following examples from the locality’s brief: “residents who live in a community, when
apprised that a methadone clinic may open, can – without undertaking scientific analysis – oppose the
idea simply on the basis that the clientele who have abused heroin have engaged in numerous illegal acts
and other opprobrious behavior; “it takes a certain quality, so to speak, to want to inject yourself with
something worse than lighter fluid;” and “It is the people (the self-inflicted disabled who ignore the
laws) that Baltimore County is to embrace into their neighborhoods.” Start, Inc. v. Baltimore County,
Md., 295 F.Supp.2d 569 (D.Md. 2003); see infra text accompanying notes 204, 205, 268 and 269.
58 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provided the legal framework and basic non-discrimination

standards that Congress adopted and expanded in the enactment of the ADA and FHA. This discussion
will focus primarily on the ADA and FHA because of those statutes’ broader reach (see infra text
accompanying notes 70-73 and 127) and weave in the Section 504 standards where relevant. It is
important to note, however, that Section 504 may fill an important gap in remedial relief against States
and entities deemed to be an “arm of the State” under the Supreme Court’s evolving sovereign immunity
jurisprudence. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001), states are immune from private suit for monetary damages under Title I of the ADA (the
employment discrimination provisions). The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Congress
similarly exceeded its authority to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity (see 42 U.S.C. §
12202) under the Title II of the ADA, the public entity provisions under which zoning discrimination
actions are brought (see Hason v. Medical Board of California, 279 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002), cert
dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 1779 (2003), but is expected to address that issue in the 2003 term in Tennessee v.
Lane, 315 F. 3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2622 (2003)). To the extent, the Supreme
Court finds that States are not subject to private damage actions under Title II, private parties may be
able to bring such actions under Section 504. The Rehabilitation Act, unlike the ADA, was enacted
pursuant to the Spending Clause, and Congress explicitly waived immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 200d-7.
Several federal appellate courts have held that a State has knowingly waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by accepting federal funding. See Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161
(3rd Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1232 (2003); Nihiser v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency,
269 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2588 (2002); Kvorjak v. State of Maine, 259 F.3d
48 (1st Cir. 2001); Douglas v. California Dept. of Youth Authority, 271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2001); Jim C.
v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001); and Stanley v.
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(FHA) – were enacted to end the isolation and exclusion of individuals with disabilities from
mainstream society and to prevent decision-making based on stereotypical attitudes and biases. These
laws protect individuals with histories of alcoholism and drug dependence from discrimination in the
receipt of public services, including zoning, and housing. While courts have not consistently interpreted
these civil rights laws to protect individuals with disabilities in the broad fashion normally afforded the
beneficiaries of civil rights statutes,59 they establish clear standards that should make local officials
think twice before adopting zoning practices that bar alcohol and drug treatment programs from
communities or treat them differently from other medical services.
A.

Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act

Title II of the ADA prohibits all public entities from discriminating against qualified individuals
with a disability or denying those individuals the benefit of or participation in its services, programs or
activities on the basis of disability. 60 Title II extends the anti-discrimination requirements of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act to all public entities, regardless of whether they receive federal financial
assistance.61 Title II also provides, at a minimum, the same level of protection as provided under
Litscher, 213 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2000). But see, Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board, 325 F.3d 609 (5th
Cir. 2003); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98 (2nd Cir. 2001). The
Supreme Court will undoubtedly address the Eleventh Amendment waiver issue in the near future.
59 See infra text accompanying note 78 (definition of disability) and supra note 58 (abrogation of

immunity).
60

42 U.S.C. § 12132 provides:
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

61 Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 provides in pertinent part:
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Section 504.62
The FHA makes it unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make
unavailable or deny a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap. The FHA also prohibits
discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental or a dwelling or in the provision of
services in connection with a dwelling.63 The term “dwelling” has been construed broadly by the courts

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section
706(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by an
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. . . .
Apart from the requirement of federal financial assistance, the key difference between the
substantive standard established under Section 504 and Title II is, according to some courts, that
disability must be the “sole” basis for discrimination under Section 504, while it need only be a
motivating reason under Title II. See Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).
62 The ADA provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall

be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.” 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a).
63 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) and (2) makes it unlawful:

(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any buyer or renter because of a handicap of –
(A) that buyer or renter;
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made
available; or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.
(2) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of
a handicap of –
(A) that person; or
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made
available; or
(C) any person associated with that person.
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to include “a temporary or permanent dwelling place, abode or habitation to which one intends to return
as distinguished from the place of temporary sojourn or transient visit.”64 Courts have applied the
FHA’s non-discrimination requirements to a wide range of “dwellings” in which individuals in
treatment for or in recovery from alcohol and drug dependence reside: a residential treatment
program;65 a group home for individuals attending an out-patient treatment program;66 an apartment for
individuals who have completed a year-long residential treatment program and are monitored by the
treatment program;67 a halfway house in which treatment program staff reside with individuals in
recovery;68 and self-run sober group homes.69
Four basic questions must be considered when evaluating whether zoning standards that restrict
the siting of alcohol and drug treatment services may be challenged under Title II or the FHA: (1) are
zoning decisions subject to anti-discrimination statutes; (2) who is protected against discrimination;
(3) what constitutes discrimination; and (4) how is discrimination proved.
64 United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 549 (W.D. Va. 1975).
65

Behavioral Health Services, Inc. v. City of Gardenia, 2003 WL 21750852, at * 5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2003) (six to twelve month residential treatment program for women and their children); Corporation of
the Episcopal Church in Utah v. West Valley City, 119 F. Supp.2d 1215, 1217 (D. Utah 2000) (proposed
residential program that would house approximately seventeen individuals for two to three months.);
Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening,1998 WL 1119864 at * 2 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1998) (proposed residential
program for women located on ship would be a “dwelling”).
66

Connecticut Hospital v. City of New London, 129 F. Supp.2d 123, 132-34 (D. Conn. 2001).

67

U.S. v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914 (1992).

68

Elliot v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992).

69

See, e.g., Tsombanidis v. City of West Haven, Conn., 129 F. Supp.2d 136 (D.Conn. 2001), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 352 F.3d 565 (2nd Cir. 2003); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp.
1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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1. Are Zoning Decisions Subject to Anti-Discrimination Protections
Congress did not define what constitutes a “service, program or activity” under Title II, but
courts have generally construed the term broadly to include all activities of a public entity. This
construction is supported by the definition of “program or activity” under Section 504 as well as the
Title II regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice (DOJ).70 Section 504 defines “program or
activity” to mean “all of the operations” of a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or local government.71 The DOJ regulations, like the statute, do not define
these terms, but the agency’s preamble to the regulations explains that “title II applies to anything a
public entity does.”72

Courts have relied on this authority as well as Title II’s catch-all prohibition

against discrimination by a public entity to conclude that municipal zoning is an activity or a service that
is covered under Title II.73

rd

70 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2003). See Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, Pa., 811 F.2d 171 (3 Cir. 1987) (section

504 claim exists in case challenging city’s refusal to issue zoning permits and award community block
grant funds).
71 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (emphasis added).
72 28 C.F.R. § 35, App. A, § 35.102 Application (2003).
th

73 Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 730-32 (9 Cir.

1999); Innovative Health Systems v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44-46 (2nd Cir. 1997);
Tsombanidis v. City of West Haven, Conn., 129 F. Supp.2d at 150-51, aff’d, 352 F.3d at 574; MX Group,
Inc. v. City of Covington, 106 F. Supp.2d 914, 920 (D. Ky. 2000), aff’d, 293 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2002);
Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 68 F. Supp.2d 602, 623 (D. Md. 1999); but see Robinson v. City
of Friendswood, 890 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. City of Charlotte, N. Ca., 904
F. Supp. 482, 484-85 (W.D. N.Ca. 1995). The DOJ’s Title II Technical Assistance Manual specifically
references the implementation of a municipal zoning ordinance as an activity that would be subject to
the Title II reasonable accommodation requirement. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT, TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, II-3.6100, Illustration 1 (1993).
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Zoning and land use requirements are also subject to the FHA.74 The legislative history of the
FHA explains:
These new subsections would also apply to state or local land use and health and safety laws,
regulations, practices or decisions which discriminate against individuals with handicaps. While
state and local governments have authority to protect safety and health, and to regulate use of
land, that authority has sometimes been used to restrict the ability of individuals with handicaps
to live in communities. This has been accomplished by such means as the enactment or
imposition of health, safety or land-use requirements on congregate living arrangements among
non-related persons with disabilities. Since these requirements are not imposed on families and
groups of similar size or other unrelated people, these requirements have the effect of
discriminating against persons with disabilities.
The Committee intends that the prohibition against discrimination against those with handicaps
apply to zoning decisions and practices. The Act is intended to prohibit the application of
special requirements through land-use regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or
special use permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the
residence of their choice in the community.75
The FHA, unlike Title II, does not directly identify public entities as being subject to its nondiscrimination requirements or set out who may be sued for discrimination. The FHA casts a broad net
by stating, “it shall be unlawful” to discriminate against individuals with handicaps.76
2. Are Persons with Alcoholism and Drug Dependence Protected Against
Discrimination
The ADA and FHA provide essentially the same scope of coverage for individuals with alcohol
and drug dependence problems, albeit with slightly different statutory language.

74

City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995).

75

H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185.
th

76 See Hemisphere Building Co., Inc. v. Village of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437 (7 Cir. 1999).
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a. Title II
Title II extends discrimination protection to “qualified individuals with disabilities.” The
ADA’s definition of “disability” is a three-pronged definition modeled directly after the Rehabilitation
Act definition. It covers an individual who has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual,” “a record of such an impairment;” or
being “regarded as having such an impairment.”77 Thus, individuals who have current disabling
condition, a condition that was disabling in the past, or are perceived erroneously as having a disabling
condition are protected against discrimination. While the statute itself does not define the terms
“physical or mental impairment,” “major life activity” or “substantially limits,” the DOJ Title II
regulations provide guidance, and the Supreme Court has further refined, and, as some commentators
would argue, restricted the scope of those terms.78
A “physical or mental impairment” is any physiological disorder or condition that affects any of
77 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003). The statutory definition applies to all three titles

of the ADA (employment, public entities and public accommodations) and no single federal agency was
given statutory authority to define that term. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has
defined the term in its regulations and the Department of Justice had done so in both the public entity
and public accommodations regulations.
78 Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 44

WILLIAM AND MARY L. REV. 1285 (2003); Kiren Dosanjh Zucker, The Meaning of Life: Defining
“Major Life Activities” Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 957 (2003);
Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilties”: Why the Definition of Disability Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act Should Be Revised to Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L.
REV. 83 (2000); Ruth Colker, The Americans With Disabilties Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1998); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class:
Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107
(1997); and Argun M. Ulgen, Comment, From Household Bathrooms to the Workplace: Bringing the
Americans With Disabilities Act Back to Where It Belongs: An Analysis of Toyota Motor Manufacturing
v. Williams, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 761 (2003).
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the body systems and any mental or psychological disorder.79 The Title II regulations provide a noninclusive list of impairments and explicitly include “alcoholism” and “drug addiction” in that list.80 In
addition, the Title II regulations define “major life activities” as “functions such as caring for one’s self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”81 The
wild card in the analysis is the amorphous term “substantially limiting.” The DOJ’s interpretive
guidance states that an individual is substantially limited when the “individual’s important life activities
are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they can be performed in comparison
to most people.”82 The Supreme Court ratcheted up the threshold for meeting this standard in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, holding that an individual is substantially limited only if the
impairment prevents or severely restricts his or her ability to perform a major life activity and the impact
is permanent or long-term.83

79 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003).
80 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003).
81 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003). The Supreme Court expanded that list in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998), holding that reproduction is a major life activity. The Court reexamined the issue in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), and held that major life
activities are those that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.
82 28 C.F.R. § 35 App. A, Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity (2003).
83 Toyota Motor Manufacturing, supra, 534 U.S. at 198. In 1999, the Supreme Court made clear in

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999), that the disability determination must be made on an individualized, case-by-case basis that
examines the effect of the impairment on the particular individual rather than on the general
characteristics of a particular condition. Moreover, to the extent an individual’s impairment is corrected
by medications, modified behavior or corrective devices, the individual does not satisfy the first prong
of the definition of disability.
35

Individuals who suffer from the impairments of alcoholism and drug dependence must satisfy the
above standards to assert protection under the ADA, but face one significant gap in coverage. The law
excludes from protection individuals who currently engage in the illegal use of drugs if the public entity
acts on the basis of such use.84 The term “drug” is defined to cover only a controlled substance, as
defined under the Controlled Substances Act,85 and, thus, individuals with current alcohol problems who
do not engage in the illegal use of drugs are not excluded from protection as an individual with a
disability by virtue of their alcohol use.86 Similarly, individuals who take controlled substances under

84 42 U.S. C. § 12210 provides in relevant part:

(a) In general
[T]he term “individual with a disability” does not include an individual who is currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.
(b) Rules of Construction
Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to exclude as an individual with a disability an
individual who –
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no longer
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no
longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use;
or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such use . . . .
85 42 U.S.C. § 12210 provides in pertinent part:

(d) “Illegal use of drugs” defined
(1) In general
The term “illegal use of drugs” means the use of drugs, the possession or distribution of
which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.]. Such
term does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed healthcare
professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substance Act or other
provisions of Federal law.
(2) Drugs
The term “drug” means a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I through V of
section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 812].
86 See Department of Justice discussion at 28 C.F.R.§ 35, App. A, § 35.131 Illegal Use of Drug (2003).
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the supervision of a licensed health care professional or as authorized by the Controlled Substances Act
are also not deemed to be engaged in the illegal use of drugs. Accordingly, individuals with alcohol or
drug dependence who have been rehabilitated or are participating in an alcohol or drug treatment
program, including methadone maintenance programs, are covered under the definition of disability, as
long as they do not currently engage in the illegal use of drugs. In addition, individuals who are
erroneously perceived as engaging in current drug use are also protected.87
There is one important exception to the exclusion of persons who currently use drugs illegally:
an individual cannot be denied health services or services provided in connection with drug
rehabilitation on the basis of his or her current use of drugs if the individual is otherwise entitled to such
services.88 Congress wisely included this provision to ensure that individuals with current drug

87 The Department of Justice explained the distinction that Congress had drawn in excluding individuals

who engage in the illegal use of drugs from the definition of “individual with a disability. “Congress
intended to deny protection to people who engage in the illegal use of drugs, whether or not they are
addicted, but to provide protection to addicts so long as they are not currently using drugs.” 28 C.F.R. §
35, App. A, § 35.131 Illegal Use of Drug (2003). Thus, protections extend to persons who are
participating in treatment programs, those who have been rehabilitated and those erroneously regarded
as engaging in the illegal use of drugs. Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of the drug
provisions, see R. Burgdorf, Drugs and Alcohol, in DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
(BNA 1995).
88 42 U.S.C. § 12210(c) provides:

(c) Health and other services
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and section 12211(b)(3) of this title, an
individual shall not be denied health services, or services provided in connection with drug
rehabilitation, on the basis of the current illegal use of drugs if the individual is otherwise
entitled to such services.
The Title II regulations provide that, “[a] public entity shall not deny health services, or services
provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, to an individual on the basis of that individual’s current
illegal use of drugs . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 35.131(b)(1) (2003).
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problems could receive health care services, including drug treatment, that are essential to recover from
drug dependence.89 Without such protection, individuals who are seeking treatment for an active drug
problem could be prevented from challenging discriminatory practices that prevent them from getting
treatment. In the zoning context, this arguably means that even an individual who has a current drug
problem would have standing to challenge a zoning standard that interferes with the establishment of an
alcohol or drug program. Drug treatment programs could also use this provision to defend claims that
they are not protected under the ADA90 based on the current drug use of some clients who are in the
early stages of recovery. 91

89 As the Department of Justice explained in the preamble to the Title II regulations, “Congress clearly

intended to prohibit exclusion from drug treatment programs of the very individuals who need such
programs because of their use of drugs. . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 35, App. A § 35.131 (2003).
90 The Title II regulations provide that “[a] public entity shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal

services, programs, or activities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an
individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.” 28 C.F.R.
§35.130(g) (2003). This provision ensures that entities that provide services to individuals with
disabilities, such as health care services, are not subjected to discrimination because of their professional
association with their clients. 28 C.F.R. § 35, App. A 3§ 5.130 General Prohibitions Against
Discrimination (2003).
Accordingly, courts have held in Title II zoning discrimination cases, that drug treatment
programs have standing to challenge discriminatory zoning decisions. See MX Group, Inc., 293 F.3d at
332-35; Innovative Health Systems, 117 F.3d at 47-48; and Tsombanidis, 180 F. Supp.2d at 280
(landlord of property rented by umbrella organization for Oxford Houses).
91 Courts have generally rejected claims that current drug use by some clients disqualifies the treatment

program from protection under the Act, without relying on §12210(c). The Second Circuit in Innovative
Health Systems noted that “the program indisputably does not tolerate drug use by its participants. An
inevitable, small percentage of failures should not defeat the rights of the majority of participants in the
rehabilitation program who are drug-free and therefore disabled under [Title II].” 117 F.3d at 48. The
District Court for the Northern District of California in Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment,
Inc. v. City of Antioch, in an order granting preliminary injunction, declined to resolve whether
§12210(c) would enable persons who currently used drugs to challenge a zoning ordinance, finding that
the rights of the named plaintiffs, who abstained from drug use, would not be affected by persons in the
38

Courts that have undertaken a close analysis of whether individuals with alcohol and drug
dependence are covered in the Title II context under the Toyota Motor Manufacturing and Sutton
standards have concluded that individuals who participate in alcohol and drug treatment and reside in
group recovery homes are protected against discrimination.92 The Second Circuit, for example, in
Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown93 concluded that future
clients of a halfway house were substantially limited in their ability to live independently and to care for
themselves based on statutorily established eligibility criteria for admission to a halfway house.94 Those
criteria limited admission to individuals who were unable to abstain from alcohol and, thus, care for
treatment program who continued to use. 2000 WL 33716782 (Mar. 16, 2000). This provision may
have relieved courts in Title II cases related to health care or treatment services of the difficult task of
attaching time frames to and cabining the term “current.” The Title II regulations define the term as
“illegal use of drugs that occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person’s drug use
is a real and ongoing problem.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003).
92 Unlike Title I employment discrimination cases, the coverage issue in Title II cases is often
conceded, even with the strict coverage standard. See, e.g., Habit Management, Inc. v. City of Lynn, 235
F. Supp.2d 28, 29 (D. Mass. 2002) (clients of a methadone treatment program are recovering drug
addicts, who “Lynn concedes are “qualified individuals with disabilities”); Smith-Berch, Inc., 68 F.
Supp.2d at 617 (“defendants do not dispute that WMI’s anticipated clientele – individuals with opiate
addiction who require methadone therapy to aid in their recovery – are disabled individuals covered by
the ADA.”); and Project Life, Inc. 1998 WL 1119864 * 1 (D. Md.) (“there is no dispute that . . . an
individual recovering from substance abuse is an individual with a disability under the ADA”).
nd

93 294 F.3d 35 (2

Cir. 2002).

94 Several courts have dealt with the inherent dilemma of satisfying the individualized standard of

coverage when a program has been barred from siting and, thus, is without actual patients to
demonstrate a substantially limiting impairment. In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, the Second Circuit noted that the concern about varying intensities of symptoms was obviated
because all residents had to meet statutorily defined levels of impairment to reside in the halfway house.
294 F.3d at 48, n.3. The Sixth Circuit in MX Group, Inc. held that, where a program has been
foreclosed from opening based on the clients it intended to serve, it would defy reason to require an
individualized determination based on an actual client. 293 F.3d at 336.
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themselves, without continued services in a structured living environment and would require such
services for three to nine months (thereby satisfying the long-term duration requirement). The Court
also concluded, without analysis, that future clients would qualify under the second prong of the
disability definition because they have a record of a substantially limiting impairment. The Sixth
Circuit concluded that future clients of a methadone treatment program would be covered under all three
prongs of the disability definition. They are substantially limited in their ability to work, parent and
function, and those limitations are not ameliorated or rendered transitory by the medication as the
recovery process could take years and is often fraught with relapse.95 The court also found that
potential clients of a methadone program had a record of a substantially limiting impairment because
they were required to provide documentary proof of one year of narcotic or opiate addiction to be
admitted and would, during that one-year period, be unable to work or function. Finally, the
“regarded-as” prong was satisfied because the program had been denied a zoning permit based on the
stereotypical, but unfounded, fear that future clients would continue drug use and would attract drug
activity to the area, thereby being perceived as being limited in productive social functioning based on
their alleged criminality.96

95 See also Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc., 2000 WL 33716782, at 6 (evidence
existed that even with the mitigating effect of methadone treatment, recovery is a process that can take
weeks, months or years after individuals enter treatment, during which time they continue to be
substantially limited in their ability to work and raise families. Methadone treatment itself imposes
substantial limitations on the patients’ lives because they must visit a clinic daily for medication, which
affects the individual’s choice of residence and work, participate in counseling, and undergo random
drug testing and intensive scrutiny.)
96 293 F.3d at 342; and Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc., 2000 WL 33716782, at 11-

12 (fear that clients of methadone program would continue to use drugs and engage in crime
demonstrated that individuals were substantially limited in ability to interact with others, work and
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The final hurdle to asserting protection under Title II, is demonstrating that the individual with a
disability is “qualified” to participate in the service, program or activity; i.e. meets the essential
eligibility requirements for participation in the public entity’s program or activity, either with or without
reasonable modifications of rules, policies or procedures.97. An individual who presents a “direct threat”
to the health or safety of others is not “qualified.” “Direct threat” is defined in the preamble of the Title
II regulations as:
a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of
policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids . . . The determination
that a person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others may not be based on
generalizations or stereotypes about the effects of a particular disability. It must be based on an
individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical evidence
or on the best available objective evidence, to determine: the nature, duration, and severity of the
risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable
modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.98
The risk at issue must not only be real, but also “significant.”99 The Ninth Circuit articulated the direct
threat standard in the context of a methadone treatment program’s zoning discrimination challenge in
Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc.. It explained that a significant risk to health and
safety includes “severe and likely harms to the community that are directly associated with the operation
of the methadone clinic . . . [and] may include a reasonable likelihood of a significant increase in crime.

refrain from criminal activity.)
97 42 U.S.C. 12131(2) defines “qualified individual with a disability,” in relevant part, as: “an

individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules policies, or practices .
. . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs
or activities provided by a public entity.
98 28 C.F.R. § 35, App. A § 35.104 Definitions (2003).
99 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998).
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. . . [I]t is not enough that individuals pose a hypothetical or presumed risk. Instead, the evidence must
establish that an individual does, in fact, pose a significant risk.” 100 While public entities often raise
this issue as a rationale for imposing special requirements on the siting of drug and alcohol treatment
services, 101 courts that have examined the factual basis for such a claim have concluded uniformly that
individuals who are participating in alcohol or drug treatment services do not present a “direct threat.”102
b. The Fair Housing Act
In addition to the ADA, individuals who are in treatment or are in recovery from alcohol or drug
dependence (as well as those erroneously perceived as current drug users) are covered under the FHA’s
definition of “handicap,” as long as they are not currently using drugs illegally.103 Individuals with

100 Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc., 179 F.3d at 736-37.
101 See supra text accompanying not 38.
102

Behavioral Health Services, Inc., 2003 WL 21750852 * 7 (women’s residential treatment program
will not constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or result in substantial
physical damage to the property of others); MX Group, Inc., 293 F.3d at 342 (ample evidence that
plaintiff’s other methadone program operated without incident of criminal activity and that “methadone
clinics present no more problems in the way of drug trafficking and diversion than other facilities that
deal with lawfully administered drugs, such as hospitals and pharmacies.”); Tsombanidis v. City of West
Haven, 180 F. Supp.2d at 289 (no evidence that allowing a group home for recovering alcoholics and
drug dependent persons to operate in a single-family district would jeopardize the public health, safety,
or welfare of neighbors or would diminish property values in the neighborhood); Bay Area Addiction
Research and Treatment, Inc., 2000 WL 33716782, at 13-19 (extensive evidence that the location of a
methadone program in a residential neighborhood does not significantly increase the risk of crime in the
neighborhood, including police records that reflected no criminal activity in the area of the clinic that
was directly attributable to the clinic); See also Smith-Berch, Inc., 68 F. Supp.2d at 617-18; and Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1570 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (in case brought under the Fair
Housing Act, “[S]tudies have . . . shown that the presence of group homes has not had an impact on
crime, safety, traffic, utilities, noise, or parking.”).
103

42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) provides:
‘Handicap’ means, with respect to a person –
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alcohol dependence who do not use drugs illegally are also protected like any other individual with a
disability, as the FHA also defines “drug” to be a controlled substance,104 distinguishing between legal
and illegal drug use. An individual’s “current use” may be a more significant barrier to challenging
zoning discrimination in residence-based treatment or supportive services under the FHA than under the
ADA (to the extent Title II protections are not asserted), as the FHA does not protect persons with
“current” illegal drug use from discrimination in the receipt of health services or treatment. In several
FHA cases brought on behalf of individuals in recovery, the courts have made clear that anyone who
resides in a recovery home or transitional house will not be protected against discrimination if he or she
uses drugs illegally.105 Courts have, however, readily extended protection to individuals with histories

(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s
major life activities,
(2) a record of such an impairment,
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment,
but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).
The FHA, unlike the ADA, does not provide explicit coverage for individuals who are
participating in or have completed treatment or are otherwise rehabilitated, but the legislative history
makes clear that Congress did not intend to exclude individuals who “have recovered from an addition
[sic] or are participating in a treatment program or a self-help group such as narcotics Anonymous.”
H.R. Rpt. 100-711 (1988), U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183. Congress explained that, “[j]ust like any other
person with a disability, such as cancer or tuberculosis, former drug-dependent persons do not pose a
threat to a dwelling or its inhabitants simply on the basis of status. Depriving such individuals of
housing, or evicting them, would constitute irrational discrimination that may seriously jeopardize their
continued recovery.” Id.
104 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
105 Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 460 (D.N.J. 1992); Oxford HouseEvergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1342 (D. N.J. 1991). In addition, to address
community opposition to services for persons with histories of drug dependence, entities have
implemented clear policies that require the immediate eviction of individuals who use drugs illegally.
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of alcohol and drug dependence, including those who continue to participate in treatment.106
The FHA explicitly excludes one additional group of individuals from protection: those who
have been convicted of the illegal manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance.107 While a
conviction record does not satisfy the definition of “handicap” and, thus, would not provide a basis for
challenging a zoning decision, this defense could be used to exclude from residential treatment services
individuals whose conviction record is associated with their underlying drug dependence – a fairly
common relationship.108 The ADA, which does not contain this exclusion, should fill in the gap to avoid

Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 453 (Oxford House policy requires
individuals who resume alcohol or drug use to leave the house); Support Ministries for Persons With
AIDS, Inc. v. Cit of Waterford, N.Y., 808 F. Supp. 120, 127 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (adult day care facility for
persons with AIDS would implement drug testing policy to ensure no-drug use policy followed and
residents required to sign a contract adhering to policy and face eviction for violation); Baxter v. City of
Belleville, Ill., 720 F. Supp. 720, 733 (S.D. Ill. 1989) (any current illegal drug user would be denied
admission to residence for persons with AIDS).
th

106 See United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 917-23 (4 Cir. 1992); Elliot v. City
th

of Athens, 960 F.2d at 977 n.2 (11 Cir. 1992); Tsombanidis, 129 F. Supp.2d at 147-48; Corporation of
the Episcopal Church in Utah v. West Valley City, 119 F. Supp.2d 1215, 1219 (D. Utah 2000); Project
Life, Inc.,1998 WL 1119864 at * 2; and Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at
459-60 (D.N.J. 1992). As with many Title II zoning cases, few courts conduct a detailed analysis of
whether the individuals in treatment for alcohol or drug dependence are substantially limited in a major
life activity. Those that have examined the impact on functionality have concluded that these
impairments disrupt personal relationships and impair one’s ability to advance in education and
employment and that these impairments continue through at least the early stages of recovery. Oxford
House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 460. The Fourth Circuit in Southern
Management Corp. concluded that individuals who were prohibited from residing in an apartment
complex satisfied the “regarded as” prong, because they were denied the opportunity to obtain an
apartment – a major life activity – as a result of the management company’s perception that they would
be undesirable tenants. 955 F.2d at 919.
107 42 U.S.C. § 3607(d)(4).
108 At least one city that fought the siting of a group recovery home in a residential neighborhood has

used this exception to assert that the residents were not protected under the FHA. The court rejected as
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this result to the extent there is evidence that the tenants’ alcohol and drug dependence was also a
motivating factor in the zoning decision.
The behavior of tenants is also subject to scrutiny under the FHA via a provision that parallels
the ADA’s “qualification” requirement. The FHA bars protection for any individual who presents a
“direct threat” to the health or safety of other individuals.”109 The “direct threat” analysis outlined
above also applies under the FHA. The legislative history to this provision explains that “[a]ny claim
that an individual’s tenancy poses a direct threat and a substantial risk of harm must be established on
the basis of a history of overt acts or current conduct. Generalized assumption, subjective fears, and
speculation are insufficient to prove the requisite direct threat to others.”110

Moreover, as with Title II,

entities are required to make reasonable accommodations that could eliminate the risk.

too speculative the city’s argument that the future residents of a group recovery home would have
convictions for drug distribution or manufacturing and, thus, not be protected under the Act. Oxford
House-Evergreen, 769 F. Supp. at 1342-43.
109 Section 3604(f)(9) states:

Nothing in this subsection requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose
tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose
tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others.
th

110 H.R. Rep. No. 711, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2190. Cf.

Talley v. Lane, 13 F.3d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir. 1994) (FHA permits public housing authority to establish
tenant selection criteria to determine if applicant is eligible for housing and to consider conviction
history; public housing authority had discretion to find that individual with history of property and
assaultive crimes, allegedly related to former drug use, would be a direct threat to other tenants).
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3.

What Actions Constitute Discrimination
a.

Title II

Title II does not set out practices that constitute discrimination, but the Department of Justice
Title II regulations identify a number of practices that constitute discrimination. Practices that are
imposed with the intent to discriminate on the basis of disability as well as those that have the effect of
discriminating violate Title II.111 The standards most relevant to zoning discrimination challenges
include the following. In providing any service, a public entity is prohibited from: (1) denying a
qualified individual with a disability “the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the . . . service;”
(2) affording “an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the . . . service that is not equal to that
afforded others;” (3) providing a “service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain
the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to
others;” or (4) otherwise limiting “the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity
enjoyed by others receiving the . . . service.”112 A public entity is also prohibited from utilizing criteria
or methods of administration that “have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to
discrimination on the basis of disability”113 Finally, a public entity is prohibited from imposing
eligibility criteria “that screen out . . . an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with

111 The Supreme Court recently affirmed in a Title I employment discrimination case involving an

individual with a history of alcohol and drug dependence that the ADA prohibits practices that have a
discriminatory purpose as well as those with a discriminatory effect. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 124 S.
Ct. 513, 519-20 (2003).
112

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), and (vii) (2003).

113

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(i) (2003).
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disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service . . . unless such criteria can be shown to be
necessary for the provision of the service. . . .”114 The Title II regulations also impose an affirmative
duty on public entities officials to (1) “administer services, programs and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities”115 and (2) “make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to
avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. . . .”116
b.

The FHA

As with Title II, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has promulgated sweeping
regulations to enforce the FHA’s disability provision by invalidating practices that have either the intent
or effect of discriminating on the basis of disability. In addition to restating the statutory prohibitions
against denying or making a dwelling unavailable because of handicap,117 the FHA regulations make it
unlawful to refuse to “make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when
such accommodations may be necessary to afford [such person] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling. . . .”118 The FHA regulations also prohibit steering practices that, because of handicap,
“restrict the choices of a person . . . in . . . seeking, negotiating for, buying or renting a dwelling . . . or . .

114

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2003).

115

28 C.F.R.§ 35.130(d) (2003).

116

28 C.F.R.§ 35.130(b)(7) (2003).

117

24 C.F.R. § 100.202(a) and (b) (2003).

118

24 C.F.R. § 100.204(a) (2003).
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. discourage or obstruct choices in a community, neighborhood or development.”119 Among the
prohibited steering practices are those that discourage any person from purchasing or renting a dwelling
because of handicap and those that communicate to any prospective purchaser that he or she would not
be comfortable or compatible with existing residents because of handicap.120
4. Proving Discrimination
Protected individuals can prove zoning discrimination under Title II and the FHA in any of four
ways: they may demonstrate that officials adopted or implemented zoning standards that are facially
discriminatory; intended to discriminate (disparate treatment); have a discriminatory effect (disparate
impact) on the basis of disability; or that officials violated their reasonable accommodation obligation by
failing to modify a facially neutral zoning practice or standard in order to avoid discrimination on the
basis of disability or to permit an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.121

119

24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a) (2003).

120

24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(1) and (3) (2003).

121 The strategic advantage to a plaintiff in alleging and proving an intentional discrimination claim

under Title II is that compensatory damages are available as a remedy. Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157
F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1159 (1999); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. Of Law
Examiners, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2nd Cir. 1998), vacated in part on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999);
and Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400 (10th Cir. 1997). But see Discovery House, Inc. v.
Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 319 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversal of $1 million jury award to
drug treatment program that successfully challenged denial of zoning permit in state court; injunctive
relief alone is afforded under Title II remedy provision). Injunctive relief is available to remedy both
disparate impact and disparate treatment violations and reasonable accommodations violations. See,
e.g., First Step, Inc. v. City of New London, 247 F. Supp.2d 135, 156-57 (D. Conn. 2003) (intentional
discrimination); Behavioral Health Services, Inc. v. City of Gardena, 2003 WL 21750852 * 11 (C.D.
Cal.) (failure to provide reasonable accommodation); and MX Group. Inc., 196 F. Supp.2d at 921
(facially discriminatory zoning ordinance). Punitive damages are not available, under Title II, against a
municipality. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
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a.

Facial Discrimination

A zoning ordinance is facially invalid if it imposes on a protected group unique zoning
requirements that are not tailored to carry out a legitimate governmental interest.122 For example, some
local jurisdictions have responded to the proposed establishment of treatment programs by enacting
emergency ordinances that prohibit the program from locating within a certain distance of a residential
neighborhood or school or impose unique occupancy or notification requirements on the entity. To the
extent such restrictions have not served a legitimate governmental interest, courts have invalidated them
as facially discriminatory. 123 The same standard has been applied under the FHA.124

Under the Fair Housing Act, compensatory damages are available if a court finds either discriminatory
intent or effect or the failure to accommodate. Punitive damages and injunctive relief are also available.
The Act provides: “if the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to
occur, the court may award . . . actual and punitive damages, and . . . may grant as relief, as the court
deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order .
. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1). See Samaritan Inns, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 114 F.3d 1227, 1239
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (punitive damages against city officials); Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City of Taylor,
102 F.3d 781, 798 (6th Cir. 1996) (failure to accommodate); Support Ministries v. Village of Waterford,
N.Y., 808 F. Supp. 120, 139-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (intentional discrimination); and United States v.
Village of Marshall, Wis., 787 F. Supp. 880, 880-81 (W.D. WI. 1991) (failure to accommodate). But
see, Behavioral Health Services, Inc., 2003 WL 21750852 (compensatory damages denied for violation
of FHA reasonable accommodation requirement).
122 Some courts analyze facially discriminatory standards as a separate theory of discrimination, while

others subsume the analysis under the disparate treatment/discriminatory intent standard. See cases cited
at note 123. The Courts in Hispanic Counseling Center, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 237
F.Supp.2d 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) and Sunrise Development, Inc. v. Town of Huntington, N.Y., 62 F.
Supp.2d 762, 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) analyzed facially discriminatory ordinances under the disparate
treatment standard, while the courts in the other cases have relied upon the facial discrimination
analysis. One court has distinguished these two theories insofar as the motive of the decision maker is
irrelevant in establishing a facial discrimination claim, but is a key consideration in an intentional
discrimination claim. Marriott Senior Living Services, Inc. v. Springfield Township, 78 F. Supp.2d 376,
388 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
123 See e.g., MX Group, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 917-18, 920, aff’d, 293 F.3d at 345 (ordinance
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b.

Intentional Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)

A locality intentionally discriminates against protected individuals if its zoning decision is
“motivated, at least in part, by an unjustified consideration of the disabled status of individuals who
would be affected by the decision.”125 It is not necessary to prove that officials are motivated by a
dislike for, or animosity against, individuals with alcohol or drug dependence.126 Nor is it necessary to

imposing on methadone treatment programs maximum occupancy requirement of one person per 200
square feet of floor area discriminatory on its face and violative of the ADA); Habit Management, Inc.,
235 F.Supp.2d at 29 (ordinance prohibiting the establishment of a methadone clinic within two miles of
a school is invalid on its face); Hispanic Counseling Center, Inc., 237 F.Supp.2d at 296 (facially
discriminatory zoning ordinance that barred substance abuse treatment facilities from all business
districts preliminarily enjoined); Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc., 2000 WL 33716782
(facially discriminatory ordinance that prohibited methadone treatment program from locating within
500 feet of a residential use preliminarily enjoined); and Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery
County, Md., 823 F. Supp. 1285 (D.Md. 1993) (county licensure law that required group homes for
persons with disabilities to notify prospective neighbors of intention to locate in community and to
provide information about clients to be served and opportunity for continual input was facially
discriminatory and served no legitimate governmental interest).
th

124 See, e.g., Larkin v. State of Michigan Dept. of Social Services, 89 F.3d 285 (6 Cir. 1996) (state

licensing law that required notification to neighbors of proposed adult foster care facility and imposed
distance requirement on such facilities facially invalid); Horizon House Developmental Services, Inc. v.
Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 995 F.2d 217 (3rd Cir. 1993)
(ordinances that imposed distance requirement for “family care home for disabled persons” facially
invalid); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, Md., 823 F. Supp. 1285 (D. Md. 1993)
(licensure regulation for group homes for individuals with mental illness that required notification of
intention to site in neighborhood facially invalid); Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, 974 F.2d 43
(6th Cir. 1992) (ordinance that imposed stringent safety requirements on homes for persons with
developmental disabilities facially invalid as it did not tailor the safety requirements to the particular
disability at issue).
125

Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Md., 911 F. Supp. 918, 929 (FHA); see also Pathways
Psychosocial v. Town of Leonardtown, 133 F. Supp.2d 772, 781-82 (Title II); Tsombanidis, 129 F.
Supp.2d at 151, aff’d, 352 F.3d at 579-80.
126

Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 911 F. Supp. at 929; Innovative Health Systems, Inc., 931 F. Supp. at 241
(“To prevail on their [Title II] claim of discriminatory treatment, the plaintiffs are not required to show
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prove that city officials were motivated solely, primarily, or even predominantly by the disability of
treatment program or group home clients.127 Courts in both Title II and FHA cases apply the Arlington
Heights factors128 to evaluate both the direct and circumstantial evidence of intent to determine whether
the disability of a treatment program’s clients was a motivating factor in the implementation of its
zoning practices. Statements from officials involved in the decision-making process as well as the
public are also important evidence of intent. Even where the official decision-makers do not express
discriminatory views, “a decision made in the context of strong, discriminatory opposition becomes

the defendants were motivated by some purposeful, malicious desire to discriminate against drug and
alcohol-dependent people.”); compare Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City of
Middleton, 294 F.3d 35, 49 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002), in which the Second Circuit stated
that evidence of animus against a protected group was necessary to establish a prima facie case under
the FHA and the ADA. The Court noted that plaintiffs must present evidence that “animus against the
protected group was a significant factor in the position taken by the municipal decision-makers
themselves or by those to whom the decision-makers were knowingly responsive.” Id. Other Circuit
Courts have defined the standard of proof for intentional discrimination under the FHA as requiring
proof that the jurisdiction would have approved a zoning request “but for discriminatory animus toward
the handicapped.” Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc., 102 F.3d at 790 (plaintiffs must show that “discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor” in the city’s decision).
127

Innovative Health Systems, 931 F. Supp. at 241 (Title II); Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, Inc. v.
Town Plan and Zoning Commission of Fairfield, Conn., 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1211 (D. Conn. 1992)
(FHA); compare Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc., 294 F.3d at 49 (“a significant
factor” but not the “sole” factor as required under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).

128

The Supreme Court in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68
(1977), identified the following factors as useful in evaluating whether a decision was motivated by a
discriminatory intent: (1) the discriminatory impact of the governmental decision; (2) the decision’s
historical background; (3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision; (4)
departures from the normal procedural sequence; (5) departures from normal substantive criteria; and (6)
legislative or administrative history including contemporaneous statements by members of the decisionmaking body. Evidence need not be provided for each factor to prove discriminatory intent. See Stewart
B. McKinney Foundation, Inc., 790 F. Supp. at 1211 (FHA); Pathways Psychosocial, 133 F. Supp.2d at
781-82, and cased cited therein.
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tainted with discriminatory intent even if the decision makers personally have no strong views on the
matter.”129 Evidence of discriminatory animus has been found to exist where officials and community
members base their opposition on stereotypical fears of increased crime and decreased property values
that are not supported by facts; complaints about over-concentration of human service programs in a
particular area; bias against individuals who require drug treatment or a particular modality of treatment;
and emotional reactions rather than facts.130

129 Innovative Health Systems, 117 F.3d at 49, and cases cited therein; City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v.

Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 123 S.Ct. 1389, 1394-95 (Statements made by decision makers
or citizens who sponsored referendum during deliberation over a referendum may constitute relevant
evidence of discriminatory intent in a challenge to an ultimately enacted initiative. But discriminatory
intent by City officials not found as “the City did not enact the referendum and therefore cannot be said
to have given effect to voters’ allegedly discriminatory motives for supporting the petition.”); Regional
Economic Community Action Program, Inc., 294 F.3d at 49 (discriminatory intent can be established by
showing animus was a factor in either the decision-maker’s action or “by those to whom the decisionmakers were knowingly responsive.”); Project Life, 139 F. Supp.2d 703, 711, aff’d, 46 Fed. Appx. 147,
2002 WL 2012545 (4th Cir. 2002) (state engaged in intentional discrimination in violation of the FHA
when it refused to enter a lease agreement with a drug treatment program based on the opposition of
local officials to have the program in “their backyard” and the state’s illegal acquiescence to that desire;
state officials “acquiesced to community pressure to keep the [program] out of the community because
of discriminatory animus toward the disabled population that Project Life would serve.”); Community
Housing Trust v. Dept. of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 257 F. Supp.2d 208, 227-28 (same in
context of housing for persons with mental illness).
130 See, e.g., Regional Economic Opportunity Action Program, Inc., 294 F.3d at 49-50 (complaints by

city and planning officials that city has taken more than its share of human services programs and is
over-concentrated with half-way houses satisfied prima facie case of intentional discrimination);
Innovative Health Services, 931 F. Supp. at 243 (complaints that alcohol and drug program would affect
residents’ quality of life, security, tranquility and value of their property); Sunrise Development, Inc., 62
F. Supp.2d at 775 (community complaints that presence of persons with disabilities lowers property
values and drains community services); Support Ministries v. Village of Waterford, N.Y., 808 F. Supp.
120, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (village official’s complaint that he does not want persons who have come
out of drug rehabilitation in a house close to a playground or in the village); cf Behavioral Health
Services, Inc., 2003 WL 21750852, * 6-7 (discriminatory animus not proven even though some city
officials and contractors used stereotypes about alcoholics and drug addicts in opposing issuance of a
conditional use permit for a residential treatment program and many citizens opposed the program based
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Courts apply the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 131 burden-shifting analysis in determining
whether intentional discrimination has been established under the ADA and FHA. If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under the Arlington Heights standard, the burden shifts
to the locality to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision. To the extent the
defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the basis of
disability.132
The Second Circuit applied this standard in Innovative Health Systems v. City of White Plains, in
which an out-patient alcohol and drug treatment program claimed that the City had engaged in
intentional discrimination by denying it a building permit to locate in a business zone.133 The Second
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction, concluding that Innovative
Health Systems (IHS) would prevail on the merits. The court relied on evidence that the city had
departed from both substantive and procedural norms in denying the building permit and that zoning
officials, while not expressing discriminatory views about individuals with alcohol and drug
dependence, had acted in the context of strong, discriminatory opposition from the community and had
been tainted by those views.
on fears and stereotypes, as the Planning Commission and City Council based their denial of the permit
on the program’s impact on city services, non-compatibility with surrounding area and population
density.)
131 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
132 Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc., 294 F.3d at 49; and Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc.,

102 F.3d at 791 (once plaintiff shows defendants were motivated at least in part by discriminatory
animus, burden shifts to defendants to prove it would have made the same decision even if it had not
been motivated by an unlawful purpose).
133 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997).
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The events surrounding the denial of the permit demonstrated the City’s discriminatory decisionmaking. When IHS applied for a building permit, the city’s building commissioner determined that it
met the zoning code’s classification of a business or professional office and was entitled to locate in the
business zone. The decision was met with intense opposition from prospective neighbors, who claimed
that the program fell within the classification of a “hospital or sanitarium,” which was not permitted in
the zone. The city attorney affirmed the building commissioner’s interpretation, and distinguished
IHS’s operation from that of a “hospital or sanitarium.” Two prospective neighbors appealed the
decision to the Zoning Board of Appeals, and, at the hearing on the appeal, community members voiced
strong opposition to the program, focusing primarily on unsubstantiated fears of crime and lower
property values. The board of appeals reversed the decision of the building commissioner, without
issuing a written resolution, as required under the zoning code, addressing the commissioner’s
interpretation, which was entitled to deference, providing a rationale for classifying the program as a
“hospital or sanitarium,” or distinguishing the program’s services from that of mental health providers
who were already operating in the same area.
The Second Circuit rejected the city’s assertion that denial of the building permit was not
motivated by discrimination, and concluded that “there is little evidence in the record to support the
[board of zoning appeal’s] decision on any ground other than the need to alleviate the intense political
pressure from the surrounding community brought on by the prospect of drug- and alcohol-addicted
neighbors.”134 The Court found that the board’s decision was highly suspect because it had ignored the
zoning code’s requirements for the classification of “hospital or sanitarium,” and did not explain why it
134 Id. at 49.
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had declined to follow the building commissioner or city attorney’s interpretation of those requirements.
Moreover, it did not explain why the treatment program was not a permissible use while other providers
of mental health services were. The city, according to the Court, also failed to provide support for the
decision when challenged in the Title II action. According to the court, “the lack of a credible
justification for the zoning decision raises an additional inference that the decision was based on
impermissible factors, namely the chemical-dependent status of IHS’s clients.”135
c.

Discriminatory Effect (Disparate Impact)

The third form of discrimination – disparate impact – generally applies to zoning practices and
standards that, while neutral on their face, have a disproportionate impact on individuals with
disabilities. Some courts have applied a disparate impact analysis where a zoning practice or decision
targets a protected class and, thus, lacks facial neutrality, 136 while others have rejected the viability of a
disparate impact claim in such cases to the extent they do not challenge a neutral zoning standard that is

135 Id.
136 See, e.g., Behavioral Health Services, Inc., 2003 WL 21750852, * 6 (denial of conditional use

permit to a drug treatment program did not constitute intentional discrimination, but city’s rationale for
denial treated the program’s clients differently from others on basis of disability); Tsombanidis, 129 F.
Supp. 2d at 151-53 and 155-59; and 180 F. Supp.2d at 289-291(disparate treatment and impact analyses
applicable in challenging city’s classification of group recovery home as a “boarding house” rather than
a “family,” which resulted in the imposition of more stringent building and fire safety standards on
group home than on other residences); Smith-Berch, Inc., 68 F.Supp.2d at 621-622, (disparate impact
analysis applied to invalidate a zoning practice that required methadone treatment programs alone to
participate in a hearing process to gain zoning approval); Sunrise Development, Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d at
776 (disparate impact analysis applied in addition to disparate treatment analysis where local ordinance
imposed more burdensome zoning standards on residential care facilities for the elderly alone); and
Potomac Group Home Corp., 823 F. Supp. at 1297 (disparate impact analysis applied to invalidate a
hearing process that was selectively enforced on group homes for elderly individuals).
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also applied to a similarly situated group. 137
Courts have articulated the standard for proving disparate impact claims under the ADA and
FHA in slightly different, yet analogous, terms. Under Title II, a zoning practice has a discriminatory
effect if it imposes a disproportionate burden on a protected class of individuals with disabilities and the
public entity cannot demonstrate that the practice is necessary to the zoning scheme and that the
disproportionate burden cannot be eliminated by a reasonable modification. 138 Thus, for example, in
Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Md., the District Court invalidated a public hearing requirement
137 See, e.g., Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc., 294 F.3d at 52-53 (disparate impact

claim dismissed where challenge is to a single specific adverse zoning decision rather than a challenge
to a facially neutral policy or practice); Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306-07 (9th Cir.
1997) (disparate impact claim under FHA not established where no evidence that permit denial practices
disproportionately affect group living for persons with disabilities as opposed to other kinds of group
living); Pathways Psychosocial, 133 F. Supp.2d at 788-89 (challenge to zoning decision regarding the
zoning designation of mental health program failed to state disparate impact claim as it did not challenge
a facially neutral policy); Corporation of the Episcopal Church in Utah, 119 F. Supp.2d at 1220
(disparate impact claim not available to challenge denial of building permit for a residential drug
treatment program in a residential zone where no similarly situated group living facility would have
been permitted in the zone). This line of reasoning is unnecessarily restrictive, as nothing in the
framework of the ADA or FHA requires an individual with a disability to prove discriminatory intent in
a case that challenges the application of a zoning standard. As noted above, Title II and the FHA and
their respective regulations bar policies and practices that have either the purpose or effect of
discriminating on the basis of disability. Moreover, in many cases there is no bright line demarcation
between cases of disparate treatment and impact, as evidence of discriminatory intent is relevant to both
analyses. While a party need not provide evidence of discriminatory intent to prevail on a disparate
impact claim, such evidence is useful in establishing such a claim. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
138 Smith-Berch, Inc., 115 F. Supp.2d at 523. This standard is derived from the Title II regulatory
provision that prohibits the use of eligibility criteria the screen out or “tend to screen out” an individual
with a disability from “fully and equally enjoying any service, program or activity, unless such criteria
can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the service, program or activity being offered.” 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2003). The interpretive guidance to this provision explains that the purpose of
this standard is to invalidate policies or criteria that indirectly prevent or limit the ability of persons with
disabilities to participate. 28 C.F.R.§ 35, App. A (2003).
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that was imposed on methadone treatment programs that sought to locate in Baltimore County, finding
that it had a disparate impact under Title II. The county required methadone treatment programs to
participate in a hearing process to demonstrate that they satisfied the zoning code definition of “medical
office,” while all other drug treatment programs and medical practices were permitted to locate as of
right as a “medical office” without participating in a hearing. The court found that, while public
expression is an important part of zoning laws, the county’s requirement imposed a disproportionate
burden on a class of protected individuals – opiate addicts who require methadone to aid in their
recovery – because no other entity that provided drug treatment or general medical care was required to
participate in a hearing to locate in a business district. The county had not met its burden of proving that
the hearing requirement was necessary to its zoning scheme because the county’s own zoning officials
had construed methadone programs to fit within the zoning code’s definition of “medical office,” and,
thus, had determined that they were entitled to locate like any other general medical office. The court
did not reach the issue of whether a reasonable modification could mitigate the disproportionate burden
because the hearing requirement itself was not necessary.139
The disparate impact standard under the FHA also examines the disproportionate burden of the
zoning standard, governmental interest in the standard and the existence of alternative practices that
139 Smith-Berch, Inc., 115 F. Supp.2d at 523-24. See infra discussion at Part IV for a detailed
discussion of the Smith-Berch litigation. See also Potomac Group Home Corp., 823 F. Supp. at 1297-99
(public hearing requirement imposed on groups homes seeking licensure had a disparate impact in
violation of the FHA; hearing disproportionately affected protected class as no other group of nondisabled individuals was subjected to public scrutiny and the hearing process facilitated the expression
of prejudices and gave weight to them in the regulatory process; defendant failed to demonstrate a
legitimate interest in the hearing requirement as licensure applications were in some circumstances
reviewed without a public hearing and the members of the review boards did not possess expertise on
licensure issues, and legitimate information could be gathered in a less discriminatory fashion).
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would mitigate the burden. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating that the
challenged standard actually or predictably results in a greater adverse impact on a protected group than
on others. The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that its actions furthered a legitimate, bona
fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with a less discriminatory
effect. Some courts evaluate two other factors in determining whether a standard has a discriminatory
effect: evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant and evidence of whether plaintiffs
are seeking to require the defendant to eliminate an obstacle to housing or to affirmatively build
housing.140
This standard was applied, for example, by the federal district court for New Jersey in issuing a
preliminary injunction in favor of a group recovery home that had been denied a certificate of occupancy
in a single family district because it did not meet the definition of “family” under the locality’s zoning
code. Individuals related by blood or marriage were presumed to meet the definition of “family” and
automatically granted an occupancy certificate, while groups of unrelated individuals were required to
participate in a public hearing and demonstrate that they met indicia of “permanence and stability” to
qualify as a “family.” The court found that the locality’s standard had an adverse impact on individuals
protected under the FHA, as it imposed more stringent requirements on groups of unrelated individuals
who, because of their disability, were more likely to require a group home setting in a residential
neighborhood to facilitate their recovery. The locality defended its standard as serving the legitimate

140 Tsombanidis, 180 F. Supp.2d at 575, citing Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 934-36; LapidLaurel v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Township of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 466-67 (3rd Cir.
2002). The Second Circuit in Tsombanidis held that statistical evidence or some analytical mechanism
is required to demonstrate a disproportionate impact on the protected class in comparison to a similarly
situated group that is not affected by the policy. 352 F.3d at 575-77.
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governmental interest of ensuring that the requisite “permanency and stability” existed, which the state’s
highest court had held was a legitimate consideration. The Court rejected this justification, finding that
the locality had failed to follow state law in making this determination. Instead of applying a functional
test, capable of being met by either related or unrelated persons, the locality automatically denied an
occupancy certificate based on the group’s unrelated status. The court also found that the locality had
not demonstrated that no less restrictive alternative existed. According to the court, a waiver of the
single family requirement would impose no administrative or financial burden and would not result in a
fundamental change in the neighborhood.141
d. Reasonable Accommodation Obligation
The fourth theory for challenging zoning standards that bar services for individuals with
disabilities is the failure to satisfy the reasonable accommodation requirement. As noted above, both
Title II and the FHA impose an affirmative obligation on public entities to modify standards, rules,
services, practices and procedures to prevent discrimination on the basis of disability and to afford
persons with disabilities an equal opportunity to enjoy and use housing.142 The parameters of this
requirement and the standards for proving a violation have been fleshed out substantially since the
enactment of these provisions.143 Several Supreme Court cases that have examined the requirement in

141 Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 461-62.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 115 and 118.
143 As described below, courts in Title II and FHA cases generally agree that a requested

modification/accommodation must satisfy three criteria: it must be reasonable, necessary and not
require a fundamental alteration of the program at issue. See PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, fn.38
(2001). This standard has evolved from earlier cases in which the courts paid little attention to the first
two criteria and focused almost exclusively on the fundamental alteration factor. See, e.g., Hovsons, Inc.
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the Title I (employment discrimination) and Title III (public accommodations) contexts provide
significant guidance for understanding the scope of this obligation in the zoning context.144
First, as a general matter, the Supreme Court has made clear that the reasonable accommodation
requirement will, in some instances, require a public entity to waive a rule or standard that would not be
waived for a non-disabled individual. The Supreme Court explained in U.S. Airways v. Barnett that:
The Act requires preferences in the form of “reasonable accommodations” that are needed for
those with disabilities to obtain the same . . . opportunities that those without disabilities
automatically enjoy. By definition any special “accommodation” requires the [entity] to treat an
[individual] with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the difference in
v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096 (3rd Cir. 1996); Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941,
945 (9th Cir. 1996) (failure to eliminate annual review of a Special Use Permit violated accommodation
obligation under FHA because no persuasive justification for requirement existed and city’s power to
abate nuisances can address any problems that arise). Indeed, the Section 504 regulation that enforces
the reasonable accommodation requirement under the Rehabilitation Act and was the precursor to the
Title II regulation does not include the “necessary” factor as an element of the standard. It provides:
A recipient shall make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its
program.
28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2003).
144 Title III standards are relevant to Title II reasonable accommodations claims, as the legislative

history directed the Attorney General, when drafting the regulation, to incorporate the specific
requirements of Title III into the Title II regulations to the extent they do not conflict with the
regulations implementing Section 504. 28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A at 525 (2003). The Supreme Court
has also examined the reasonable accommodation requirement in the Title II context of
deinstitutionalization of individuals with mental illness, focusing primarily on what modification would
be deemed “reasonable” in that specific context. In Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the
Supreme Court ruled that in evaluating whether the placement of an individual in a community-based
program was reasonable or constituted a fundamental alteration, a public entity was entitled to consider
the resources available to it to serve all individuals with the mental illness and its obligation to maintain
a range of facilities. This type of resource analysis has limited applicability in determining what is
either “reasonable” or a “fundamental alteration” in the zoning context.
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treatment violates an [entity’s] disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation
beyond the Act’s potential reach. . . . . The simple fact that an accommodation would provide a
“preference” in the sense that it would permit [an individual] with a disability to violate a rule
that others must obey – cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is
not reasonable. 145
Second, Barnett confirmed that the accommodation obligation reaches rules that create barriers because
of an individual’s disability as well as rules that are not disability-based and create barriers to persons
regardless of disability.146 Thus, the reasonable accommodation requirement in the zoning context will
require a public entity to modify some neutral zoning standards that operate to exclude persons with
disabilities but have no relationship to the disability itself.147

145 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002).
th

146 See discussion in Giebeler v. M & B Assoc., 343 F.3d 1143, 1150-51 (9 Cir. 2003) (waiver of

landlord’s rental policy that forbid cosigners was a reasonable accommodation to enable an individual
with AIDS who could not otherwise afford the apartment, even though the rule applied to all prospective
tenants). In Barnett, the requested accommodation involved a waiver of a seniority system that affected
the entire workforce, not just those with disabilities. While the waiver was not deemed reasonable in
the particular case, the Court indicated that a waiver of a seniority system could be reasonable under
some circumstances. The Barnett standard implicitly overrules the Seventh Circuit holding in
Hemisphere Building Company, Inc., 171 F.3d at 440, that the duty to accommodate is limited to rules
and policies that hurt persons with disabilities “by reason of their handicap, rather than that hurt them
solely by virtue of what they have in common with other people, such as a limited amount of money to
spend on housing.” But see Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557,
561 (7th Cir. 2003) (post-Barnett case affirming Village of Richton Park standard without mentioning
Barnett).
147 This standard has been established consistently in zoning cases. For example, in Hovsons, Inc. v.

Township of Brick, supra n. 143, the Third Circuit ruled that a nursing home was entitled to a waiver of
the zoning code provision that barred all such facilities from residential areas, and rejected the locality’s
contention that authorization to locate in a hospital zone, as permitted under its zoning code, satisfied its
accommodation obligation. This standard has also been applied in cases in which a group home for
persons with disabilities seeks to locate in a single-family residence zone as a “family” but does not
meet the locality’s “family” definition (either because it is a group of unrelated individuals or because it
exceeds a cap on the number of unrelated individuals who may reside together as a “family”) and is,
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The reasonable accommodation obligation requires a public entity to make “an individualized
inquiry . . . to determine whether a specific modification for a particular person’s disability would be
reasonable under the circumstances as well as necessary for that person, and yet at the same time not
work a fundamental alteration.”148 To prevail on a reasonable accommodation claim, the plaintiff must
make an initial showing that the proposed accommodation is “reasonable” and “necessary” to prevent
discrimination on the basis of disability or provide an equal opportunity to enjoy housing. After
establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the locality to demonstrate that the accommodation
would fundamentally alter its zoning scheme or impose an undue administrative or financial burden.149

thus, subject to other requirements to locate in that residence zone. While the “family” definition would
also bar group living by unrelated individuals who are not disabled, courts have waived the standard for
group homes for individuals with disabilities, concluding that they could not reside in a residential
neighborhood without a therapeutic living environment of a group home and that a specific number of
residents in excess of the cap is needed to cover costs. See, e.g., Smith & Lee Associates, 102 F.3d at
795-96; ReMed Recovery Care Centers v. Township of Williston, Chester County, Pa., 36 F. Supp.2d
676 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (waiver of cap on number of unrelated people permitted to live in single-family
residence district required for group home for persons with brain damage to enable it to operate); Oxford
House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 462-63 (evidence supports waiver of
requirement that a group of unrelated individuals must demonstrate indicia of “family” to locate in
single-family residence district). Similarly, in Corporation of the Episcopal Church in Utah, 119 F.
Supp.2d at 1221-22, the district court held that a locality was required to provide a reasonable
accommodation to a drug treatment program that sought to locate a residential treatment program for
seventeen individuals in a single-family residence district even though the zoning code prohibited such
use in the zone and also barred similar services for non-disabled individuals. But see Forest City Daly
Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 1999) (denial of special use permit to
developer to build an assisted living facility in a business zone did not violate reasonable
accommodation requirement because comparable residences for persons without disabilities were not
permitted in the zone).
148 PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. at 688.
149 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402 (“once the plaintiff has made [the showing that an accommodation is

reasonable on its face] the defendant . . . then must show special (typically case-specific) circumstances
that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.” See also Oconomowoc Residential
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The initial showing of reasonableness, according to the Supreme Court in Barnett, requires proof
that the proposed accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, i.e. ordinarily or in the run of cases.”150
Thus, for example, the federal district court in Tsombanidis v. City of West Haven, found that a request
to waive the zoning code’s limitation on the number of unrelated persons who could reside in a single
family residence was reasonable to enable seven individuals in recovery to live in a single-family
neighborhood. The request was reasonable, according to the court, because the group recovery home
operated in a manner similar to a single family residence and the zoning code imposed no limitation on
the number of related people who may live together in a single-family neighborhood. 151
The “necessary” standard requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection or direct
linkage between the requested modification and the ability to obtain an equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling or avoid discrimination in zoning practices.152 Thus, the court in Tsombanidis

Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2002); Geibeler, 343 F.3d at 1155-58;
and Hovsons Inc., 89 F.3d at 1104. This formulation gives meaning to both the terms “reasonable” and
“undue hardship” rather than collapsing the two into a single inquiry that determines the reasonableness
of a requested accommodation based on whether it would impose an undue financial or administrative
burden. See, e.g., Smith & Lee Assoc., 102 F.3d at 795; Wisconsin Correctional Service v. City of
Milwaukee, 173 F. Supp.2d 842, 855 (E.D. Wis. 2001). This formulation also eliminates confusion as to
which party bears the ultimate burden of proof on the issue. See Barnett at 401-402. Barnett implicitly
overrules the Fourth and Fifth Circuit rulings in Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Md., 124
F.3d 597, 603-04 (4th Cir. 1997) and Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175,178 (5th Cir.
1996), which held that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof on whether an accommodation is
reasonable.
150 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401. As noted above, the proof for demonstrating “reasonableness” is different

from the proof for demonstrating “undue burden” or “fundamental alteration.”
151 Tsombanidis, 180 F.Supp.2d at 291, aff’d, 352 F3d at 580.
152 Courts have explained this requirement in varying terms. See, e.g., Giebeler, 343 F.3d at 1155
(plaintiff must show that “but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to
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concluded that lifting the cap on the number of unrelated people who could reside together in a singlefamily district was necessary because persons in recovery need to live in group homes located in singlefamily neighborhoods removed from areas where alcohol and drugs are readily available. Without the
waiver of the cap, persons in recovery would be denied the opportunity to live in a group home because
a certain number of residents is needed to make the group home model functionally successful and
economically feasible.153 Similarly, the court in Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee, found that a waiver of an ordinance that barred community living arrangements for persons
with disabilities from locating within 2,500 feet of one another was necessary to permit individuals to
move from an institution to a community-based setting. According to the court, the distance
requirement precluded new group homes from locating in most areas of the city, thereby preventing
individuals who require supportive living from residing in almost all residential neighborhoods.154
Finally, the “fundamental alteration or undue burden” standard focuses on the hardship to the
enjoy the housing of their choice”); Behavioral Health Services, Inc., 2003 WL 21750852, * 7
(accommodation is necessary if it will “ameliorate the effects of the disability of the participants.”);
Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 784 (the necessity standards requires a showing that without the required
accommodation the individual with a disability will be denied the equal opportunity to reside in a
residential neighborhood); and Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 604 (plaintiff must show a “direct linkage
between the proposed accommodation and the ‘equal opportunity’ to be provided . . . . [I]f the proposed
accommodation provides no direct amelioration of a disability’s effect, it cannot be said to be
‘necessary.’” ).
153 Tsombanidis, 180 F.Supp.2d at 290; see also ReMed Recovery Care Centers, 36 F. Supp.2d at 685
(necessity to lift cap on number of unrelated persons living in a single family residence demonstrated
where group home for persons with brain injuries could not operate financially without additional
residents and additional residents provided social and staffing benefits); but see Bryant Woods Inn, 124
F.3d at 605 (expansion of group home for elderly persons from 8 to 15 persons was not necessary to
provide therapeutic environment or to be financially viable).
154 Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 787.
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public entity in modifying its policy or practice. The Supreme Court explained in PGA Tour v. Martin
that a fundamental alteration would occur if the requested modification would either alter an essential
aspect of the activity at issue (even if it affected everyone equally) or provide to the individual with a
disability an advantage over others so as to fundamentally alter the character of the activity.155 In the
zoning context, courts evaluate how the accommodation would affect the jurisdiction’s zoning scheme,
administrative services and finances, or the particular neighborhood in which an entity seeks to locate.156
Courts have examined, for example, whether a proposed change would unduly burden municipal
services, police or emergency services, traffic or street parking, and population density in a particular
neighborhood. In evaluating this evidence, courts require specific evidence of an adverse impact, rather
than speculation or anecdotal evidence.157

155 PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 690. The Supreme Court applied this same formulation under Section

504 in its first decision on the reasonable accommodation requirement, Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413-14 (1979). In Davis, the Court ruled that the modification
requested by a nursing student who was deaf – assignment of a full time, personal supervisor when
attending patients and elimination of clinical courses from required curriculum – would constitute a
fundamental alteration in the nursing program because it compromised the essential requirements and
purpose of the program. See also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 304, 307-08 (1985) (requiring state
Medicaid officials to evaluate all proposed changes in benefits to determine whether state’s goals could
be met without disproportionately disadvantaging persons with handicaps would impose administrative
costs well beyond what is required under Davis).
156 While neither the FHA nor Title II regulations mention the “undue burden” standard, 28 C.F.R. §

35.130(b)(7) (2003), it has been read into the reasonable accommodation requirement under both laws,
and financial burdens are taken into consideration as part of the analysis. See, e.g., Olmstead v.
Zimring, 527 U.S. at 606, n. 16; and United States v. California Mobile Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413,
1417 (9th Cir. 1994).
157 See, e.g., Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 785-786 (allegations that group home for persons with brain
injuries and development disabilities will generate more police calls and impose greater burden on
emergency services is too speculative to constitute evidence of undue financial and administrative
burden and is based primarily on anecdotal evidence from the opponents of the group home).
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Thus, for example, the federal district court in Behavioral Health Services, Inc. v. City of
Gardena, concluded that the city had failed to demonstrate that issuing a conditional use permit to an
organization that sought to remodel an abandoned hospital to provide residential alcohol and drug
treatment services to women would constitute an undue administrative or financial burden or
fundamentally alter the nature of the neighborhood. The court rejected the city’s claim that the heavy
density of the project would make it incompatible with the surrounding neighborhood or impose
additional administrative burdens. According to the court, since the building already existed in the
neighborhood, the presence of the treatment program would not fundamentally alter the community’s
appearance. Moreover, since the participants would be spending most of their time on the site itself,
they would not be driving to and from the program on a regular basis. The court also noted that the zone
itself did not have a density requirement and permitted people to come and go freely without any
limitations on their numbers. The court also rejected the city’s assertion that the program would impose
additional burdens on a neighborhood park. The court reasoned that the level of use by program
participants would not differ from that of visitors to a hospital or people working at or using the building
for another commercial purpose.158
The court in Oconomowoc applied a similar fact-specific analysis in rejecting the city’s claim
that undue financial and administrative burden would result from traffic risks, and lack of sidewalks in
the proposed site and the possibility that residents would not be properly supervised based on the
defendant’s problematic history of running similar group homes in other locations. According to the

158 Behavioral Health Services, Inc., 2003 WL 21750852, * 6-7.
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court, the city had failed to demonstrate the nature or quantity of burden that the proposed facility would
impose at the site at issue in the case based on the provider’s past operational problems. Claims that
program would generate the need for more emergency services also were not based on factual evidence
that would distinguish the proposed home from any other neighborhood residences. Finally, the city’s
assertion that clustering group homes would result in disproportionate costs to emergency services did
not, according to the court, explain how those costs would be mitigated by adhering to the distance
requirement.159
Similarly, the court in Tsombanidis ruled that the city had failed to demonstrate that lifting a cap on
the number of unrelated people who could reside in a single-family neighborhood would impose any
“undue hardship” or “substantial burden.” According to the court, there was virtually no cost to
permitting seven individuals to reside in a group recovery home, as there was no evidence that the
residents would impose greater administrative or financial burdens regarding the use of city or
emergency services. Speculation on the part of residents about the risks of having persons in recovery
as neighbors was not borne out by any proof of a real threat to safety. The court also found that, since
the group home operated much like any other single-family residence, the accommodation would neither
fundamentally alter the nature of the neighborhood nor effect a fundamental change in the city’s zoning
code.160

159 Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 786.
160 Tsombanidis, 180 F.Supp.2d at 291, aff’d, 352 F.3d at 580; See also ReMed Recovery Care Centers,

36 F. Supp.2d at 684-85 (permitting three additional persons to reside in group home would not
fundamentally alter zoning laws or impose undue administrative or financial burden as home would
operate like any other family in the neighborhood, generate comparable amount of traffic, and look the
same as other buildings; no evidence of greater financial or administrative burden).
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As a procedural matter, a growing number of courts require an individual who seeks a
modification of a facially neutral standard or policy to make a formal request of the public entity before
filing a Title II or FHA action alleging a violation of the law, even if this requires the entity to go
through an administrative hearing to obtain the modification. Courts have increasingly concluded that
an accommodation claim is not ripe unless the public entity has been given an opportunity to consider
and rule on the request.161 Thus, even though Title II and the FHA do not require an individual with a
disability to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a claim,162 an individual will likely have to
participate in the locality’s administrative process to formally seek a modification of a policy or practice,
to the extent such a process exists and is required of all entities that seek waivers of a zoning standard
and is not a futile process for obtaining relief. Courts have also made clear, however, that a locality does
not satisfy its reasonable accommodation obligation by simply providing a process for seeking a

th

161 See, e.g., Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249 (8 Cir. 1996) (group home must seek

variance to operate with more than eight individuals in a residential zone before reasonable
accommodation claim under FHA is ripe; process would not be futile); U.S. v. Village of Palatine, Ill.,
37 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (7th Cir. 1994) (group recovery home must seek special use approval through a
hearing before reasonable accommodation claim under FHA is ripe; requirement is imposed on all
entities and seeking approval is not futile); Tsombanidis, 120 F. Supp.2d at 159-61, aff’d, 352F.3d at
578-79 (group recovery home must seek special use permit, an exemption or variance from city and fire
marshal before reasonable accommodation claim under ADA and FHA is ripe; process would not be
futile); Marriott Senior Living Services, Inc., 78 F. Supp.2d 376, 380(1999) (reasonable accommodation
claim not ripe where housing provider did not present final plan to locality to afford it an opportunity to
consider request for an accommodation); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, 825 F.
Supp. 1251, 1264 (E.D. Va. 1993) (FHA claims not ripe until group home applies for conditional use
permits to exceed the cap on number of unrelated people permitted to reside in residential zone).
162 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (Title II provides for the same procedural rights as are available under Section

504) and 28 C.F.R. § 35.172(b); and 42 U.S.C. § 3613(B)(2) (2003).
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waiver.163
B. Summary
These civil rights protections hold the promise that fair and non-discriminatory zoning standards
will exist for those in need of drug treatment services. They also provide the tools to challenge state and
local zoning practices that inhibit the establishment of drug treatment services when that promise is not
honored. The challenge, however, is to create the political will to implement the non-discrimination
standards on behalf of individuals who, as a group (if not individually), are unpopular and not organized
politically, and, thus, obviate the need for litigation to enforce those rights. An examination of zoning
practices in two communities offers an insight into the complexity of this problem and the starting point
for identifying potential solutions.
Part IV: Public–Private Partnerships to Bar Drug Treatment Services
The establishment of most health care services rarely evokes bitter zoning battles. Typically, a
medical practice locates an appropriate office, usually in a residential, office or business zone depending
upon the land use classifications and zoning districts under the locality’s zoning code, and with little
fanfare opens its doors for business. As demonstrated in the previous discussion, drug and alcohol
treatment providers often do not enter communities with the same ease. Some localities specifically
define alcohol and drug treatment as a distinct land use in their zoning codes and impose special
requirements – notification and public hearing, spacing or distance limitations and conditional use
standards – not required of other medical services. Other localities may classify alcohol and drug
services like other medical services but then respond to community opposition to a proposed program by
163 Oconomowoc, 300 F.3d at 785 (“the right to appeal to [the board of zoning appeals] is not in and of

itself an accommodation.”)
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taking official action to bar those services: reinterpreting zoning standards; enacting emergency zoning
ordinances that change the ground rules; and applying intense pressure to abandon a site. Vocal
opponents can forge strong alliances with local officials who, while bound by their oath of office to
represent all constituents and uphold laws prohibiting discrimination, either share the sentiments of the
opposition or see political advantage in doing so. Establishing drug treatment programs becomes a
political “third rail” in some communities.
The zoning practices in Baltimore County and Baltimore City, Maryland demonstrate this
dynamic. Both jurisdictions impose burdensome zoning standards on alcohol and drug treatment
programs that are not required of other medical services, including notification and hearing procedures
and, in the case of Baltimore City, community approval. Some residents have used these procedures to
galvanize community opposition, building on fear and stereotype rather than a factual examination of
the quality of the proposed service. Officials retain to these discriminatory standards to appease
community opposition even when treatment programs have demonstrated that they operate
harmoniously in and serve the community.
The stories that follow are typical of events that are taking place throughout the country.164 Efforts
by programs to meet the demand for treatment services are met by fairly standard concerns and fears on
164 One commentator has observed in the context of developing affordable housing that a “solid core of
concerns” surface in all communities in which developers seek to establish housing. Opponents are
generally concerned about who will be living in the housing, tenants’ behavior, such as potential
criminal activity and loitering, effect on property values, appearance and density of the proposed
housing, land use issues such as parking and traffic, and process. The opposition’s tactics, which are
similarly predictable, include: distributing flyers; holding community meetings to organize against the
development; demanding meetings with the developer; lobbying local officials; getting the media
involved; and holding public hearings. Tim Iglesias, Managing Local Opposition to Affordable
Housing: A New Approach to NIMBY, 12 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING, 78, 82 (Fall 2002).
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the part of communities. Political leaders then respond by adopting special requirements that give
communities notification of proposed programs and an opportunity to mount opposition, heighten public
scrutiny through a hearing processes or bar programs entirely from communities165

165 In some states, officials are now looking to statewide zoning legislation to bar treatment services.

For example, the Virginia General Assembly in its 2004 session adopted a bill, Senate Bill 607, that
would prohibit the siting of methadone treatment programs within a half-mile of schools and statelicensed day care centers and require notification to local jurisdictions of licensure applications. See text
at http://legis.state.va.us. This and other bills were filed in response to community opposition to several
proposed methadone programs. A newspaper account of the legislation noted that, while opponents of
such treatment programs cite the peril they pose to children, no actual incidents of criminal activity or
improper behavior had ever occurred at schools that are presently located within blocks of methadone
programs. Legislation Would All But Bar Drug Clinics, THE ROANOKE TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at B1;
Drug czar pans bill limiting methadone clinics, ROANOKE.COM, March 12, 2004. Several bills were also
introduced in the 2004 session of the Maryland General Assembly: House Bill 1244 and Senate Bill 474
would authorize methadone treatment programs to locate under the same zoning standards as a health
care practitioner’s office that provides outpatient treatment and would prohibit the application of special
exceptions, conditional use permits or procedures to methadone programs if such requirements are not
imposed on a health care practitioner’s office; and House Bill 1115 and Senate Bill 761 would authorize
licensed halfway houses for persons with alcohol and drug problems to locate in single and multi-family
residential zones on the same basis as other residences of similar density without being subject to special
exceptions, conditional use permits or procedures that are not also imposed on all other residences. See
text at http://www.mlis.us.md.
The California legislature considered a number of bills from the mid to late 1990’s relating to
residential care and treatment facilities for individuals with disabilities. The proposals were introduced
in response to perceived “over-concentration” of residential services in particular areas and put forth a
number of predictable options, including moratoriums on new residential services in specific counties,
expansion of distance requirements, municipal approval of particular types of facilities that serve
persons with criminal records. In an effort to comprehensively address these issues, the legislature
enacted in 1997 a resolution that established a Care Facilities Task Force that was asked to study the
issues related to the integration and dispersal of residential care facilities, state licensure requirements,
and local government oversight and to make recommendations regarding state regulation of residential
care and treatment facilities, taking into consideration Fair Housing Act standards. The
recommendations of the Task Force are reported in Senate Health and Human Services Committee,
“Report to the Legislature and the Governor, Senate Concurrent Resolution 27, Residential Care and
Treatment Facilities (January 31, 1998) (hereafter California Task Force Recommendations). Those
recommendations have never been implemented. Telephone Interview with Task Force Member Susan
Blacksher (February 10, 2004).
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A. Baltimore County, Maryland: Exclusion of Methadone Maintenance Treatment
In the spring of 1998, the co-owners of a methadone maintenance treatment program,166 White
Marsh Institute, undertook to challenge the denial of zoning approval for their proposed program in
Baltimore County, Maryland. 167 White Marsh Institute had located what its principals believed to be
the perfect site for a methadone treatment program – a commercial zone at the intersection of several
major transportation arteries with no nearby residential properties -- but was denied zoning approval to
open. One of the owners had tried unsuccessfully in 1993 to establish a methadone treatment program
in Baltimore County and thus suspected a pattern of discrimination against individuals with drug
dependence who required methadone to treat their opiate dependence. The facts soon revealed that,
indeed, Baltimore County had a long-standing practice of excluding methadone treatment programs.168

166

Methadone maintenance treatment is the most thoroughly researched drug treatment modality, but
remains the most controversial and misunderstood. Methadone is a synthetic narcotic that is used to
treat chronic pain, frequently associated with cancer, and is also useful in opiate dependence treatment.
In the treatment of opiate dependence, methadone is used in two ways. It is prescribed to withdraw an
individual from opiates by gradually decreasing doses of methadone over a relatively short period of
time. Methadone is also prescribed as a maintenance treatment whereby a patient is given increasing
doses over several weeks to reach the point of tolerance and is then stabilized at an appropriate dose for
an indefinite period of time. At the stabilized dose, the patient does not feel a euphoric effect from the
medication, does not experience withdrawal symptoms, and cannot achieve a euphoric effect by taking
other opiates, because methadone creates a cross-tolerance or “blockade” to such drugs. As a result, the
patient is totally functional and not sedated, and one’s efforts to get “high” by using heroin or ingesting
additional amounts of methadone are futile. THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF METHADONE TREATMENT,
supra n. 5, at 194. Methadone maintenance treatment is widely accepted as the most effective treatment
for opiate dependence. Id. at 30-31, 37.
167 I was an attorney with the Legal Action Center, a public interest law firm specializing in drug,

alcohol, AIDS, and criminal justice issues that was retained by White Marsh Institute with respect to this
matter.
168 The factual information outlined in this section is referenced in the two published opinions in SmithBerch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Md., 68 F. Supp.2d 602 (D. Md. 1999) and 115 F. Supp.2d 520 (D. Md.

72

A predictable pattern of official activity had unfolded each time a methadone treatment program
sought to locate in the County: County officials sought State intervention to halt or slow down the
siting; they facilitated community opposition behind the scenes; and they imposed, through
administrative practices or legislation, burdensome standards that resulted in the exclusion of programs.
This strategy began to take shape in 1989 when County officials faced bitter community opposition to
the opening of a satellite office for its one publicly-funded methadone treatment program. County
officials closed the program just two weeks after it had opened. Faced with the prospect of this or other
programs trying to open, County officials established a procedure that required the State Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene to give them the right to approve proposed methadone programs prior to the
State licensing such a program. The process was designed to give County officials notice of all
proposed programs169 and to provide them the opportunity to inform the community, which, in turn,
predictably organized opposition. The County adopted this procedure because methadone treatment
programs fit within the definition of a “medical office,” under the Baltimore County Zoning Code
(B.C.Z.R.), a use permitted to locate “as of right” in an area zoned for commercial businesses.170 The

2000). All documents are on file with the Legal Action Center, 236 Massachusetts Ave., N.E. Suite 505
Washington, D.C. 20002.
169

By the late 1990’s, the state was somewhat of an unwilling partner in this arrangement. State
regulations require alcohol and drug treatment programs to comply with local zoning requirements as a
condition of state certification. MD. REGS CODE tit. 10, § 10.47.01.05 (2003).

170

Section 101 of the B.C.Z.R. defines “medical office” as a “place for the treatment of outpatients by
one or more medical practitioners. The term does not include a veterinarian’s office, medical clinic,
ambulatory care center, diagnostic center, birthing center or dialysis satellite unit. The term does not
include ambulatory surgical facilities.” The County permitted all non-methadone treatment programs to
locate “as of right” as a medical office in business and commercial zones. Under the B.C.Z.R., the
medical services that were excluded from the definition of “medical office” were included in the
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pre-approval requirement provided the opportunity for administrative and political intervention, which
was not available under the County’s own zoning code.
In 1993, when several methadone treatment programs attempted to open in the County, the County
Council decided not to rely on the pre-approval process alone. It passed a resolution asking the
County’s Planning Board to consider proposing amendments to the zoning code that would define
methadone clinics and restrict them from inappropriate zones. Amendments were never proposed,
however, as the County’s Planning Office advised against the revision based on legal advice from the
county attorney. Its report noted that methadone clinics fall under the definition of “medical office” and
that it would be very difficult legally to require separate standards for methadone clinics as compared to
medical offices. As a result, no changes were made to the county’s zoning code.
In 1997, with renewed efforts by several methadone programs to locate in the County, including
White Marsh Institute, the County Council took several additional steps to prevent their operation. It
again passed a resolution asking the Baltimore County Planning Board to propose amendments to the
county zoning regulations that would define methadone clinics and drug treatment centers and specify
zones in which such programs could locate. The County Executive then asked the Secretary for the
State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to suspend the certification process for all methadone
programs that sought to locate in the County until the County Council considered these amendments.
Finally, the County voted to impose a moratorium on all new methadone programs pending the
enactment of legislation. While no such legislation was introduced or enacted at that time, the County
definition of “medical clinic.” Methadone treatment programs did not fall within this definition. This
distinction became important in 2002 when the County sought to legislate where methadone treatment
programs could site.
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never lost interest in legislating in this area. Five years later, after litigation, it succeeded in doing so in
response to renewed efforts to provide methadone treatment.
The denial of zoning approval for White Marsh Institute was notable because the co-owners had
over thirty-five years of experience in providing methadone treatment in Maryland and enjoyed a
reputation among the State’s regulators of running top-notch programs. Years of experience had taught
them to take great care in locating an office in the County, avoiding all sites that could generate
community opposition. Their proposed site was located in a small shopping mall in a heavy commercial
zone, surrounded by a sanitary landfill171 and other businesses. The closest residential area was over a
mile away.
Before signing a five-year lease for the office space, White Marsh Institute sought and received
clearance from the Baltimore County Health Department official designated under the County’s preapproval policy. It also won the acceptance of neighboring businesses in the shopping mall. But the
program ran into problems as soon as it sought an operating license from the County. The County
zoning office informed the program’s owners that the County had a “special policy” for methadone
clinics that required it to participate in a public hearing that would determine whether it qualified as a
“community care center.”172 No mention was made of the “medical office” provision or that medical

171 The fact that the treatment program would be located next to a sanitary landfill was not lost on the

community. At least one program opponent protested that the community already had “the dump” and
should not be “dumped” upon again. While alcohol and drug treatment programs are in no way
analogous to waste disposal sites and other uses that are traditionally deemed to be LULU’s – locally
undesirable land use -- communities often rank these services as having the same level of
unacceptability. See supra note 38.
172

Section 101 of the B.C.Z.R. defines “community care center” as:
A small-scale facility, sponsored or operated by a private, charitable organization or a public
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offices, including drug treatment programs that do not dispense methadone, locate as of right in business
zones without a hearing process.
Strong opposition erupted when certain community members learned about the proposed
methadone program. Some civic associations and state and local elected officials voiced their
opposition, all of which was based on the fact that individuals with drug problems would be served.
Opponents expressed the purely speculative concern that the program’s clients would engage in criminal
activity in the neighborhood. The community and elected officials also put pressure on the owners of
the building to revoke the lease. The Institute’s co-owners responded to these concerns by holding a
community meeting, responding to concerns about security, clientele and methadone treatment and by
repeatedly inviting elected officials and the community to visit their existing methadone programs in
other communities in Maryland. Those efforts were futile.
A public hearing was held in September 1997 to determine whether White Marsh Institute could
locate at the site as either a “medical office” or “community care center.” In October 1997, the Zoning
Commissioner denied White Marsh Institute the right to locate. The decision stated that community
organizations and local elected officials opposed the siting solely because of animus toward the clients
who would be served and the fear that they would be a threat to the neighborhood. White Marsh

agency, and licensed by the Maryland State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, or the
Maryland State Department of Social Services, for the housing, counseling, supervision, or
rehabilitation of alcoholics, or drug abusers, or of physically or mentally (including emotionally)
handicapped or abused individuals who are not subject to incarceration or in need of
hospitalization.
As a for-profit entity, White Marsh Institute did not fit within this definition.
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Institute was forced to surrender its five-year lease as a result of the Zoning Commission’s decision.
Community backlash was so fierce, that the owner of the mall posted a sign stating that no treatment
program was located on the premises.
In June 1998, White Marsh Institute filed suit in the federal District Court of Maryland, SmithBerch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Md., challenging the denial of zoning approval under Title II of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). One year later, the District Court denied the County’s motion
to dismiss,173 finding that the County’s special methadone policy imposed a disproportionate burden on
individuals with disabilities and would violate Title II unless the County could show that its policy was
necessary to carry out it zoning scheme. The parties entered settlement negotiations shortly thereafter,
resolved the monetary claim, and agreed that the federal District Court would resolve the request for
injunctive relief based on cross motions for summary judgment on the question of whether the County
violated the ADA by requiring Plaintiff to submit to a public hearing to determine whether a methadone
treatment programs could operate in the County rather than permitting it to locate as a medical office as
a matter of right.
In July 2000, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.174 It ruled that the
County had violated Title II because its public hearing and special exception requirements imposed a
disproportionate burden on individuals with disabilities and the hearing requirement was not necessary
173 Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, MD, 68 F. Supp.2d 602 (D. Md. 1999).
174 The relief requested in plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was carefully crafted in an effort to

prevent the county from enacting a new zoning ordinance that would impose discriminatory standards
on methadone programs. Thus, in addition to requesting a declaration that the county’s practice violated
the ADA, plaintiff also sought an injunction prohibiting the county from treating methadone programs
differently from medical offices for purposes of zoning.
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to its zoning scheme. The Court relied on evidence demonstrating that the County had consistently
construed methadone treatment programs to fit under the zoning code’s definition of “medical office”
and that its own attorney had advised that applying different standards to methadone treatment programs
was not justifiable legally. The Court concluded that the County could not impose a hearing
requirement on methadone treatment programs when that same requirement was not imposed on medical
offices and other drug treatment programs.175
The victory did not magically change the hearts or minds of the community or County officials.
Beginning in January 2001, the program searched for over a year, throughout the County, for an
appropriate building that would rent office space to a treatment program. At least one large commercial
property owner stated that it would not rent space to a drug treatment program, but many more simply
did not return calls after learning the nature of the business. In February 2002, the program finally
located a landlord willing to rent office space, and agreed to begin lease negotiations in April.
Those negotiations never took place. On April 1, 2002, the County Council introduced
legislation, Bill No. 39-02, to amend the County’s zoning code with regard to methadone treatment
programs and all other drug treatment services. The landlord backed out of the negotiations.
The events surrounding the introduction of Bill 39-02 were a rerun of the preceding decade.
Two proposed methadone treatment programs, neither of which was associated with White Marsh
Institute, had rented offices within several blocks of each other and were going through the state and
federal licensure process. When residents in the community learned of the proposed programs, some

175 Smith-Berch, Inc., 115 F. Supp.2d 520 (D. Md. 2000).
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objected vociferously.176 County Council members and state legislators responded, first, by appealing to
State officials to regulate the siting of methadone treatment programs. When State officials refused to
do so, the County Council introduced Bill No. 39-02177 and passed it on an expedited basis two weeks
later.178
Bill 39-02 vitiated the Smith-Berch relief and, indeed, imposed more burdensome zoning

176

The community’s opposition was covered widely in the press: Two Drug Clinics Posed for
Pikesville, OWINGS MILLS TIMES, March 13, 2002; Pikesville Residents Gear Up to Fight Two Proposed
Methadone Clinics, BALTIMORE JEWISH TIMES, March 14, 2002; Protesters Crash Clinic Open House,
OWINGS MILLS TIMES, March 19, 2002; A Bitter Battle, BALTIMORE JEWISH TIMES, March 20, 2002;
County Pulls Back Use Permit for Pikesville Methadone Clinic, BALTIMORE SUN, March 22, 2002;
Council Bill Would Ban Certain Medical Clinics, OWINGS MILLS TIMES, April 2, 2002; Bill Would Block
Drug Clinics Near Residences, BALTIMORE SUN, April 2, 2002; Council Measure Would Ban Some
Medical Clinics in Residential Areas, TOWSON TIMES, April 3, 2002; Clinics Foresee Legal Battles,
BALTIMORE SUN, April 22, 2002.
177 The Legal Action Center, counsel to White Marsh Institute in the Smith-Berch litigation, testified
before the County Council on Bill No. 39-02, informing the County that the Bill violated the Court’s
summary judgment order. The testimony urged the County to abandon legislative efforts that
discriminated against individuals in need of alcohol and drug treatment. Testimony on file with the
author.
178 The legislation was handled on an expedited basis because both programs were close to completing

the licensure process. The state licensure process requires proof that the programs are zoned properly,
and under the Smith-Berch decision, both programs were permitted to locate in a business zone as of
right. Thus, to bar the programs from opening, County officials had to amend the zoning standard
before the programs completed the licensure process. Bill 39-02 imposed the new zoning standards on
any program that was established after April 1, 2002 and provided a six-month grace period to comply
with the new standards to any program that was established and operating after April 1, 2002 and before
the effective date of the legislation (which turned out to be April 16, 2002). One program opened its
doors for operation the day the legislation was passed and just hours before it was signed by the County
Executive. The County asked the State to revoke the program’s license, asserting that it was not
“operating” before the enactment of the legislation, and, thus, not properly zoned. When the State
refused to do so, the County filed a zoning enforcement action to enjoin its operation. The second
program had not gotten far enough along in the licensure process to take advantage of the Smith-Berch
zoning standard.
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requirements on treatment programs than had previously existed. Under the legislation, all alcohol and
drug treatment programs are required to participate in a public hearing and obtain a special exception to
locate in any business or office zone. The ordinance also prohibits these providers from locating within
750 feet of a residentially zoned property line and imposes enhanced parking requirements -- two
requirements not imposed on other medical services. The ordinance permits treatment programs to
locate as of right only in manufacturing zones.179
Four years after the commencement of litigation, the program was back in court180 and, more
important, was no closer to providing methadone treatment to county residents. The likelihood of

179 The County Council attempted to sidestep the Court’s injunction to treat methadone programs like
medical offices by imposing these same requirements on a small segment of other medical providers –
“freestanding ambulatory care facilities.” These facilities are defined under Maryland law to include
any ambulatory surgical facility, freestanding endoscopy facility, freestanding facility utilizing major
medical equipment, kidney dialysis center, or freestanding birthing center that is not owned or operated
by a hospital. Until the enactment of Bill No. 39-02, the County’s zoning code defined these providers
as “medical clinics,” not “medical offices.” Bill No. 39-02 did not amend the definition of “medical
office” and did not impose these new restrictions on any “medical office;” they continue to locate “as of
right” in business zones and are not subject to distance or enhanced parking requirements. Thus, the
County had again treated methadone treatment programs differently than all other medical offices,
contrary to the Court’s order in Smith-Berch, Inc., and had reimposed the same zoning practices – a
public hearing and special exception requirement – that the court had ruled violated the ADA.
180 In May 2002, counsel for Smith-Berch filed a contempt motion asking the Court to find the County

in contempt of its July 2000 summary judgment order and to enjoin the enforcement of Bill No. 39-02.
In August 2002, the district court enjoined Baltimore County from enforcing the new ordinance as it
applied to methadone treatment programs. Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, Md., 216 F.Supp.2d
537 (D. Md. 2002). The County appealed the decision, asserting that the lower court had lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the contempt motion. In May 2003, the Fourth Circuit, without reaching the
merits of the underlying ADA claim, reversed the lower court and held that because the District Court’s
July 2000 order did not specify the injunctive relief that it sought to issue, as required under Rule 65(d)
Fed. R. Civ. P., the Court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the implementation of the new zoning ordinance.
The validity of Bill No. 39-02 is now the subject of litigation in Helping Hand Inc. v. Baltimore County,
Md., CCB-02-2568 (D. Md.) and START, Inc. v. Baltimore County, No. CCB-03-2051 (D. Md.).
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finding a landlord who would be willing to rent office space to any methadone treatment program was
slim and the prospect of unmitigated opposition by the County and some community members great.
The Baltimore County experience provides one model for addressing zoning discrimination against
individuals with disabilities. It focused exclusively on litigation to enforce federal civil rights. The
“win the battle, but lose the war” result raises the question of whether other legal and non-legal
strategies should be pursued in these emotionally and politically charged and complex situations. An
equally discriminatory zoning policy in the neighboring jurisdiction of Baltimore City presents a good
case study to test that question and to identify other approaches to expand access to treatment services.
B. Baltimore City: Legislating the Location of Alcohol and Drug Services
Perhaps no city in the United States is more closely identified with drug addiction than Baltimore,
Maryland. Books, movies, television series181 and headline news182 have graphically depicted the
desperate lives of individuals addicted to drugs and the devastation of entire communities because of
drug-related crime and an economy based on the drug trade. The Mayor of Baltimore, Martin O’Malley,
has called drug addiction “the crisis that is killing our city,”183 and city residents deem drug abuse to be

181 E.g., DAVID SIMON & EDWARD BURNS, THE CORNER (1998) and the Home Box Office miniseries of

the same title; DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS (1993) inspired the
television series, Homicide: Life on the Streets.
182 In the fall of 2002, the country was shocked by the firebombing deaths of Angela and Carnell

Dawson Sr. and their four young children in Baltimore’s Oliver community. The family was allegedly
targeted because Mrs. Dawson confronted drug dealers on her block and reported them to police.
O’Malley has proper focus: on city’s ills, not boosterism, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 25, 2002; Arson victim
is remembered as ‘full of life,’ BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 1, 2002; Acknowledging ‘our debt to this family,’
BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 25, 2002.
183 Grand Jury Charge, Grand Jury for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, January Term 2003. Judge

Althea Handy charged the January 2003 Grand Jury with investigating the available alcohol and drug
treatment options and the ways in which the criminal justice system could better serve defendants with
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the city’s Number One health problem.184 An estimated 58,000 adults in Baltimore City –
approximately 10% of the city’s adult population – are addicted to drugs and in need of treatment.185 In
2003, roughly 25,000 were treated in the City’s publicly funded treatment system.186 While the City has
tripled the number of treatment slots since 1996,187 its current treatment capacity serves only one in
three city residents who need such care.188 As drug treatment becomes accepted as the most cost-

drug problems.
184 BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOOD INDICATORS ALLIANCE, VITAL SIGNS FOR BALTIMORE

NEIGHBORHOODS: MEASURING BALTIMORE’S PROGRESS TOWARD STRONG NEIGHBORHOODS AND A
THRIVING CITY 13 (2002) (hereafter Vital Signs).
185 G. S. YACOUBIAN ET AL., CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH, ESTIMATING THE NEED FOR
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT IN MARYLAND: AN UPDATE OF REUTER ET AL. (1998) 18 (2002). This is
20% of the statewide adult population (roughly 286, 000 people) who are in need of treatment. Id.
The criminal justice costs of untreated drug dependence in Baltimore City are staggering. Half
of the persons charged with felony crimes in Baltimore City in 2001 were charged with felony narcotics
crimes. An estimated 70% of all cases heard in the Baltimore City Circuit Court were directly or
indirectly related to drug abuse. Approximately 90% of the homicides in the city are drug-related. The
costs to the city in crime alone are estimated to be over $3 billion. Charge Committee Report, Grand
Jury for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, January Term 2003 at 1 (hereafter Grand Jury Report) at
1-2.

186 Baltimore Substance Abuse Systems, Inc.
187 The city agency that administers the alcohol and drug treatment system gets fifty calls each day

from persons seeking drug treatment. The City’s budget for alcohol and drug treatment services has
grown from $14 million in 1995 to $60 million in 2003. Executive Director, Baltimore Substance
Abuse Systems, Inc., Speech (Apr. 29, 2003).
188 All sectors of the City, from business to government to medical to religious to legal, have

recognized the need to dramatically increase the availability of treatment to address the City’s drug
problem, and the City and State have made increased funding for treatment services a higher priority
since the mid-1990’s. DRUG STRATEGIES, SMART STEPS: TREATING BALTIMORE’S DRUG PROBLEM 8-10
(2000). The January 2003 term Grand Jury Charge Committee endorsed this public health approach.
The Grand Jury, echoing the views of experts around the country who have studied the effectiveness of
the national response to drug dependence, concluded that the City cannot arrest its way out of the drug
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effective means of enhancing public safety,189 the need for treatment slots will increase even more.
The symbolic importance of drug treatment was driven home by the Mayor in the summer of 2003
when he selected a new residential treatment program – the first of its kind to be established in the city
in thirty years190 -- as the location for announcing his reelection bid. His campaign sign – Treating
Addiction, Reducing Crime – was a powerful endorsement of treatment as critical to the City’s
rejuvenation.191 The story that was not told at that event, however, was the City Health Department’s

epidemic and that treatment and alternative sentencing practices offer a more effective and cost-effective
way to create safer and healthier communities. Grand Jury Report at 14-15. The Grand Jury specifically
recommended that the City: (1) establish a continuum of care for substance abusers that would provide
treatment and a range of supportive services, preferably in a residential setting; (2) divert non-violent
drug offenders to a “continuum of care” rather than incarceration; (3) use criminal citations rather than
arrests for offenders who are buying drugs for personal use; and (4) reexamine regulated or licensed
distribution of drugs to individuals for personal use. Grand Jury Report at 4-14.
189 The City’s treatment expansion is thought to have contributed to a reduction in violent crime in the

City. From 1999 to 2001, violent crime dropped 24% and robberies decreased 28%. After a decade of
more than 300 homicides each year, the number of homicides dropped to 261 in 2000 and 259 in 2001.
STEPS TO SUCCESS, supra n. 25, at 6. The trends in drug-related health problems have dramatically
improved with the expansion of treatment services. The number of drug-related emergency room visits
for cocaine and heroin problems fell by 19% in 2001, the largest drop among cities in the United States,
see data at http://www.DrugAbuseStatistics.SAMHSA.gov. The number of overdose deaths in Baltimore
dropped from 343 in 1999 to 334 in 2000 and 306 in 2001. DANA LEHDER ET AL., CENTER FOR
SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH ALCOHOL AND DRUG-RELATED OVERDOSE DEATHS IN MARYLAND 7
(2002), at http://www.dewsonline.org/dews/pubs/me11-02.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2004). In addition, the rate
of syphilis dropped significantly during the period 1999 to 2001. MARYLAND DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
MENTAL HYGIENE, DIVISION OF SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES, at http://edcp.org/pdf/P&S_19932002.pdfId. (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
190 BALTIMORE SUN, June 24, 2003. Providing drug treatment is one component of the Mayor’s two-

pronged approach to fighting crime. Creating a persistent police presence to ward off drug dealers is the
other component.
191 One must question, however, whether the seemingly inextricable linking of treatment to crime

further promotes the stigmatized view of treatment.
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struggle to get zoning approval to site this treatment program.192 Like all other drug treatment providers
in Baltimore, the Health Department was required to obtain the enactment of a city ordinance – a
conditional use ordinance -- authorizing the siting of the program. This involved obtaining community
approval for the program, submitting extensive information to the city’s Planning Department, and
participating in two separate public hearings before the Planning Commission and the City Council; a
process that took over eight months to complete.193
In a City that has, from all appearances, bought into the concept of drug addiction as a treatable
disease, it has surrendered to the political nature of drug control by adopting a zoning policy that places
a premium on public sentiment, rather than objective facts about the magnitude of the need for treatment
and quality of services. It also relies upon elected officials to introduce and support legislation (the
conditional use ordinance) that, if unpopular with vocal constituents, could harm one’s political career.

192 The City does not own or operate this or other treatment programs, but the Health Department took

the unusual step of purchasing the building and obtaining zoning approval before awarding a bid for the
operation of the program. The treatment program, Gaudenzia Baltimore, is located in the Park Heights
community, which is located in the City’s zip code that had the second largest number of people served
by drug treatment programs in 2001 and the second largest number of diagnosed AIDS cases for the
period 1981-2002. VITAL SIGNS, supra n. 184, at 38-39.
193 The Health Department staff person who marshaled the project through the process described it as a

“bureaucratic nightmare.” The City attorney’s office took several months to determine the proper
zoning process for a residential treatment program. Once the conditional ordinance process was
commenced, the Planning Department could not adequately describe the information that needed to be
provided and then sought information that was not available because of the unique nature of the project.
Obtaining community approval was time consuming because of the multiple neighborhood associations
that had to be consulted on the project. Finally, approval required the seemingly repetitive process of
public notice and a public hearing before two different city authorities. The staff person concluded that
the effort takes sophistication, political connections and an ability to navigate an unhelpful bureaucracy
– skills that some providers do not have. Telephone Interview with Baltimore City Health Department
Staff (June 27, 2001).
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While zoning matters often pull public officials into the political fray, the underlying standard for siting
treatment programs turns the process itself into a political contest. In the current environment, the
standard is nothing less than hostile to the establishment of treatment programs.
1.

Baltimore City Zoning Standards
a. Conditional Use Ordinance (CO)

Under the Baltimore City Zoning Code, a provider who seeks to establish an outpatient treatment
program194 or a residential program serving more than eight individuals195 is required to obtain a

194 Non-residential treatment services are covered under the zoning classification “substance abuse

treatment center” and defined as:
a facility that provides and represents or advertises itself as providing:
(1) nonresidential counseling, treatment, care, medication or rehabilitation for individuals who
show the effects of substance abuse; or
(2) transportation of individuals for the purpose of substance abuse treatment, care, medication,
or rehabilitation.
BALTIMORE MD. ZONING CODE, COMPACT EDITION, TITLE 1 § 1-194 (2000). Non-residential treatment
programs include a variety of out-patient counseling services (both intensive and non-intensive) and
medication assisted treatment (such as methadone treatment), all of which must be certified by the State
to operate. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 8-403 (b) (2003); and MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, §
10.47.03.01 (2003).
195 Residential treatment programs are covered under the term “homes for non-bedridden alcoholics or

homeless persons,” which is not defined in the code, or the term “family.” The zoning code defines
“family” to include a group of not more than four (4) unrelated people living together as a single
housekeeping unit (BALTIMORE MD. ZONING CODE, supra n. 192), but the City Planning Department has,
since mid 2002, permitted groups of eight (8) unrelated people to live together under the definition of
“family.” Residential services include halfway houses and intermediate care facilities, which must be
certified by the State to operate. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, §§ 10.47.02.06, 10.47.02.07, and
10.47.02.08 (2003) In addition, group recovery homes, which provide a clean and sober living
environment for persons (some of whom have participated in or continue to participate in treatment) as
well as non-therapeutic support services, are not licensed by the State. These housing services fill an
important gap in the continuum of care for individuals who have begun their recovery but are either
homeless or want to avoid returning to a drug-using home environment. Group recovery homes with up
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conditional use ordinance to locate in any part of the city.196 A conditional use ordinance (hereafter CO)
is zoning legislation that is enacted through the municipal legislative process. The program is required
to have a city council member sponsor the conditional use bill, post notice of the requested authorization
after the bill has been introduced in the City Council, and then submit detailed information about the
proposed site and its operation to the City’s Planning Department, which makes recommendations to the
Planning Commission about whether it should support the legislation.197 During this review process, the

to eight individuals can locate under the definition of “family,” which are permitted to locate “as of
right” without going through a zoning process. Larger group homes are required to locate under the
term “homes for non-bedridden alcoholics and homeless persons” and must obtain a conditional use
ordinance.
196 The conditional use ordinance requirement for alcohol and drug services is also included in the city

code provision that regulates health facilities. The provision prohibits the establishment of any home for
the rehabilitation of non-bedridden alcoholics or substance abuse treatment center “unless authorized by
an ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.” BALTIMORE CITY REV. CODE, HEALTH, HE §
3-101. A violation of this requirement can result in the issuance of an order by the Health
Commissioner to discontinue all operations within ten days of the order. HE § 3-104. Providers that
fail to comply with such an order are guilty of a misdemeanor and can be fined up to $1,000 for each
day of operation. HE § 3-107.
197 Under the zoning code, the City Council is required to refer the bill to the Board of Municipal and

Zoning Appeals (BMZA), the Planning Commission and any other relevant agency for their written
reports and recommendations. The agencies are required to submit their recommendations to the City
Council within 100 days of introduction of the bill. BALTIMORE MD. ZONING CODE, COMPACT EDITION,
TITLE 16 §§ 16-203, 301, and 302 (2000).
The Planning Commission’s recommendations (as well as the BMZA’s) are to be based on a
number of zoning considerations including: (1) the nature of the proposed site, including size and
shape; (2) resulting traffic pattern and adequacy of off-street parking; (3) nature of the surrounding area
and extent to which the proposed use might impair its development; (4) proximity of other places of
public gathering, such as churches and schools; (5) accessibility of fire and police protection; (6)
accessibility of light and air; (7) type and location of adequate utilities, access roads, drainage and other
necessary facilities; (8) preservation of historic and cultural landmarks; (9) provisions of the City Master
Plan; (10) provisions of any applicable Urban Renewal Plan; (11) all applicable requirements of the
zoning code; (12) the intent and purpose of the zoning code; and (13) any other matter of interest to the
general public. BALTIMORE MD. ZONING CODE, COMPACT EDITION, TITLE 14 § 14-205. Section 16-304
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Planning Department also ascertains community sentiment about the proposed program by identifying
neighborhood associations that the program is required to meet with and get community approval
from.198 The community approval requirement is not contained in the CO provision of the zoning code,
but it is the linchpin of the siting process for alcohol and drug treatment programs. Failure to obtain
community approval or to agree to “conditions” requested by the community199 during that process will
kill the legislation.
Upon completing its review, the Planning Department prepares a report for the Planning
Commission, which, in turn, hears the proposal at a public hearing. The same neighborhood
associations that were consulted previously are notified of the hearing and given an opportunity to
of the Zoning Code incorporates these considerations for a CO. While these considerations guide the
Planning Department’s information gathering process, the Planning Commission report does not address
these issues directly.
198 This information is based on extensive interviews of alcohol and drug treatment providers that the

author conducted from June 2001 through January 2002 and September 2002 to May 2003. Treatment
programs have been identified by numbers to protect their privacy. Interview notes are on file with the
author.
Telephone Interview with Baltimore City Health Department Staff (June 27, 2001); Personal
Interview with Director of Program 1 (June 28, 2001); Telephone Interview with Director of Program 6
(Jan. 8, 2002); Telephone Interview with Director of Program 18 (Jan. 7, 2002); Telephone Interview
with Contracts and Development Officer of Program 15 (May 20, 2003).
199 Treatment providers have been required to limit the number of clients who will be served as a

condition of obtaining a favorable recommendation. Telephone Interview with Director of Program 1
(July 20, 2001); Personal Interview with Director of Program 16 (June 28, 2001); Telephone Interview
with President of the Board of Directors of Program 13 (July 27, 2001). The Planning Department uses
the zoning process to deal with programmatic issues and to evaluate whether the proposed facility will
create problems for the neighbors. Telephone Interview with former Division Manager, Current
Planning, Baltimore City Planning Department (September 5, 2001). Thus, a program’s operating
hours, plans for where clients may congregate and smoke and the movement of clients in and out of the
facility are scrutinized. Telephone Interview with Baltimore City Health Department Staff (June 27,
2001); Telephone Interview with Director of Program 1 (July 20, 2001).
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testify. Once the reports have been filed with the City Council, the Council’s Land Use Committee must
also conduct a hearing on the bill. The public is again provided notice of the hearing and given an
opportunity to testify. Following the hearing, the Council votes on the bill, and, if passed, sends it to the
Mayor for signature. As a legislative process, there is no right to appeal the Council’s rejection of the
bill or the Mayor’s refusal to sign the legislation.
The CO process is imposed on land uses that are controversial200 and is designed to make officials
“listen to the community” and “help clean up the community.”201 The power of the community in
determining the outcome of the CO process was demonstrated by the public flailing of one well
respected, out-patient treatment program that had served the city for over 30 years. The Director of the
program, hoping to provide a permanent home for her non-profit program, had purchased and renovated
a building several blocks from the site it had occupied for ten years. In the summer of 2002, she moved
her program into the building without first obtaining a CO.202 The new office sat on the perimeter of an
upper income, predominantly white community that is separated by a major road from a lower-income,
predominately African-American community. The African-American community from which the

200 For example, other land uses that are required to obtain a CO include: adult entertainment, adult

book stores, community correction centers, incinerators, parole and probation offices; racetracks,
recyclable materials recovery centers, and stadiums. Convalescent and nursing homes are the only other
land use that is required to obtain a CO to locate in every zoning district in the city. BALTIMORE MD.
ZONING CODE, COMPACT EDITION, Chart (2000).
201 Telephone Interview with former Division Manager, Current Planning Division, Baltimore City

Planning Department (Sept. 5, 2001).
202 The program operated two out-patient programs and four halfway houses in different locations
throughout the city, but had never obtained a CO previously. Telephone Interview, Director of Program
6 (Jan. 7, 2002).
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program had moved wholeheartedly supported the treatment program. While the provider thought that
the new location, which was half a block from the major artery, was located in that same community,
she had, in fact, entered an entirely different racial and socio-economic community. A single neighbor’s
complaints to zoning officials about music and cigarette smoke coming from the program’s parking lot
triggered an investigation that revealed the program’s failure to obtain a CO. The City Health
Department abruptly closed the program pending compliance with that process.
The program’s director, in an effort to win public support, held an open house to answer questions
and inform residents about the program’s services and unblemished track record.203 The meeting turned
into an angry indictment of the program, characterized by stereotypical fears about the clients.204 The
community, insulted that it had not been consulted before the program had moved in, voiced
unsubstantiated concerns about increased crime and lower property values. Some speculated about the
program serving sexual predators, inebriated individuals roaming the neighborhood, and unspecified, yet
seemingly predictable, disruptions to the neighborhood. Others warned that the substantial tax base that
was represented by those in the room did not have to remain in the city and that the program was simply
203 The meeting was held on September 17, 2002. Notes from that meeting are on file with the author.

Prior to the meeting, the neighborhood association submitted a list of over 50 questions to the Health
Department. A copy of those questions is also on file with the author.
204 The Director provided a profile of her clients, who typically were employed, entered treatment either

through Drug Court referrals, school or self- referrals and traveled to the program by bus. The program
did not accept individuals with violent criminal records, but only those with non-violent, drug-related
crimes. The program, like other publicly funded programs in Baltimore City, is required to reserve a
certain number of treatment slots for individuals referred from the criminal justice system. Indeed, one
of the residents who participated in the meeting, but lent no vocal support, was a local judge who had
referred criminal defendants to the program. The program routinely monitors clients for drug use
through standard drug testing protocols and refers clients who continue to use drugs while enrolled in
the program to detoxification services.
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in the “wrong neighborhood” and should be located where “these people lived.” The City’s Health
Commissioner, who participated in the community meeting, acknowledged the good treatment outcomes
that the program had achieved consistently, but berated the program’s director for undermining the
City’s progress in expanding treatment by ignoring the CO process. He assured residents repeatedly that
the City would not permit the program to locate in the community if they did not want it there.
Following this cue, the neighborhood association voted to oppose the program rather than negotiate
“conditions” under which the program could operate. The director abandoned her effort to obtain a CO,
being advised by the City’s Planning Department that the bill would go nowhere without support of the
Health Department. The director put the building on the market and returned to its previous location. 205
No other health care service is subjected to this process when seeking to locate in any zoning
district in the City.206 Outpatient medical services are permitted to locate as of right in certain business

The outcome of this zoning battle can best be understood as a socio-economic and racial clash with
the politically powerful prevailing. At the same time, programs face the same opposition in some
neighborhoods whose residents and community leaders are engaged in the CO process from the start,
and whose residents are lower-income individuals who, when seeking care for addiction, would access
such services at non-profit treatment programs. This has been driven home to one of the City’s most
respected residential treatment providers that sought to expand an existing halfway house program for
women on a one-acre plot in a predominately African-American, multi-family dwelling neighborhood.
The provider met with community leaders to discuss its plans as funding-raising progressed and invited
them to visit its residential treatment program. The community association rejected the program’s offer,
noting that it did not want additional treatment services in the neighborhood. The provider hired an
outside consultant to “sell” the program to the community, but was awaiting the introduction of a bill
almost one-year into that process. Telephone Interview, Contracts and Development Officer of Program
15 (May 20, 2003).

205

206 Hospitals are required to obtain a CO to locate in particular residence and business districts, but are

also permitted to locate “as of right” without going through any zoning process in residence districts
with higher density dwellings and several business districts. BALTIMORE MD. ZONING CODE, COMPACT
EDITION, Chart (2000).
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and industrial districts and a mixed office and residence district under two land use categories.207 Outpatient mental health services and psychiatric rehabilitation programs, which provide many of the same
types of counseling services as alcohol and drug treatment programs and serve persons with dual
diagnoses of mental health and substance abuse, locate as of right in many zoning districts in the City
under the “office” land use category. Residential services for persons with mental illness also locate as
of right, pursuant to a state law that preempts local standards for group homes.208 Thus, drug and
alcohol treatment services must comply with far more burdensome zoning standards than other similarly
situated health services.
i.

Origin of the Conditional Ordinance Process

The CO process is the legacy of zoning discrimination against persons who sought alcohol
treatment in the mid-1950’s. Not unlike current practices, the City incarcerated, rather than treated,
alcoholics at that time, and private entities attempted to provide alternatives by establishing recovery
homes. Zoning officials attempted to shut down the homes operated by one of these organizations, the
Flynn Christian Fellowship Houses, Inc., but sparked a three-year legal and legislative battle that
207 The “office” use, an undefined term in the zoning code, permits business, professional and

governmental offices with no sales or bulk storage to locate as of right in the office-residence district
and five business districts. BALTIMORE MD. ZONING CODE, COMPACT EDITION, Chart (2000). The “clinic:
medical or dental” use is defined as “a building the principal use of which is for offices of physicians or
dentists for the examination and treatment of people on an out-patient basis.” BALTIMORE MD. ZONING
CODE, COMPACT EDITION, TITLE 1 § 1-126 (2000).
208 Licensed group homes for persons with mental illness that have up to eight residents are permitted

to locate as of right in any residential zone. Group homes with nine to sixteen residents are permitted to
locate as of right in any multi-family zoning district. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §§ 10-514 and 10518 (2003). State law also prohibits the application of any special exception, conditional use permit or
procedure to these group homes that differs from those that are applied to single-family or multi-family
dwellings. HEALTH-GEN. I § 10-518(b)(3) (2003).
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culminated in the enactment of the CO process.
Beginning in 1958, Flynn Houses proposed, but could not win approval of, zoning legislation that
would have permitted the recovery homes to operate either as of right or with the approval of the Board
of Municipal and Zoning Appeals (BMZA) in residential neighborhoods.209 In 1962, however, the City
Council approved legislation that, for the first time and over the objections of the BMZA, authorized the
City Council to grant a conditional use to “homes for non-bedridden alcoholics and for the care and
custody of homeless persons.”210 The new standard permitted neighborhoods to vote on whether a
recovery home could locate in their area.
In 1971, when the City adopted its Zoning Code, it required a conditional use ordinance for
“homes for non-bedridden alcoholics and homeless persons.” One year later, the City added the land
use “drug abuse rehabilitation and treatment centers” and adopted the conditional use ordinance process
for all drug and alcohol treatment programs (both out-patient and residential). City officials were quite
explicit in 1972 that they were adopting the CO practice so that communities could bar treatment
programs from their neighborhoods because of the fear that they would attract drug addicts and the
crime associated with those individuals.211

209 The legislative history reveals that the Planning Commission objected to a proposal that the recovery

homes locate “as of right” in residential districts because the “homes . . . could result in misuses which
would be a serious nuisance to adjoining residential properties.” The Commission noted that the
location of such homes “should be subject to individual consideration and controls, guides and standards
. . . .” Journal, City Council of Baltimore, Nov. 16, 1959, at 537.
210 Journal, City Council of Baltimore, Jan. 29, 1962, at 1126.
211 The Planning Commission advised at the time that the CO process was appropriate because it

permitted the City Council to impose conditions and restrictions on the establishment, location,
construction, maintenance and operation of the programs to “reduce or minimize any effect of such use
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The zoning code standard for residential and out-patient treatment programs has remained the
same since 1972, with only one significant modification. In 1994, the City Council adopted a definition
for the term “drug abuse rehabilitation and treatment centers” to ensure that treatment programs would
not evade the CO process. The legislation was offered in response to public opposition to one particular
methadone treatment program that bussed clients to a program in a neighboring county for treatment.
The community complained about loitering, littering and property damage by clients who were not
supervised while waiting for the bus.212 City officials discovered that the program had not gone through
the CO process, but had located as of right in a business district as a medical office. The Director of the
Planning Commission approved of the legislation, which defined what constituted a treatment program,
to ensure that “proper review and community input” occurs prior to permitting the use in any
neighborhood.213
The history demonstrates that, at every critical juncture, City officials adopted its zoning

upon other properties in the neighborhood.” Journal, City Council of Baltimore, Jan. 24, 1972, at 34849. The Planning Department noted that the public hearing would ensure community input (Id. at 349),
and the City’s Commissioner of Health predicted the tenor of community input:
The primary problem involved with drug abuse rehabilitation centers is their location. Rightly
so, many communities do not want such a center in their neighborhood because of the fear that it
will attract drug addicts and the crime associated with such addicts to their areas. The best way
that this problem can be handled is through zoning where both the City Council and the Zoning
Commission can hold public hearings to determine where such a center can or cannot be located.
Journal, City of Baltimore, Apr. 17, 1972, at 432.
212 Planning Commission Staff Report on City Council Bill # 951, Nov. 3, 1994; City Council Hearing

Notes, Nov. 9, 1994.
213 Charles C. Graves III, Planning Commission Staff Report on City Council Bill # 951, Nov. 3, 1994.

93

standards in response to public concerns and bias against individuals who needed alcohol and drug
services. The city also adopted standards that would ensure the greatest level of regulation and
community control in the siting process.
b. Conditional Use Board Process
In contrast to the CO process, the City zoning code also provides for a second conditional use
process, referred to as the conditional use board (CB) process, that is a traditional administrative (not
political) process. The process is generally required for land uses that seek to locate in a zoning district
for which they are not permitted as of right.214 The process is more streamlined than the CO with less
agency involvement and scrutiny, fewer layers of review and significantly less deference to the
community. The decision-maker in the process, the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals (BMZA),
is an appointed body and, thus, not subject to the same political influences and considerations as the City
Council. The whole process can be completed within two months.
In evaluating an application for a CB, the BMZA conducts a hearing for which the public is
given notice through posting and an opportunity to present its views. Community approval, however, is
neither sought nor required. To approve a conditional use, the BMZA must find that the use will not be
detrimental to or endanger the public and the authorization is consistent with the purpose and intent of
the zoning code.215 In practice, the BMZA presumes that the applicant meets the required findings

214 For example, a medical and dental clinic is permitted to locate in the office-residence district if it

obtains a CB and physicians and dentists may open an office in several residence districts with a CB.
Consumer-run programs that provide social and recreational services for persons with mental illness are
permitted to locate in any residence district or the office-residence district with a CB. BALTIMORE MD.
ZONING CODE, COMPACT EDITION, Chart (2000).
215 BALTIMORE MD. ZONING CODE, COMPACT EDITION, TITLE 14 § 14-204 (2000).
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unless demonstrated otherwise. Applicants may appeal an adverse BMZA decision to the courts.216
2.

Impact of the Conditional Ordinance Process on Establishing Treatment Programs

The foiled efforts to establish treatment programs described above are not isolated cases. The CO
process has prevented and delayed the establishment of many treatment programs in Baltimore. The
impact of the CO process, like its purpose and history, is critical to evaluating its legality.
Treatment providers have responded to the CO process in three ways – adopting both the
concealment and resistance strategies to a stigmatizing procedure.217 First, some providers have located
without going through the conditional ordinance and approval processes, at times with the tacit approval
and guidance of zoning officials. Providers have avoided the process through: (1) the intervention of
landlords both with and without informal community approval;218 (2) structuring residential services to

216 BALTIMORE MD. ZONING CODE, COMPACT EDITION, TITLE 14 § 17-302 (2000).
217 See supra note 198.
218 For example, one publicly-funded program that provides a range of out-patient alcohol and drug

services as well as mental health and primary medical care was told that it could not move into a
particular building because the community already had the maximum number of social service
organizations it could support. The program was prepared to back out of the plan, but the landlord
facilitated a meeting with the neighborhood association, which then approved the siting of the program.
The provider did not go through the CO process at that time, but upon returning to a previous location
five years later was required to do so. Telephone Interview with Executive Director of Program 1 (July
20, 2001). A second out-patient program opened with the approval of the landlord who indicated that
the program could open as a medical office as long as no medications were being dispensed. Telephone
Interview with Director of Program 2 (Jan. 8, 2001). A third program had the same experience – siting
upon the landlord’s confirmation that the building was properly zoned for an out-patient drug treatment
program – only to learn several years later when the program sought to expand its services that a CO
was required. When the neighborhood association learned that the program provided alcohol and drug
treatment services, it complained to zoning enforcement officials who threatened to close the program
for failing to have a CO. The neighborhood association ultimately voted in favor of the program
remaining in its location on the condition that it remove its sign, not expand its services and operate
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fit under the definition of “family” and relying on the Fair Housing Act’s non-discrimination
standards;219 and (3) locating under the “office” use, at times by not identifying that they provide alcohol
or drug services.220 While some providers were not aware of the CO requirement, others consciously
avoided the process because of the community approval requirement.221 This has resulted in an

under a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. Personal Interview with Director of Program 3 (June 28, 2001).
219 Halfway houses and group recovery homes have located under the “family” designation, rather than
the “homes for non-bedridden alcoholics” use, and have exceeded the four-person cap on unrelated
individuals even before the Planning Department lifted that cap to eight persons in 2002. (see supra
note 195.) For example, a six-month residential program for twelve women and children located in two
adjacent townhouses under the designation of “family” with the approval of the landlord alone.
Telephone Interview with Director of Program 4 (June 2001). Housing and zoning officials have
advised a number of group home providers whose homes serve five to twelve persons without going
through the CO process, asserting that federal anti-discrimination statutes protect individuals with
disabilities that seek to live together. Telephone Interview with Executive Director of Program 5 (Aug.
3, 2001); Telephone Interview with Executive Director of Program 6 (Jan. 7, 2002); Telephone
Interview Executive Director of Program 7 (Jan., 8, 2002).
220 For example, one program, which provides both mental health and alcohol and drug treatment,

sought to relocate after one neighborhood association asked city zoning officials to close the program.
While the zoning office refused to close the program, it would not permit the program to expand its
services and advised it to be as invisible as possible and not advertise its services. When the program
found a new location, the zoning office advised the program to operate as of right as a mental health
clinic and did not require it to go through the CO process. Telephone Interview with Director of
Program 8 (July 18, 2001). Similarly, the Director of Program 6 opened a second out-patient counseling
program in a shopping mall without going through the CO process based on the guidance of a City
Council member and city planner. Both advised that the CO process could be avoided if the application
for an occupancy permit omitted information about alcohol and drug treatment services. Telephone
Interview with Director of the Program 6 (Jan. 8, 2002).
221 When one state certified halfway house, that had been in operation since 1972, moved to a new

location in the late 1990’s, the director decided not to seek a CO because he had attended a
neighborhood association meeting in which some residents expressed the view that the area had enough
drug treatment and did not want more. Afraid to approach the neighborhood for fear of stirring up
opposition, the director maintains a low profile and does not engage the community. Telephone
Interview with Director of Program 9 (January 7, 2002).
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inconsistent application of the zoning standard.
Second, some providers have structured their out-patient and residential services to avoid going
through the conditional use ordinance and community approval processes.222 They have chosen this
course because of the complex and time-consuming nature of the ordinance process223 as well as the real
and perceived difficulty in obtaining community approval. This has resulted in programs limiting the

222 For example, a crisis intervention center for individuals with mental health and alcohol and drug

problems provides detoxification services to individuals in an apartment building. Patients undergoing
detoxification live in individual apartments, with two people per apartment, to fit under the zoning
code’s definition of “family.” The program would like to have a free-standing center with
comprehensive services, but has been deterred by the prospect of having to obtain community approval.
Personal and Telephone Interviews with Director of Program 10 (June 28 and July 19, 2001).
A methadone treatment program has resorted to providing treatment through mobile units that
dispense medication at three different sites in the City in order to avoid obtaining community approval.
While the mobile units make care more accessible, clients must go to a second location to obtain
counseling and medical examinations. The arrangement also creates numerous operational and staffing
problems: the program’s vans, medication and counseling services are in three different locations;
alternative dosing arrangements must be made when the vans break down or are snowed-in; and nursing
staff are difficult to retain in a mobile treatment program. The program would like to consolidate its
services in one location but is certain that it could not obtain community approval for a new fixed site
location. Telephone Interview with Executive Director of Program 11 (Aug. 2, 2001). Ironically, the
program, which was created as a mobile service to avoid the CO process, faced the prospect of having to
obtain a CO when it sought to deal creatively with an aging fleet of vans. To extend the life of the van
generators, the program decided to install a utility pole in the church parking lot from which is operates
so that it could use an external power source to provide heat and air conditioning. Zoning officials
initially informed the program that it would be deemed a fixed site if it plugged the van into the external
power source, and, thus, be required to obtain a CO. The program resolved the problem by having the
church install the utility pole in its name. Telephone Interview with Executive Director of Program 11
(September 30, 2002). This situation highlights the administrative and fiscal drain the CO process
imposes on providers that seek nothing more than to provide a medical service.
223 One treatment program opted to cap the number of women it would serve in its halfway house

because of the time and effort involved in obtaining a CO. Rather than establish two halfway houses for
six women each, it opted to limit the capacity in each to four women. Telephone Interview with
Executive Director and Program Manager of Program 12 (January 7, 2002).
97

number of individuals who will receive care, choosing not to expand capacity and providing less
coordinated services.
Third, some providers have undertaken the ordinance and approval processes, but have spent
significant time and resources garnering support from multiple neighborhood associations, developing
detailed information for city zoning officials, negotiating with city officials based on community input,
and participating in duplicative hearings.224 This lengthy process, which hinges on community approval,
adversely affects all alcohol and drug providers and their clients by exposing them to intense public
scrutiny and, at times, discriminatory animus. Some providers have not succeeded in obtaining approval
because of community opposition to the clients who will be served,225 while others have experienced
significant delays and increased costs in establishing or relocating services.226

224 See supra note 193. When Program 16, a methadone treatment program that has operated in the city

since 1971, sought to relocate in the mid-1990s, the process took nine (9) months.
225 For example, one of the City’s oldest methadone treatment programs had considered moving its
program in the late 1990’s and started seeking the support of the neighborhood associations. The
community objected to the methadone treatment modality, so the Director decided to back off.
Telephone Interview with Director of Program 13 (July 20, 2001). A well established residential
treatment provider in Maryland spent over three years looking for a site for a women’s residential
treatment program and going through the zoning process. It lost two potential sites because of
neighborhood opposition. At one community meeting, a council member expressed the view that the
neighborhood had enough non-profits and drug treatment and did not want another. The program’s
representative concluded that the biggest impediment to establishing treatment services was winning
community and council support: vocal opponents go to council members who then erect barriers.
Telephone Interview with staff person of Program 14 (Aug. 17, 2001).
226 One outpatient treatment program worked with the community associations for two years before

receiving community approval. The community turned a deaf ear to the program initially because one
resident had intentionally circulated false information that the program would be a methadone treatment
program. The Director finally won community approval through a long education process that included
inviting all interested persons to visit her existing program on an unannounced basis to observe the
program. Telephone Interview with Director of Program 6 (Jan. 7, 2002). It took a primary health care
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Because of the influence of neighborhood associations, some programs have invested significant
resources into maintaining community relations. Program personnel become active members in
neighborhood associations to demonstrate their support for and involvement in the community and to
address the community’s concerns about the program.227 They also foster community support by serving
the residents of the community, often on a priority basis even if capacity is limited, and by using the
program’s resources to enhance the neighborhood. Programs, for example, sponsor youth programs and
other training services, conduct prevention programs in neighborhood schools, and hire staff from the
neighborhood.228 Some have also implemented policies and procedures to ensure that the programs do
not negatively affect the community, such as non-loitering policies.229
Indeed, some treatment providers believe that the implementation of formal “agreements” for
community engagement could be the basis for eliminating the CO process itself. Rejecting the
facility that provides treatment services five months to win community approval when it sought to
return to a previous location. In going to the community, the program learned that, because of its low
profile, many had not known that a drug treatment program had operated in the location years earlier.
Telephone Interview with Director of Program 1 (July 20, 2001). Another long-standing, well-respected
residential program has been forced to retain the services of a community development organization to
win community approval for the expansion of an existing halfway house program. The program went to
the community association early in the planning process to discuss its plans and thought that approval
would be forthcoming only to be informed that the community simply wasn’t interested in the program
expanding its services. Telephone Interview with Contract and Development Officer of Program 15
(May 20, 2003).
227 One methadone treatment program has had a staff person working for eight years full time on

community development issues. Personal Interview with Director of Program 16 (June 28, 2001).
228 Personal Interview with Director of Program 17 (June 28, 2001); Telephone Interview with Director

of Program 6 (January 7, 2002); Telephone Interview with Director of Program 5 (August 3, 2001).
229 Personal Interview with Director of Program 16 (June 28, 2001); Telephone Interview with Director

of Program 13 (July 20, 2001).
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stereotypical view that treatment programs and their clients impose a burden on communities, these
providers have crafted a set of “good neighbor practices” that are intended to promote a cooperative
relationship between the provider and the community’s residents. The “good neighbor practices” focus
on three goals: education, community building, and program responsiveness.
The “good neighbor practices” seek to promote education about alcohol and drug treatment
generally and the program’s services specifically through a number of concrete actions: participation in
community association meetings and activities; inclusion of community members on the program’s
advisory committee or appropriate boards; and sponsorship of on-going education programs about
addiction and treatment services for community residents.
They promote community building by working with neighborhood associations to improve the
quality of life in the community. Those strategies include: offering employment to qualified residents;
providing administrative support to community associations and participating in their neighborhood
activities; giving priority to residents who want to enroll in the program; working with the community to
educate city officials about the need for police presence to curb drug-related criminal activity; and
serving as a liaison to city officials to seek city intervention to address community-based problems that
are perceived to be related to the treatment program but are beyond the control of the program.230
Finally, the good neighbor practices identify a number of strategies to demonstrate the program’s
responsiveness as a “neighbor” and commitment to quality care, including: identification of contacts

230 For example, treatment providers, like other residents in a community, are not equipped to stop drug
dealing that occurs in the neighborhood or disperse persons who are not enrolled in a program but are
loitering in the area. Programs can, however, intervene by informing city officials that law enforcement
or other city agencies are needed to address these problems.

100

within the program to address community concerns about the program’s operation; commitment to meet
or exceed state regulations on staffing levels to ensure quality treatment; and adoption of a formal
process to address issues that arise between the community and the program, including mediation if the
problem cannot be resolved informally. Programs that are new to a neighborhood are advised to
demonstrate their responsiveness by providing information about the program to the leadership of the
community association and by identifying how the program plans to adhere to the good neighbor
practices. 231 From the program’s perspective, adoption of such measures would help integrate the
program into the community and give communities a good partner in addressing their problems, which
the CO process fails to do.
3.

Legality of the Conditional Ordinance Process

Litigation has been visibly missing from the strategies programs have adopted to respond to the
CO requirement. Yet, a strong case can be made that Baltimore’s zoning standards are both
intentionally discriminatory and have a discriminatory effect. The City has imposed the CO requirement
and the underlying community approval process on all alcohol and drug treatment programs and some
group recovery homes in order to ensure heightened scrutiny of proposed services and to give
communities the right to reject the siting of such services because of their clients. The City’s zoning
practices also have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability: alcohol and drug services are
singled out and required to comply with a process that imposes unreasonable burdens – intense public
scrutiny and approval and a lengthy and costly review process – and the practices are not necessary to
the City’s zoning scheme.
231 The “good neighbor practices” are on file with the author.
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a.

Disparate Treatment

An analysis of the direct and circumstantial evidence of the city’s intent in adopting the CO
process, under the Arlington Heights standard, leaves little doubt that the process was adopted precisely
because of official concern about the individuals who would be served by the treatment programs.
1. Historical Background
The historical background of the CO process and the events leading up to the City’s adoption of
that process for treatment programs in its zoning code provide compelling proof of the City’s
discriminatory intent. The CO process was devised in the early 1960's specifically to address the siting
of recovery homes for alcoholics. After Flynn Houses fought the BMZA’s efforts to shut down its
recovery homes in residential neighborhoods, the City Council created the CO process to bypass the
BMZA. While the CO process was designed to facilitate the operation of recovery programs, it was
nonetheless grounded exclusively in a consideration of the clients who would be served by the program
and was facially discriminatory insofar as it only applied to persons with alcohol problems.232
Moreover, the process did not place group recovery homes on an equal footing with other medical or
residential uses. The City refused to adopt legislation proposed by Flynn Houses that would have
permitted recovery homes to locate as of right as an accessory use in residential areas or with the
approval of the BMZA – the existing zoning practices. It instead devised a new, more subjective zoning
standard, including a public hearing process that was certain to give voice to community bias. In what

232 A benign purpose does not save a practice from challenge under either the ADA or FHA. “[A]
purportedly benign purpose of a facially discriminating ordinance is irrelevant to a determination of the
lawfulness of the legislation.” Potomac Group Home Corp., 823 F. Supp. at 1296; see also Larkin v.
State of Michigan Dept. of Social Services, 89 F.3d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1996).
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amounts to a departure from substantive criteria, the Council adopted the process over the objections of
the BMZA, which asserted that the City Council did not have statutory authority to grant a use
exception.233
2. Discriminatory Views of Decision-makers
In 1972, when the City amended its zoning code to add the use category of “drug abuse
rehabilitation and treatment centers” and to apply the CO process to such use, the legislative history
reveals that City officials highlighted the negative stereotypes of clients who require treatment services
and implemented a process that would facilitate the exclusion of treatment programs based on those
stereotypes. The Commissioner of Health stated at that time that many communities do not want
treatment programs “because of the fear that [such programs] will attract drug addicts and the crime
associated with such addicts to their areas.” The CO process addressed this issue, according to the
Health Commissioner, because it enabled both the City Council and Zoning Commission to hold public
hearings to determine where a treatment center could, and could not, locate. The Zoning Commission
endorsed the CO process because it allowed the City Council to tightly regulate all aspects of a proposed
treatment program, including the “establishment, location, construction, maintenance and operation,”
and ensured community input on these issues as well.234
Courts have relied on similar historical evidence and contemporaneous events and statements of
discriminatory intent to invalidate zoning practices targeted at individuals with alcohol and drug
dependence. For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington
233 See supra text accompanying notes 209 and 210.
234 See supra text accompanying note 211.
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affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that city officials violated Title II when, in response to a
methadone program seeking to locate in the city, they enacted an ordinance that excluded all such
programs from the city. According to the district court, “[t]he action by the City was a panicked
reaction to public hysteria based on stereotypes concerning [the program’s] clients, who are either
‘persons with disabilities’ or regarded as such.”235 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded in Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment Inc. v. City of Antioch that a zoning ordinance
that prohibited methadone programs from locating within 500 feet of any residential property, enacted in
response to community opposition to a proposed program siting close to a residential area, discriminated
on its face against individuals with disabilities under Title II.236 Finally, the federal district court in
Easter Seal Society v. Township of North Bergen concluded that town officials acted with discriminatory
intent under the FHA when they amended the town’s zoning code to require a conditional use for
community residences for the developmentally disabled to locate in residential zones, rather than
continue the practice of permitting such facilities to locate as of right. According to the court, the
zoning provision was passed in response to strong community and official opposition to the proposed
siting of a home for individuals with psychiatric disorders and drug dependence and imposed onerous
requirements on community residence programs.237
The CO requirement continues to serve the same discriminatory purpose it did when first created.
City zoning officials readily acknowledge that it is intended to make city officials “listen to the
235
236
237

106 F. Supp.2d at 920, aff’d, 293 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 2002).
179 F.3d at 734-35.
798 F. Supp. 228, 234 and 236 (D.N.J. 1992).
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community” and “help clean up the community.” The centerpiece of the process for treatment services
– the community approval requirement (a standard not provided for explicitly in the Zoning Code) –
assures that community views will not only be considered in the decision making process, but indeed,
will be the single most important factor. City Council members have made community approval a
prerequisite for their support of a prospective treatment program, and the experience of programs
demonstrates that the Planning Department requires such approval to proceed with the Planning
Commission’s hearing and recommendation. When complaints from the community are lodged against
existing programs that have not obtained a CO, zoning decisions have been based exclusively on
whether the neighborhood association has agreed to have the program remain in the community.238
Predictably, some community input is not based on legitimate, factual concerns, but rather stereotypical
fears about increased crime and decreased property values that are not supported by the facts. A vocal
minority can effectively derail a proposed program by communicating objections to council members.
Courts have held in analogous situations that a jurisdiction engages in intentional discrimination
when it embraces a community approval process that encourages decisions to be made on the basis of
stereotypical fears about and bias against individuals who require alcohol and drug services, the City has
engaged in intentional discrimination. City officials have “a duty not to allow illegal prejudices of the
majority to influence the decision-making process. . . . [I]f an official act is performed simply in order to
appease the discriminatory viewpoints of private parties, that act itself becomes tainted with
discriminatory intent even if the decision maker personally has no strong views on the matter.”239

238 See supra text accompanying note 201and notes 204 and 205.
239

Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp.
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Courts have, accordingly, invalidated as facially discriminatory community notification requirements
that require entities serving persons with disabilities to inform neighbors of their intention to locate in a
community – much less obtain their approval.
For example, the Sixth Circuit in Larkin v. State of Michigan Dept. of Social Services held that a
state licensure requirement for adult foster care facilities that required notification to residents whose
properties were within 1500 feet of a proposed facility violated the FHA. The court ruled that the
requirement was facially discriminatory because it applied only to adult care facilities, thus singling out
for regulation services for individuals with disabilities. Moreover, according to the court, the state had
not demonstrated that its justification for notification – to promote integration and deinstitutionalization
– would be advanced by a notification requirement. To the contrary, notification would “more likely
have quite the opposite effect, as it would facilitate the organized opposition to the home, and animosity
towards its residents.”240 The court also noted that the State had not demonstrated that the needs of
individuals with disabilities would warrant such notice.241
Similarly, the federal district for Maryland in Potomac Group Home, Corp. v. Montgomery
County, Md., invalidated, under the FHA, a community notification requirement that required proposed
95, 104 (D.P.R. 1990). See also Innovative Health Systems, Inc., 117 F.3d at 49 ( “[A] decision made in
the context of strong, discriminatory opposition becomes tainted with discriminatory intent even if the
decision makers personally have no strong views on the matter.”); Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp.2d at
711 (denial of berth to proposed alcohol and drug treatment program violated FHA because State
officials “acquiesced to community pressure to keep the [program] out of the community because of
discriminatory animus toward the disabled population that Project Life would serve”); and Smith-Berch,
Inc., 68 F. Supp.2d at 625, quoting Project Life.
240 Larkin, 89 F.3d at 292.
241 Id.
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group homes for elderly individuals to inform communities of their intention to site and provided an
opportunity to submit on-going comments about the compatibility of the group home with the
neighborhood.242 According to the court, the neighbor notification rule:
necessarily assume[s] that people with disabilities are different from people without disabilities
and must take special steps to “become a part of the community.” This requirement is equally as
offensive as would be a rule that a minority family must give notification and invite comment
before moving into a predominantly white neighborhood. . . . [N]otices of this sort galvanize
neighbors in their opposition to the homes.243
The court found that the very purpose of the notification – to allow community input on the
compatibility of the group home within the community – revealed its discriminatory purpose. The court
also ruled that the community notification process violated the FHA even if a group home is ultimately
permitted to locate, since the FHA is intended to prohibit discriminatory processes as well as
exclusionary decisions. The process itself generates an outpouring of hostile reactions from neighbors
and the resulting stigma, according to the court, is not easily erased.244
Baltimore’s community approval requirement goes far beyond notification requirements as it
gives primacy to the views of the community in the zoning process. No other similar health care entity
must take these special steps, and there is no evidence that community approval has any relationship to
“cleaning up” a community or that the needs of persons with alcohol and drug problems warrant an
approval requirement. Even if a program ultimately wins community approval, it and its clients likely

242

Potomac Group Home, Corp., 823 F. Supp. at 1296-97; see also Township of West Orange v.
Whitman, 8 F. Supp.2d 408, 424-426 (E.D. Mich. 1998).

243

Id. at 1296.

244

Id. at 1297.
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will have been subjected to heightened scrutiny in the process and will be forced to live with the
resulting stigma. The Fourth Circuit in Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening cited an identical community
approval requirement in affirming a district court decision that the state violated the ADA by refusing to
rent a berth to a drug treatment program so that it could establish a residential program on a former ship.
The Court noted that state officials delayed the rental in response to pressure from state legislators
whose districts included the location of the berth and required the program to obtain support from the
surrounding community – a requirement that had never been imposed on any other potential tenant at the
location.245
3. Discriminatory Effect
In addition to being adopted and perpetuated for a discriminatory purpose, the CO and
community approval requirement also has a discriminatory effect. First, the process singles out a
specific class of protected individuals for special treatment and imposes a more burdensome and lengthy
process for establishing services. Courts have consistently found that the imposition of special
procedures on individuals with disabilities has a discriminatory effect.246 One of the key components of
these special requirements is that they expose individuals with disabilities and the facilities that serve

245 Project Life, Inc., 46 Fed. Appx. 147, 150, 2002 WL 2012545 **1.
246 Smith-Berch, Inc., 68 F. Supp.2d at 621 (county’s special methadone policy that required methadone

programs to undergo a public hearing rather than locate as of right as a medical office had a
disproportionate burden on a protected class of individuals because no other medical facility was
required to undergo that process); and Sunrise Development Corp., 62 F. Supp.2d at 774 (city ordinance
that required congregate care facilities for senior citizens to obtain a zoning change to locate in a
residential neighborhood, rather than a special use exception as previously required, had a
discriminatory effect; these facilities were singled out as requiring a zoning change, while other uses that
could be as offensive to a residential character were permitted to locate with a special use exception).
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them to public scrutiny while other similarly situated individuals and facilities do not suffer the same
indignity. This factor has also led some courts to find a discriminatory effect.247
A second discriminatory effect is that the community approval requirement limits the sites that
are available for treatment programs and group homes in the community and, ultimately, treatment
capacity. Treatment programs avoid selecting sites in communities that are certain to mount significant
opposition and often are excluded from those that can. Courts have ruled that the imposition of
requirements that make it more difficult for individuals with disabilities to live where they choose has a
discriminatory effect under the FHA and ADA.248 This principle is equally applicable to non-residential
services under the ADA based on the Title II regulatory requirement that services for individuals with

247 Stewart B. McKinney Foundation, 790 F. Supp. at 1219 (requirement that a proposed home for

individuals with HIV obtain a special exception, which required a public hearing, has a discriminatory
effect because it holds the future tenants up to public scrutiny in a way that non-HIV infected persons
would not be); and Ardmore, Inc. v. City of Akron, Ohio, 1990 WL 385236 at * 5 (N.D. Ohio 1990)
(ordinance that required residential group home for adults with mental retardation to obtain a conditional
use permit and submit to public hearing had a discriminatory effect because FHA protects right of
individuals with disabilities to procure housing in the community without being singled out for
discriminatory public scrutiny).
Some courts have not invalidated a hearing process that is applied uniformly to all individuals regardless
of disability, even if persons with disabilities may be exposed to invasive public scrutiny. See Oxford
House, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1262-64 (distinguishing cases in which public
hearing requirement is imposed on persons with disabilities alone from those in which “participation [in
the public components of zoning decisions] is required of all citizens whether or not they are
handicapped.”); cf. Smith-Berch, Inc., 115 F. Supp.2d at 523-24 (“a public hearing requirement does not
of itself establish an actionable violation of the ADA,” but disproportionate burden exists when county
“has only allowed the public to express its opinion on methadone clinics and not on other medical
offices . . . .”).
248 See Sunrise Development, Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d at 774 (requiring congregate care facility to obtain a
zoning change had a discriminatory effect under both the FHA and ADA; the procedure would make it
more difficult for the residents of those facilities to live in the residential neighborhood of their choice).
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disabilities be provided in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the particular
individuals.249 The community approval requirement operates much like a distance requirement, which
essentially imposes a quota on the number of persons with disabilities who can reside or be served in a
particular area. As discussed in Part III, courts have almost uniformly invalidated distance requirements
as facially invalid, with some finding no adequate justification for imposing a quota on the presence of
persons with disabilities.250
The third discriminatory effect of the CO process is that it results in delay in establishing alcohol
and drug services. In contrast to other medical services that locate as of right in certain districts,
treatment services that succeed in obtaining community approval must find a sponsor for legislation, go
through an extensive administrative review process, participate in two hearings and then obtain passage
of an ordinance. This results in substantial delay in providing health care to vulnerable persons and
investment of scarce resources to complete the process. Courts have readily concluded that procedures
that impose additional burdens and delay on the establishment of services for individuals with
disabilities have a discriminatory effect.251
The factors taken together demonstrate that the CO and community approval processes
249 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (d) (2003).
250 See, e.g., Larkin v. State of Michigan Dept. of Social Services, 89 F.3d at 291; and Horizon House

Developmental Services, Inc., 804 F. Supp. at 695.
251 See, e.g., Sunrise Development, Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d at 669 and 676 (process for obtaining a zoning

change was significantly more costly and lengthy than obtaining a special use permit – thirty-three
months compared to sixty-two days, respectively – and, therefore, had a discriminatory effect); Stewart
B. McKinney Foundation, 790 F. Supp. at 1220 (special exception requirement, which included
submission of various site and architectural plans and fire and health reports and a hearing, had a
discriminatory effect; it had the potential of being burdensome, controversial, unpleasant and
expensive).
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intentionally discriminate against individuals with alcohol and drug dependence and the programs that
serve them.
b.

Disparate Impact

The CO process is also subject to challenge under a disparate impact theory. The discussion
above clearly demonstrates that the CO process imposes a disproportion burden on alcohol and drug
treatment services. The remaining questions in the disparate impact analysis are whether the standard is
necessary to carry out the City’s zoning scheme, and, if so, whether modifications can be made that
would mitigate the disproportionate burden.
The City would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that the CO requirement is necessary to its
zoning scheme. A significant number of programs and group homes have located without obtaining a
CO, and they have operated successfully without being subjected to exhaustive public and official
scrutiny. The single justification for the CO process is that it ensures that officials will consider
community views about a proposed program. This same justification has been rejected by courts, to the
extent community views are obtained only with regard to services for persons with disabilities and not
similarly situated services.252 Hearing requirements have also been rejected in cases in which the
jurisdiction has applied a hearing requirement on an ad hoc basis in the most controversial matters but
not in other routine decisions. The likelihood that a hearing will provide a venue for the airing of biases
rather than legitimate interests also undermines a finding of necessity. As the federal district court in

252 Smith-Berch, Inc., 115 F. Supp.3d at 523-24 (“[t]hough public expression obviously is an important

part of zoning laws, . . . since the County has only allowed the public to express its opinion on
methadone clinics and not on other medical offices or drug treatment facilities, the public hearing
requirement . . . cannot be considered ‘necessary’ to the County’s zoning scheme”).
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Potomac Group Home noted in invalidated a hearing requirement as having a discriminatory effect,
“[a]lthough [county officials] themselves may not harbor prejudices . . . against the handicapped elderly,
they have designed and utilized a regulatory procedure which facilitates the expression of [community]
prejudices and which gives weight to such views in the process.”253
Even if the City identified a legitimate reason for evaluating a treatment program’s compliance
with neutral zoning standards, it could satisfy that need through a far less burdensome process. As the
court recognized in Potomac Group Home, if “[county officials] need information from a provider
regarding its program . . . there are less formal means to obtain it,” including a non-public meeting at
which experts would consult and consider the programmatic aspects of a provider’s proposed
program.254
V.

Beyond the Legal Standards: Community and Official Response to Siting
Treatment Services

The foregoing analysis suggests that a litigation-based strategy would likely result in the
invalidation of Baltimore’s zoning standards. The question remains, however, whether that strategy
would facilitate not only the adoption of a new zoning standard that secures the right of treatment
programs to locate on a fair basis for the long term but also would result in a more tolerant environment
that promotes the establishment of new services. To answer that question two other perspectives must be
considered: neighborhood associations that represent residents in the communities in which a treatment
program seeks to locate and the City government which represents and serves both sets of constituents

253

Id. at 1297.

254 823 F. Supp. at 1299.

112

and interests. The perspectives of these groups suggest that numerous factors far beyond the legal rights
of the parties must be considered to craft an effective solution.
A. Neighborhood Perspective
Baltimore is a city of neighborhoods – over 260 neighborhoods, each with its own unique housing
stock, amenities, population and values and a long tradition of civic involvement. 255 More than 600
neighborhood associations work on issues that affect their communities, and many have a rich history of
activism on drug and alcohol prevention and treatment issues. 256 The city’s oldest citizen action
organization, the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), has been an indispensable
resource for neighborhood associations who wish to tackle drug-related issues that affect their quality of
life. Beginning in the late 1980’s, CPHA coordinated a coalition of neighborhood associations and other
advocacy groups in a ten-year legislative and legal battle to remove alcohol and tobacco billboards from
lower income, African-American neighborhoods.257 In the mid-1990’s, community frustration with
open air drug markets mixed with fear of confronting drug dealers resulted in the development of a
comprehensive community anti-drug campaign that combined the efforts of community associations,
lawyers, city planners, urban designers and law enforcement to route out drug dealing sites and prevent
crime. As communities were trained in how to rid their neighborhoods of open air drug markets, they

255 VITAL SIGNS, supra n. 184, at 1.
256 A survey conducted by the Baltimore Neighborhood Indicators Alliance that sought to identify the

issues that neighborhood associations work on revealed that over half of those responding address drugrelated issues frequently. VITAL SIGNS, supra n. 184, at 13.
257 The history of this initiative is described in M. Themba, MAKING POLICY, MAKING CHANGE: HOW

COMMUNITIES ARE TAKING LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS 40-54 (1999).
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also realized that locking people up did not stop the drug trade and that their own residents and family
members desperately needed treatment services.258 The limited availability of drug treatment was the
single most important regional issue identified by neighborhood associations attending a Neighborhood
Congress convened by CPHA in the spring of 1999.259 As a result, CPHA and many neighborhood
associations began to work with other advocacy groups to demand expanded drug treatment resources in
the city and state and these efforts have helped win increased state funding for treatment.260
Neighborhood support for treatment, however, has not translated into support for treatment and
group recovery homes in “my neighborhood,” even in some communities with vacant and boarded
houses, significant drug-related crime and substantial need for treatment services. CPHA’s work has
most recently evolved into dealing with NIMBY issues by bringing community groups and treatment
providers together to work on strategies that will enable the two to co-exist and support one another and

258 The demand for drug treatment in the community depicted in THE CORNER resulted in the creation

of a treatment program, Recovery in Community (RIC). In 1997, a local foundation began to meet with
representatives from three neighborhoods about what was needed to counter the impact of drugs in their
communities and then funded what became RIC. The program’s goals are to reduce crime and alcohol
and drug use and increase employment and quality of life among the residents of its three target
community neighborhoods. Recovery in Community: Program Description with Goals and Objectives,
on file with author. RIC opened its doors in mid-1999 and provides out-patient counseling, acupuncture,
community outreach and intervention, as well as referral services to in-patient, detoxification and
methadone treatment and group recovery homes. In 2003, the program established its own group
recovery home in the same neighborhood, again with significant involvement of the neighborhood
associations. Telephone Interviews with Director of Recovery in Community (Oct. 31, 2001 and March
14, 2003). The program has enjoyed community support because it was designed to meet the needs of
those in the neighborhood. Telephone Interview with Organizer, Outreach Southwest Association (Oct.
30, 2001).
259 Presentation by Betty Robinson, former Chief Organizer, CPHA, October 29, 2002.
260 VITAL SIGNS, supra n. 184, at 13.
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change the NIMBY attitude.
Community conversations have identified many factors that contribute to resistance. First,
providers and the communities in which they locate often do not talk to one another, resulting in a lack
of understanding about drug addiction, the recovery process and the nature of treatment.261 Limited
communication also undermines the ability of qualified programs to educate the community about what
constitutes qualified treatment and group home services, and to distinguish themselves from bad services
that invariably exist and often begin to define “treatment” generally.262 It also prevents the community
from putting a human “face” on those in recovery.263 Some providers remain isolated because they

261 Dear has noted that the source of information about persons with disabilities and proposed facilities

that serve those individuals affects the level of community acceptance for such facilities. In the context
of mental health facilities, most people, according to Dear, receive a substantial portion of information
about mental disability from the popular media. This source of information is associated with fewer
acceptances of mental health facilities. Greater acceptance has been seen when individuals obtain
information from informal sources, such as books, family and friends, have greater personal exposure to
mental health care professionals and are well-informed about mental disability. MICHAEL DEAR ET AL.,
CAMPAIGN FOR NEW COMMUNITY, ACCEPTING AND REJECTING COMMUNITIES 21-22, 24 (Resource
Document Series 1996). If this same pattern holds for the acceptance of alcohol and drug treatment
facilities, the treatment programs’ failure to educate the community undermines acceptance. Media
messages regarding drug problems certainly contribute to a narrow, frequently negative perspective of
persons with this disability.
262 The significant need for housing for individuals in recovery has led to the establishment of many

group recovery homes, some of which do not adhere to housing code standards or ensure drug-free
environments. These entities may color the public’s perception of “drug treatment” and undermine
support for state-certified treatment programs and qualified group recovery homes.
263 This is critically important because once community residents have an opportunity to interact with
individuals in recovery their stereotypes are often disproved, as they realize that those individuals are no
different from themselves. The author has observed the sudden softening of opinion among those
resistant to group recovery homes when an individual recounts his or her history of recovery and
describes the value of living in a group home setting. Personalizing recovery also challenges the racial
stereotypes many hold. Many residents’ attitudes are also colored by personal experiences with family
members who have struggled unsuccessfully to overcome their addiction or have inflicted great pain on

115

believe that they have a right under the law to locate like any other health service and that they should
not be prevented from providing an important service that will ameliorate the effect of drug activities.264
Experience has also taught that the best – and perhaps only – way to be accepted by a neighborhood is to
keep a low profile, move in quietly and then demonstrate compatibility with the neighborhood by being
a “good neighbor” once established.265
Residents, on the other hand, have a personal investment in their neighborhoods, and are most
offended by the notion that a treatment provider will come into their neighborhood without first
informing them.266 They perceive this as disrespectful, fatal to a long-term trusting relationship and

them. Dear has observed that the degree of familiarity with and awareness of the characteristics and
problems of the client group is an important factor in an individual’s acceptance of that group. The
greater the understanding, the more likely an individual will tolerate the group. Dear, supra n. 261, at
13.
264 Presentation by Betty Robinson, former Chief Organizer, CPHA Drug Treatment Committee

October 29, 2002.
265 The research identifies three types of community entry strategies: low, moderate/medium, and high

profile. See Dear, supra n. 39, at 12, and articles identified therein. Community association
representatives in Baltimore have candidly acknowledged that treatment providers may be better off
adopting a low profile strategy -- not announcing their intention or obtaining community support prior to
moving into a community. Those that have sought approval often never get sited. President, Liberty
Road Community Council, CPHA Discussion (March 14, 2003). The community outreach coordinator
for one neighborhood association that has worked for years with a particular recovery home noted that
the recovery home would still be waiting for the association to vote on its coming into the neighborhood
had it sought community support prior to opening. Community Outreach Coordinator, Garwyn Oaks
Housing Resource Center, CPHA Community Conversation (May 29, 2003). At the same time, entering
a community without obtaining support can back fire if the community, upon learning about the
program, strongly opposes it. Subsequent attempts to gain community support often are met with
accusations of deception and complaints of an irreparable breach of trust. Program 6 Community
Meeting (September 17, 2002); see Dear, supra n. 39, at 12.
266 Among the key concerns of communities are programs that (1) come into the neighborhood

unannounced; (2) provide services that the community perceives it does not need; and (3) are
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perhaps predictive of the level of future commitment to the neighborhood.267 Some communities,
regardless of how well a program or recovery home is run, cannot get past the perception that persons
who are addicted to drugs are being brought into their neighborhood. If a neighborhood is doing well,
residents may not want to risk a problem, and, if problems already exist on a particular block, residents
may not want to attract more addicts for fear of increased crime and lower property values.268 This is
particularly true if an existing group home provider or treatment program does not provide quality
services or permits active drug use, loitering or trash accumulation to occur in or around the facility.269
Communities are also skeptical about the effectiveness of treatment services since relapse rates are high
and the incidence of drug addiction in Baltimore is so great. While substantially more funds have been
invested in treatment, few see the city turning the corner in reducing the number of persons with active
disconnected from the neighborhood and do not act like a homeowner. Community associations believe
that they should be brought into the planning process and have their needs considered even if federal
disability rights standards do not require this of providers. And they have a negative view of providers
who exercise their federal rights without first engaging the community. CPHA Community Meeting
(April 29, 2003).
267 Dear refers to this as the “stake” in the neighborhood or the level of commitment to the

neighborhood. This factor greatly influences group attitudes about a facility. The community’s
involvement in a siting decision increases as the individual’s stake rises. Dear, supra n. 259, at 12-13.
268 President, Patterson Park Neighborhood Association, CPHA Discussion (March 14, 2002). Some

communities also point to the negative effect a troubled community may have on those who are seeking
to recover. Hollins Market Residents Say Influx of Drug Treatment Centers and Group Houses is
Hurting the Neighhorhood, BALTIMORE CITYPAPER, May 14-20, 2003.
269 Treatment services are alternatively viewed as the entity that causes of all the neighborhood’s

problems and as the entity that is expected to solve all the community’s problems. Thus, programs are
expected to resolve a community’s drug dealing activity and loitering even when those problems are not
caused by or associated with the program’s clients. Similarly, a program may not be welcome in a
neighborhood, but may still be expected to provide treatment services to the neighborhood’s residents on
a priority basis.
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addiction or crime associated with addiction.270 Finally, some communities complain that they have
become saturated with social services, and, thus, do not want additional vacant buildings to be occupied
by recovery homes or treatment programs.271 Many want other desperately needed services and
resources to be invested in their neighborhoods, and others believe that all neighborhoods should take
their “fair share” of social services.
The CO process and community approval requirement, if followed, provide a process for
implementing these views and are, therefore, supported by neighborhood associations. Those
neighborhoods that perceive themselves as not having a drug problem or whose socio-economic or racial
make-up differs from their perception of the clients who are served by a drug treatment program use the
process to exclude treatment programs.272 Similarly, neighborhoods that believe they have a

270 CPHA Treatment Provider Meeting (April 22, 2003). Research has shown that a critical ratio of

treated to untreated individuals in a community must be achieved before improvements at the individual
patient level have a demonstrable community-wide impact. STEPS TO SUCCESS, supra n. 25, at 4. The
slow pace at which services are expanded can, in turn, affect community support for those services.
According to Dear, community support wanes when “compassion fatigue” sets in. This arises when the
general public is tired of dealing with an entrenched, persistent problem and begins to despair of finding
a solution. Dear, supra n. 261, at 15.
271 CPHA Community Meeting (April 29, 2003); Hollins Market Residents Say Influx of Drug

Treatment Centers and Group Houses is Hurting the Neighborhood, supra n. 268. One community
portrays itself as the “treatment/help center of the City, claiming to serve over 3,000 people daily at drug
treatment centers, parole and probation centers, soup kitchens and mental health clinics. Community
associations from the area complain that these services overwhelm the residents and businesses and
prevent the community from being a viable neighborhood. Letter from Charles Village Community
Benefits District to Department of Planning, Mar. 6, 2000 (on file with author). “Fair share” proposals
raise a number of complex issues including: gathering data on the magnitude of need for a range of
social services in a particular community or region; evaluating the extent to which those needs are met
with existing services; and identifying the types of services that are needed to fill the gaps. This
discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 203-205.
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disproportionate share of the city’s treatment services and non-profit programs also use the process to
exclude programs. At the same time, communities that have been ravaged by drug use and drug related
crime, and have advocated for increased funding for treatment services, also support the community
approval process. From their perspective, the process serves several purposes.
First, some believe it provides a means of quality control. Neighborhood associations have long
held the view that treatment programs have little regard for the quality of life in the surrounding
community. The community approval process gives residents the ability to evaluate whether the
program will be well managed and determine how it will address future concerns.273
The approval process is also a tool for political control. Residents view the approval process as the
only way they can have a voice in the number and type of treatment services that locate in the
community. Without that process, programs have no incentive to be responsive, and a sense of
hopelessness in reinforced in the community. 274 On a different level, the approval process is viewed as
providing an opportunity to identify other desperately needed services. While communities need
treatment services, they have an equally compelling need for jobs, and improved housing, roads and
schools.275 All too often, residents see treatment programs and soup kitchens coming into their

273 Telephone Interview with Director of Operation Reachout Southwest (Oct. 30, 2001). Communities

also support an on going community review process to ensure quality as well as enforcement of state
and local laws. CPHA Community Meeting (April 29, 2003).
274 Telephone Interview with Director of COIL, Inc.(Oct. 31, 2001).
275 For this reason, communities look to treatment programs to provide some of those resources as well.

Programs are more welcome if they can offer jobs to qualified residents of the neighborhood, offer child
care or health care services to residents and provide prevention education in local schools.
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neighborhoods, but not investments in these other critical areas.276
Finally, and closely related, the process is used as a tool for community building. Community
organizers are desperate to work with entities who wish to form partnerships to address the community’s
pressing needs. To the extent providers discuss their plans with the community and seek its
recommendations before moving in, the community has reason to support the programs.277 These
programs also tend to be more engaged in the community after they locate, by participating in
community meetings, helping at events and street clean-ups and policing for drug dealing.278
Representatives from some community associations, with the leadership of CPHA, have translated
some of the benefits they hope to gain through the CO process into a set of operating principles –
community-provider partnership strategies – to guide treatment providers who seek to locate in
communities. Like the “good neighbor practices” developed by treatment providers, the “partnership
strategies” also fall into the general areas of education, community building, and program
responsiveness and, in most aspects, overlap with the program “good neighbor practices.” In the area of
education, communities want to have on-going education about drug treatment and recovery and ways
the community can assist in advocating for expanded services. They want to learn about what has
worked in other communities that have had good experiences with treatment programs. They would
also like to have on-going communication with the program through the establishment of a program276 Telephone Interview with Director of Operation Reachout Southwest (October 30, 2001).
277 Telephone Interview with Director, COIL, Inc. (October. 31, 2001). Communities view a program

that partners with the community to address crime, vacant homes and other problems as an asset. CPHA
Community Meeting (April 29, 2003).
278 Telephone Interview with Director of Operation Reachout Southwest (October 30, 2001).
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community liaison, inclusion of a community representative on the program’s board, and institution of
regular meetings and outreach to educate the community about available services.
In the area of community building, communities want programs to actively participate in
community association meetings and neighborhood improvement activities and to work with the
community and law enforcement to reduce drug dealing and other illegal activities in the vicinity of
programs. Finally, in the area of responsiveness, communities want programs to adhere to the highest
professional and ethical standards in providing their services; maintain “good neighbor” standards by
not tolerating trash, noise, littering, substandard housing conditions or other community norms; and
provide community residents with fast track access to treatment services.
Two elements of responsiveness that go beyond the provider’s good neighbor practices include the
communities’ desire to have programs (1) solicit their concerns and input from the time a program is
being considered for a particular location until it has been opened and (2) respect a community’s desire
for “fair share placement” and seek an alternative site if several programs already exist in the immediate
vicinity.279
B.

Baltimore City Perspective

City health and zoning officials recognize that the CO process hinders the expansion of treatment
services280 and may violate federal anti-discrimination standards.281 Those same officials, until recently,

279 A copy of the “community-provider partnership strategies” in on file with the author.
280 The City’s Health Commissioner has noted that the lengthy process jeopardizes a provider’s ability

to retain funding for the proposed program while complying with the CO requirement.
281 Zoning officials have informed treatment programs that it is unlawful for a program’s zoning

process to be derailed by a neighborhood’s refusal to provide its approval. Telephone Interview with
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have been slow to change the standard.282 The CO and community approval processes certainly pose
both practical and political dilemmas for city officials. While circumvented in some circumstances,
these processes have been embraced by neighborhood associations around the City. This poses a
political dilemma for elected city officials who fear constituent opposition by proposing or agreeing to
rescind the 40 year-old practice. Eliminating the approval process could also create a backlash against
treatment – aligning those communities that want to exclude all treatment services with those that want
more control over the services that come into their neighborhoods – that would further exacerbate siting
problems.
As a practical issue, the community approval process, as well as the elaborate Planning
Director of Program 6 (Oct. 10, 2002). The City’s Health Commissioner has also stated that the CO
process is probably illegal and subject to suit. Program 6 Community Meeting (September 17, 2002).
As of the spring 2003, the City Council member who chairs the Land Use Committee, which has
jurisdiction over CO legislation, has refused to conduct the required Council hearing for proposed drug
treatment services because of her concern that such procedures are unlawful under federal disability
statutes. She has directed the Planning Department to craft a procedure that complies with the law.
Communications with Old Goucher Neighborhood Association; External Affairs Officer for Health Care
for the Homeless; and Director of Legislative Affairs, Baltimore City Health Department (May 12,
2003).
282 Thus, for example, in March 2003, the Baltimore City Planning Department proposed revising its

zoning code provisions related to group homes for individuals with disabilities in order to comply with
the Fair Housing Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. It would formally eliminate the CO process
for group homes that serve less than nine individuals, and would permit those facilities to locate as of
right in all residential districts. The proposal, however, would retain the CO process for group homes
for more than nine individuals that seek to locate in areas zoned for single family dwellings as well as
for congregate living facilities with seventeen or more individuals that seek to locate in any residential
or business zone. Baltimore City Planning Department Comprehensive Rezoning Project: Zoning for
Group Homes and Assisted Living, Draft 3-25-03. The Planning Department was prepared to introduce
legislation to implement this plan in the spring of 2004, but, under new leadership, re-evaluated its
position. The Director of Planning has indicated his intention to eliminate the CO process for treatment
services. Telephone Conversation with Director of Baltimore City Planning Department. (February 23,
2004).
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Department evaluation process, is, in part, a proxy for a quality oversight process. The zoning process is
not intended to, and should not, serve this purpose; the state licensure and oversight process fills this
role.283 But to the extent communities are not satisfied with the State’s oversight or they must contend
with underfinanced treatment programs and unregulated transitional homes284 that they view as having a
negative effect on their neighborhoods, they will look to the zoning process to filter out the potentially
problematic providers. These issues must be addressed in crafting a workable solution.
Part VI: Comprehensive Strategies to Establish Community-Based Treatment Services
Many scholars have explored whether litigation is an effective tool to shape public policy and
achieve social change and public health goals.285 While the establishment of community-based drug

283 All states provide oversight for alcohol and drug treatment services. In Maryland, for example, state

regulations require all programs offering drug and alcohol treatment to be certified by the Office of
Health Care Quality. Regulations establish standards that all programs must meet regarding governance
structure, clinical, environmental, and staff requirements, patient grievance procedures, and record
keeping. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 47.01.03 – 47.01.08 (2003). Certification is based on an application
that demonstrates compliance with the standards, a site visit, and correction of any deficiencies that are
identified. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 47.03.05 (2003).
284 Group recovery homes that provide housing but no treatment services are not subject to state

licensure requirements. This lack of regulation has led some to advocate for a registration requirement
for group recovery homes that are not otherwise licensed. The call for registration often arises when a
group home is not properly managed, and residents in the group home as well as in surrounding
dwellings are exposed to health and safety risks. Such problems can and should be addressed through
traditional law enforcement and local building code enforcement. Imposing regulations on “housing”
that serves persons with disabilities would arguably violate the FHA and ADA because a registration
requirement would treat persons with disabilities who require a group living arrangement to reside in the
community differently from other “family” settings.
285 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press 1991); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL
POLICY (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1977); S. A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RGHTS:
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND POLITICAL CHANGE, (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1974); Peter H.
Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
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treatment services may fall short of Rosenberg’s definition of “policy change with nationwide
impact,”286 his model for evaluating when litigation will successfully effect social change is nonetheless
instructive in this context. Rosenberg maintains that three structural constraints on courts limit their
ability to produce social reform unless political, social and economic conditions have become supportive
of change. Those constraints are: (1) the limited nature of constitutional rights, which prevents courts
from hearing or effectively acting on many significant social reform claims; (2) the judiciary’s lack of
independence from other branches of government; and (3) the judiciary’s lack of tools to develop
appropriate policies and implement decisions. 287 Courts can overcome these constraints, according to
Rosenberg, only when: (1) ample legal precedent exists to overcome the limited nature of rights; (2) the
legislative branch has enacted or is seriously considering legislation relating to the reform or the
executive branch supports a reform position, overcoming the judiciary’s lack of independence; (3) and
political and popular support exists so that those who must change their behavior to accomplish change

289 (Summer 2002); Peter D. Jacobson and Soheil Soliman, Litigation as Public Health Policy: Theory
or Reality?, 30 J. LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS 224 (Summer 2002); and Peter D. Jacobson and Kenneth E.
Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & LAW 769 (Aug. 1999).
286 Rosenberg includes within this category social reforms that either affect large groups of people,
such as African-Americans, women or workers, or alter bureaucratic and institutional practice
nationwide. ROSENBERG, supra n. 285, at 4. In the context of drug policy, this social reform could
include efforts to decriminalize or legalize drug use. The public health strategy of dramatically
expanding access to prevention and treatment, which necessitates change in a number of institutions to
expand education among health care professionals, integrate alcohol and drug services into primary
health care systems and modify and enhance financing streams, would also arguably fall into this
definition.
287 ROSENBERG, supra n. 285, at 10-21.
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will do so, overcoming the judiciary’s lack of implementation power. 288
Without being too formulaic, this model suggests why litigation, even if successful in
establishing civil rights protections, is not the best tool to ensure that drug treatment services will be
established in communities.289 As seen in the Smith-Berch litigation, ample legal precedent existed to
enforce the program’s right to locate in the community. The Court did little more than faithfully enforce

288 Rosenberg asserts that social reform also requires one of four conditions to exist to address the
forces that may seek to prevent change: actors outside the courts must offer positive incentives, such as
money or other benefits, to induce compliance; other actors must impose costs to induce compliance;
market forces must operate to implement the change, bypassing recalcitrant institutions; or persons who
are crucial to implementation and willing to act use the courts to provide leverage, a cover or an excuse
for doing so. ROSENBERG, supra n. 285, at 31-36.
289 Litigation may, however, be a necessary, albeit insufficient, strategy in situations in which political
institutions are unwilling to address long-standing problems. Jacobson, supra n. 285, Litigation and
Public Health Policy Making, at 798; and HOROWITZ, supra n. 285, at 24 (noting that courts become
involved in social policy matters because of the reticence of policymakers to address them, and their
“occasional proclivity to push them onto the courts.”) Litigation was certainly necessary to create an
opportunity for methadone treatment programs to locate in Baltimore County because official opposition
had blocked movement for almost a decade, notwithstanding a documented need for such treatment.
See supra text following note 168.
This critical role of litigation has led some scholars to observe that the judiciary plays an
important role in policy making at particular stages in that process. “Although trial courts rarely
establish new legal rules, they do constitute the actual meaning of legal rules and, in addition, they play
an important role in the definition of policy problems, in the formulation of alternatives, and certainly in
the implementation and evaluation stages of the policy process.” Lynn Mather, The Fired Football
Coach (Or, How Trial Courts Make Policy) in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 170, 174 (Lee Epstein, ed.
1995). Mather shares the view of others that “no single political actor or institution could command the
entire policy process. . . . [P]ublic policy is made through the actions and interaction of different
political players at different points in the process.” Id. See also, Nico Calavita, Kenneth Grimes and
Alan Mallach, Inclusionary Housing in California and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8
HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 109, 137 (1997) (describing the judiciary’s role in promoting the development
of inclusive housing for low and moderate income individuals in New Jersey through the Southern
Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel litigation; court initiated change in a highly resistant
political and social climate, forced other government agencies to act and “set in motion a process,
mechanisms and an awareness that would not otherwise exist.”).

125

rights that Congress has clearly established under the ADA, and the equitable remedy it ordered merely
required the county to implement the zoning standard its own attorneys and planning officials had
advised applied to methadone programs.290 The Court’s was powerless, however, to implement its
decree and prevent the county from reinstituting the discriminatory practices via legislation when
political and public support for the equitable siting of treatment programs did not exist.291
Those same factors are operating in Baltimore City.292 Notwithstanding the existence of legal

290 As noted above, the county had interpreted its own zoning code as requiring methadone programs to

be treated like other medical offices that provided care on an out-patient basis. Thus, issuing an
injunction that required the county to implement that standard was not a far reach. See supra text
accompanying notes 170 and 175.
291 The county’s enactment of the zoning ordinance demonstrates that unwilling government players
“have a practically limitless capacity to sabotage reform.” ROSENBERG, supra n. 285, at 19. The county
defended its ordinance as not violating the original injunction on the implausible ground that the court
had invalidated an unwritten administrative practice, not a legislatively enacted ordinance. Thus,
asserted the county, a new action was required to challenge the ordinance, even though it reinstated
standards that had been invalidated by the court. The District Court, while unwilling to hold the county
in contempt, did enjoin the implementation of the new ordinance, finding it in violation of its injunction.
The county’s ability to thwart enforcement of the injunction through an appeal to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals amply demonstrates Rosenberg’s observation that parties can use the judicial process
to delay and prevent change. Id. at 18.
The county’s ability to enact a restrictive zoning ordinance after the Smith-Berch litigation, when
it had been unsuccessful in doing so prior to that, also confirms Rosenberg’s observation that litigation
success often mobilizes the opposition. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Real World of Constitutional Rights:
The Supreme Court and the Implementation of the Abortion Decisions, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 390,
415-17 (Lee Epstein, ed. 1995). See also, Malkin, supra n. 39, at 823-826 (describing local legislative
efforts to prevent the establishment of group recovery homes following the Supreme Court’s decision in
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.).
292 Two case studies may provide a better basis for raising relevant issues than establishing broad

generalizations. One should certainly examine the outcome of other zoning litigation to see whether it
has facilitated the siting of not only the litigant but other treatment programs as well. For example, the
treatment provider who prevailed in Innovative Health Services, Inc. v. City of White Plains, never
moved into the property. In Maryland, several methadone treatment programs were blocked from
locating in Howard County in the summer of 2003 because of community and official opposition, even
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rights that render notice and approval requirements unlawful, some public officials believe residents
should have a voice in whether a treatment program is permitted to locate in a particular community.
This derives from deeply held fears by some that treatment services expose neighborhoods to more harm
than they prevent. Even those public officials who know those sentiments to be generally unfounded
have demonstrated little interest in opposing vocal opponents. Legal precedent has little sway even with
those in communities who recognize the benefit of treatment services; they care more about whether
providers demonstrate respect, are willing to work with the community and respond to its needs. They
generally have little regard for the program’s legal right to locate in the community and are ambivalent
at best about affording civil rights protections to persons with histories of alcoholism and drug
dependence.
Moreover, even if litigation were successful in invalidating the city’s zoning scheme, the hard
work of crafting a workable zoning standard, persuading local officials and residents to support it, and
equipping providers to work with communities would still remain to be done. In the meantime, valuable
time and resources that could have been used to mobilize those who support treatment, work with
communities to identify their treatment needs and address legitimate concerns, and organize political
support for equitable zoning standards would have been lost.293 The lessons from extensive litigation in

though Smith-Berch, Inc. sets the legal standard in the state. Lawmakers plan legislation to limit drug
clinic sites, HOWARD COUNTY TIMES.COM, October 2, 2003
293 See discussion in ROSENBERG, supra n. 285, at 12 and 341-43 (“Social reformers, with limited

resources, forgo other options when they elect to litigate. Those options are mainly political and involve
mobilizing citizens to participate more effectively.”); and Jacobson, supra n. 285, Litigation and Public
Health Policy Making, at 797 (“litigation might detract from other policy efforts if the public perceives
that the problem has been ‘solved’ through litigation . . . .”) The Smith-Berch litigation again provides a
useful lesson. While the litigation was pending, those who wanted to establish treatment programs
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another public health context – tobacco control – are instructive: “policy-making responsibility and
power will continue to rest with legislators and regulators.”294
Ultimately, community resistance to alcohol and drug treatment services will not be overcome
until those services are fully integrated into medical education and practice and adequately funded
through both federal funding and private insurance. The mainstreaming of comprehensive addiction
care for individuals of all socio-economic classes, while no easy task,295 will gradually reduce the need
for specialty treatment services that are not only more readily targeted and but also tacitly reinforce the
notion that “special” treatment is perhaps warranted.
Communities across the country, however, cannot wait for this transformation of our health care
system; the magnitude of the problem, unmet demand for treatment, and societal costs are too great.
Instead, we must take what we know about community concerns, treatment efficacy, and legal
waited to see how the court would rule and did not press county officials to establish much needed
treatment services. After the litigation, providers operated under the false sense of security that the
problem had been resolved. No one initiated an education, planning or political process that could have
perhaps prevented the enactment of the discriminatory zoning ordinance.
294 Jacobson, supra n. 285, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making, at 802. Jacobson notes that

litigation has been most effective in achieving public health goals where “advocates built the moral and
political case against the tobacco industry through years of legislative lobbying, grassroots organizing
and savvy use of media.” Id. at 797. He concludes that while “[l]itigation has stimulated a national
debate over the role of smoking in society and eventually may well move the policy agenda, . . . a
sustained legislative and regulatory presence is required to ensure meaningful policy changes.” Id. at
802.
295 See Cindy Parks Thomas and Dennis McCarty, Adoption of Drug Abuse Treatment Technology in

Specialty and Primary Care Settings, in NEW TREATMENTS FOR ADDICTION: BEHAVIORAL, ETHICAL,
LEGAL AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS App. D, D-11 – D-15 (Henrick R. Harwood and Tracy G. Myers ed.
(2004) (identifying barriers to a fuller integration of primary care and addiction treatment, including
provider education, financing mechanisms and disincentives, confidentiality requirements and concerns,
and the persistent presence of stigma).
128

protections for persons who seek and participate in treatment and develop legislative and communitybased strategies to facilitate the establishment of treatment services.296 These strategies will require
treatment programs, government officials and communities to operate under a new set of rules that are
equally responsive to well-established legal rights on the one hand and legitimate community concerns
about public safety and quality of care on the other. They also require significant investment in
education about addiction, analysis of treatment needs across regions, and comprehensive planning. A
strategy that is based on securing the establishment of “one treatment program at a time” will fail
because resources become consumed with responding to the vocal minority who want to prevent
programs from siting “next door,” instead of tapping into the public’s general support for treatment,
which must be mobilized to create substantially more capacity.297 Finally, the strategies require action
both within communities, so that treatment programs are known by and interact with their neighbors,
and by local and state governments, so that the necessary environment for the expansion of treatment
exists. State and local governments have a critical role in ensuring that non-discriminatory zoning

296 Other commentators have suggested litigation as well as legislative strategies to facilitate the

expansion of group recovery homes. See Eastman, supra n. 39, at 34-35 (calling for Congress to amend
the FHA to clarify reasonable accommodations standard and for state legislatures to preempt local
zoning standards that treat residential structures for persons with disabilities differently from residences
of families or other unrelated individuals); and Malkin, supra n. 39, at 817-26 (arguing that courts must
do a better job enforcing the FHA by giving broad effect to the reasonable accommodations requirement
and scrutinizing facially neutral zoning standards, such as the definition of “family,” conditional use and
distance requirements, that exclude group recovery homes).
297 One commentator has noted that, in most cases, the number of people expressing opposition to social

service programs is generally quite small and that the number of people actually taking action against a
facility – the “vocal minority” – is likely to be even smaller. “Little more than 2-4 blocks away from the
center of any dispute lies the silent majority – people who are often unaware of the conflict, and
generally in favor of community care for the needy.” Dear, supra n. 261, at 15-16 and 25.
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standards are in place across a state; sufficient regulatory oversight exists; the scope of treatment need
and existing services is documented; and program-specific problems, when they arise, are addressed
promptly through existing police powers.
The following recommendations provide a framework for such comprehensive and collaborative
strategies.
1.

Implement fair, non-discriminatory zoning standards for out-patient and residential
alcohol and drug treatment services and a reasonable accommodations policy.

Civil rights standards that have evolved under the ADA and FHA provide a strong mandate for
the implementation of fair, non-discriminatory zoning standards for both out-patient and residential
treatment services. The failure to implement such standards not only inhibits the establishment of
treatment services but also creates an environment in which treatment programs are more inclined to
avoid community interaction and locate in communities that are perceived as either less hostile or unable
to block the program. This may lead to the establishment of services that are less accessible to those
who need them and less effective in addressing a region’s drug problem.298 It also results in mutual
distrust, a sentiment (whether perceived or real) of clustering or “over-concentration” of programs in
certain communities, and a missed opportunity to tailor services to address the community’s needs.
Thus, the starting point for creating more open communities is to implement a zoning standard
that permits drug treatment programs to locate under the same standard as similarly situated medical
298 For example, one study in Maryland concluded that persons who traveled less than a mile to

outpatient treatment in Baltimore had a 50% greater likelihood of completing treatment. MARYLAND
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, supra n. 33, at 37. Studies have uniformly concluded
that length of stay in treatment is one of the most critical factors in treatment success. NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, supra n. 21, at 16.
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services. Out-patient drug treatment programs, which must satisfy state licensure requirements and, in
some cases, federal regulations and national health accreditation standards, should be permitted to locate
like other general medical practices that provide medical care on an out-patient basis. Residential
services, including programs that are licensed to provide treatment services and group recovery homes
that provide no services, should be permitted in residential communities on the same basis as single and
multi-family dwellings of comparable size, density and function. To the extent general medical
practices and dwellings are permitted to locate in certain zoning districts without obtaining special
approval, participating in hearings, or adhering to conditional use requirements, treatment services
should be afforded the same rights. This means that treatment services should not be required to notify
communities of their intention to locate at a particular site if other similar services are not required to do
so.299
Reasonable accommodations policies must also be implemented as part of fair zoning practices
to give treatment services the opportunity to obtain a waiver of rules that would otherwise prevent them
from locating in particular areas. Local jurisdictions may, consistent with ADA and FHA standards,
require providers to seek an accommodation through a public hearing process as long as that same
process is required of all entities that seek a waiver of zoning standards. At the same time, localities
may wish to use an administrative, non-hearing process for deciding such requests. A public hearing
process always carries the risk that the decision-making process will be infused with bias and
stereotypical considerations that taint the final decision and expose the jurisdiction to claims of
discrimination. An administrative fact-gathering process that evaluates the necessity of a requested
299 Community notification and involvement is better achieved through other means outlined below.
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modification and the impact on the surrounding community will protect both the jurisdiction and the
treatment program, while permitting an inquiry into legitimate zoning considerations.
The establishment of fair zoning standards need not be left to local officials. While zoning is
quintessentially a local activity, states retain sufficient police power in this area to step in where local
authorities fail to ensure non-discriminatory zoning standards.300 Indeed, since it is the state that must
ultimately deal with the costs of untreated alcohol and drug dependence by expending funds on law
enforcement, health care and social welfare programs, state officials have a significant interest in
ensuring that treatment services are available. Thus, states should enact statewide legislation or
promulgate regulatory standards that establish a single, uniform zoning standard based on the above
general principles.301

300 States have enacted statewide standards that govern the siting of residential services for persons with

disabilities. See Arlene S. Kanter, A Home of One’s Own: The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988
and Housing Discrimination Against People with Mental Disabilities, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 925, 974-78
(1994) (outlining state zoning statutes that preempt local ordinances that impose restrictive zoning laws
to group homes for persons with mental disabilities). In Maryland, for example, a state-wide statutory
standard authorizes licensed homes for persons with mental illness to locate in residential neighborhoods
on the same basis as single-family dwellings and multi-family dwellings based on the number of
residents, which are set forth in the statute. MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 10-518(b)(1) and (2) and
MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10 §§ 10.21.04.02(B)(2)(a) and (b) (2003). The law also preempts the application
of any special exception, conditional use permit or procedure that differs from that required of singlefamily or multi-family dwellings of similar density. MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 10-518(b)(3).
301 The experiences of state and local governments in creating inclusive housing for low and moderate

income individuals provide valuable lessons for crafting such standards. For example, in New Jersey, a
state administrative agency was created in 1985 to assume responsibility for implementing the Mount
Laurel remedy, which required developing municipalities to provide their fair share of low and moderate
income housing. The state agency determines the “fair-share” obligation of each municipality and is
required to certify that the municipal plan provides a realistic opportunity to achieve its fair share goal.
The municipality’s plan is required to identify present and future fair-share obligations and specify land
that would be most appropriate for development. In California, the California General Plan Law
requires localities to adopt a general plan that includes, among other items, a housing element that
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The executive branch should also consider using its fiscal power to create economic incentives
for local authorities to implement fair zoning standards.302 Local jurisdictions are dependent upon state
funding for both treatment services and law enforcement. The executive branch should condition the
receipt of these appropriations on proof that the locality has established and adheres to nondiscriminatory zoning standards. In distributing discretionary state and block grant funds, states should
provide funding incentives to jurisdictions that demonstrate success in establishing services. State
monitoring and oversight beyond the standard check-off on a funding application will be required to
ensure compliance, and administrative agencies may need to provide technical assistance to localities to
help them develop and win support for such standards. 303

addresses the locality’s need for lower-income housing and its program for meeting its “fair share” of
that need. A state agency must certify compliance with the housing element, but has no authority to
mandate changes. Calavita, supra n. 289, at 117-19. According to Calavita, the inclusive housing
programs in both states have produced significant and measurable results because of intervention by
either a higher level of government or the courts. Inclusive housing was achieved in New Jersey
through the judicial imposition of fair-share obligations on local jurisdictions and in California through a
legislatively mandated housing element and fair-share doctrine. Calavita concludes that the enactment
of an effective inclusive housing program cannot be expected without such intervention. Id. at 135.
302 Both New Jersey and California offered economic and other incentives to localities and developers

to create inclusive housing. In California, eligibility for state-administered federal housing programs is
linked to housing element compliance. The threat of litigation also provides an incentive, as the
California General Plan Law authorizes litigation to stop the issuance of building permits until an
approved housing element is produced. On the local level, developers have received cost-offsets
(including the use of federal low-income housing tax credits) and regulatory relief (density increases,
impact fee waivers, fast-track permit approval, reduced parking requirements, and relaxed design
restrictions) to counter the costs incurred in providing inclusionary units. Calavita, supra n. 289, at 117
and 121-22. In Jersey, incentives have included cost offsets, bonus credits to municipalities that
produced affordable rental units, and a “builder’s remedy” that authorizes courts to grant zoning relief
and building permits to projects that include an appropriate portion of low and moderate income
housing. Calavita, supra n. 289, at 115-16 and 128.
303 This, of course, requires policy-makers on the state level to be committed to enforcing non-
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2.

Conduct a comprehensive planning process that assesses the need for treatment services
in a particular region, the existing out-patient and residential services and appropriate
locations for new services.

The staggering numbers of individuals who are not receiving treatment for alcohol and drug
dependence leaves little doubt that treatment services are not available to meet the need. Yet, a
frequent refrain from those who face the prospect of a treatment program or group home entering their
community is “we have enough treatment programs already.” While this response is generally based
more on perception than reality, data is needed to document the extent of need, the type of treatment
services available, and the location of existing out-patient and residential services. These data are
essential to determine whether communities lack services that their residents need or have the correct
mix of out-patient, residential and group living services; whether services are, in fact, clustered in
some communities; and whether there is an “over” or “under” concentration of services based on the
needs of the locality.
State agencies, which administer the publicly-funded treatment system and license public as well
as private treatment services, must collaborate with the appropriate local jurisdictions and local health

discrimination standards and willing to withstand pressure from local officials and the public to
intercede and implement practices that delay or prevent programs from siting. See supra text
accompanying notes 169 and 177. State officials will undoubtedly engage in political compromises
between different parties, requiring treatment providers and advocates to monitor state decisions to
prevent the implementation of discriminatory practices. See, e.g., Lawmakers plan legislation to limit
drug clinic sites, HOWARD COUNTY TIMES.COM, October 2, 2003 (In response to opposition by some
Howard County residents and officials to the proposed siting of two methadone treatment programs,
Maryland’s chief health official agreed to implement a newspaper notification requirement for
methadone treatment programs as part of the state licensure process.)
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departments, to gather this data and then use it to plan for the siting of new programs.304 Armed with
data on geographical areas in which treatment services are lacking and bound by a non-discriminatory
zoning standard, local health and planning officials should evaluate where treatment services are
needed and identify buildings and dwellings that would be available and appropriate for such services.
While providers can not be limited to those sites, this process would assist them in the difficult and
time-consuming job of identifying appropriate properties and would establish a more collaborative
relationship.
A comprehensive planning process is also an important vehicle for building community support
for treatment and ensuring that services meet the needs of the particular community and are available in
the best locations. Residents of communities are more invested in drug treatment services if they
understand that they serve the needs of those living in the community. By helping to shape the services
that will be provided, residents will begin to view a treatment program as a resource that meets their
health care needs and a potential source of employment, educational services and child-centered
services.

304 Others have emphasized the importance of comprehensive planning in addressing local zoning
conflicts. See, e.g., California Task Force Recommendations, supra n. 165, at 9-11 (outlining types of
information to be gathered, development of a pilot program to conduct needs assessment and devise a
plan, and funding and other incentives for encouraging compliance with the plans); and CAMERON
WHITMAN AND SUSAN PARNAS, FAIR HOUSING 23 and 29-30 (Washington, D.C. 1999). A
comprehensive planning process is already required of States and localities that receive certain federal
block grant funds for housing assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Recipients are required to assess and respond to community-wide needs as part of the Consolidated Plan
and Analysis of Impediments. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12701 and 5301 et seq. and 24 C.F.R. parts 91 and
570. Advocates for persons with disabilities have observed that this process must be used more
effectively to address the housing needs of persons with disabilities. Whitman at 30.
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3.

Ensure that all entities that provide treatment services are certified or licensed and that
licensure requirements are enforced.

All programs that provide therapeutic services, as defined by a state’s licensure and regulatory
scheme, must be subject to licensure and oversight. This ensures that individuals will receive high
quality care and that providers who do not conform to regulatory standards will either improve their
practices or face sanction. Licensure and oversight functions must be adequately funded so that
regulations are enforced and technical assistance is provided to programs that require help to improve
quality and compliance with standards of care. At the same time, localities must recognize and respect
the different roles that zoning and licensure play in the establishment of treatment services so as not to
impose zoning standards as an additional, yet unnecessary, means of quality control.
Oversight of group recovery homes is a particularly important concern in many communities
across the country. Group recovery homes are an essential source of housing to many individuals who
are without family supports or require a living environment that is removed from the influences of
alcohol and drug use. They also provide a continuum of services and support that many find necessary
to maintain sobriety. Group homes provide varying levels of services, ranging from the Oxford House
and faith-based sober living models that provide no therapeutic services to those that have therapeutic
services provided on-site by outside providers to those that provide therapeutic services that fall under
the state’s regulatory scheme. Ensuring that group homes operate effectively in neighborhoods is
critical for both therapeutic and community support purposes because they are imbedded in
neighborhoods and become the “face” of treatment.
Group homes should be subject to state oversight based upon whether they provide services that
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are otherwise subject to state regulation. While group homes that provide housing exclusively should
not be subject to any different oversight than the personal residence of persons with or without
disabilities, those houses must certainly comply with uniformly enforced occupancy and health and
safety codes that are applied to similarly situated housing. To the extent, treatment or other health
services are provided by outside professionals, it is those care givers who must be licensed to provide
the specific health service. The fact that those services are obtained in a residential setting should not
require the group home to be licensed, given that a private residence need not be licensed when health
services are delivered in the home.305
State and local governments can provide an incentive to residential services to comply with
licensure requirements and health and safety codes by ensuring that client referrals are made only to
those facilities that demonstrate compliance. As courts, probation and parole systems, and government
funded social service agencies increase their reliance on residential services and group homes, this
becomes an important mechanism to raise the level of group home services.306
4.

Implement practices that facilitate the inclusion of programs in communities and resolve
disputes.

A wide range of education practices must be implemented at the community level to ensure that
305 See Whitman, supra n. 304, at 28. Some have suggested that membership organizations representing

unlicensed group homes (those that provide housing exclusively) should develop standards to ensure
safe living environments. California Task Force Report, supra n. 165, at 12. In an effort to identify
which residential services should be subject to state licensure or certification, the California Task Force
identified four factors that would bring a group home under state regulation: the entity provides services
to residents; receives funding to provide housing or services to residents from sources other than the
resident’s personal income; requires residents to attend or participate in outside programs or activities;
and maintains records beyond personal biographical emergency data on residents. Id.
306 California Task Force Report, supra n. 165, at 12.
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treatment services are recognized as an asset and that community concerns are addressed. Local
officials must begin by implementing outreach programs to educate communities about treatment
services and non-discrimination requirements. Teams consisting of health officials, drug and alcohol
treatment experts, individuals in recovery, community organizers and law enforcement officials should
offer education programs to dispel myths and stereotypes about individuals who participate in treatment
and provide research-based information about the effect of treatment services on crime, drug and alcohol
use and other health problems, employment, and quality of life in communities. The teams should also
discuss state and local standards for certification and oversight and identify actions that residents can
take to report programs that do not comply with those standards. Local officials must also send a strong
message that non-discriminatory zoning standards will be enforced in all communities.
Treatment providers must also recognize the importance of establishing and maintaining good
community relations to both build support for their services and contribute to the neighborhood. To the
extent a locality adopts and stands behind a fair zoning standard, providers should be less concerned that
revealing their presence and engaging the community at an early stage of program development will
have a detrimental effect. The adoption of “good neighbor practices,” like those prepared by providers
and neighborhood associations in Baltimore and other jurisdictions, will also help providers demonstrate
their interest in working collaboratively with neighbors and helping them resolve community problems.
By including residents on the program’s advisory board and participating in neighborhood association
activities, providers will help educate community members about treatment services and create
opportunities to introduce the community to other providers who wish to establish services.
Neighborhood associations must also adopt “good neighbor practices,” which include a commitment to
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welcome qualified programs into neighborhoods and not oppose the siting of programs that agree to
implement good neighbor policies.307 This assurance will also make providers more comfortable
approaching community associations about plans for future programs and obviate the need for formal
notification requirements which violate non-discrimination standards.
Localities, working with community organizers and established treatment programs, must also
offer technical assistance to those providers that are hesitant or ill-equipped to work with neighborhood
associations. An effective way to address this need is to create or support an existing community-based
organization that can identify barriers to effective collaboration, help programs address deficiencies, and
mediate differences that arise between community associations and treatment programs.308
Conclusion
There is no “quick fix” that will eliminate opposition to community-based alcohol and drug
treatment services and ensure that these services can locate in communities. This article suggests that,
like other complex public health problems, the adoption of legislative and regulatory standards based

307 The Citizen’s Planning and Housing Association, working in collaboration with a group of treatment

programs, has developed a single “good neighbor” policy that contains commitments on the part of both
providers and communities. Community associations that adopt the policy agree that they will not
oppose the siting of a treatment program solely on the basis of the clients who will be served. The
policy is on file with the author. Many other organizations have developed and recommend the adoption
of “good neighbor” practices. See California Task Force Report, supra n. 165, at 12; and Whitman,
supra n. 304, at 12-13 and 30 (disability advocates emphasize that responsibilities under good neighbor
practices must be multilateral, with elected officials and neighbors having a duty to welcome group
homes and community residences and to educate themselves about non-discrimination standards, just as
providers and residents have a duty to be a good neighbor and correct breaches of that duty.)
308 As noted above, the Citizen’s Planning and Housing Association has performed this role in
Baltimore. See supra text following note 260. Portland, Oregon has a Community Residential Siting
Program in its Office of Neighborhood Involvement that provides information about siting, community
involvement guidelines and mediation/facilitation services. See http://www.bettercommunities.org.
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on federal non-discrimination standards, comprehensive planning, and community education will, in
the long run, be more effective in establishing treatment services than a sole reliance on litigation.
Successful expansion will also depend upon the investment of adequate resources to increase treatment
capacity to meet the demand for services and ensure the availability of high quality, comprehensive
services, including links to education, job training and placement, housing and family services where
appropriate. Modifications in health care financing in both the private and public sectors will also be
necessary to expand capacity, and those financing models must take into account that alcohol and drug
dependence are chronic, not acute, medical conditions.
There is no better time to begin to adopt these public health strategies. Politically, both the
public and policy-makers have grown weary of our Nation’s over-reliance on criminal justice policies
that impose huge financial and human costs, perpetuate racial discrimination, and do little to address
the underlying health and crime problems. Rapid advancements in scientific and medical research
now provide a solid foundation for relying on treatment and prevention strategies. And civil rights
standards that protect individuals with alcohol and drug problems have withstood many challenges in
this arena. It is time to pay serious attention to treating the “American Disease.”
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